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This research investigates how the EA modelling language ArchiMate can be ex-
tended to provide support for security modelling for application in the micromobility
enterprise context. EA methodologies enable the governance of large business struc-
tures and support the integration processes for IT systems. These benefits align well
with the current needs of enterprise security, with stakeholders showing increasing
interest in security governance and compliance. Micromobility enterprises are a good
candidate for EA security modelling as they utilise quickly emerging and evolving
technologies.
To investigate the unique, intersecting, context of ArchiMate, security modelling,
and micromobility enterprises; a four phase methodology was defined. First, a scop-
ing SMS study was held, identifying the current state of research and informing the
SLR methodology. Second, an SLR study was held, identifying 71 primary papers
for synthesis. Third, interviews within industry and government were performed to
enrich and contextualise the findings of the SLR. Fourth, the synthesis of the SLR
and interviews was completed.
The results of this research consist of four contributions. First, a mapping of
current micromobility research is provided through the SMS study. This outlines a
current lack of micromobility specific research. Second, an initial identification and
classification of micromobility specific security considerations is provided. Third,
interviews regarding micromobility, EA and security modelling provide deeper con-
textualisation of the research and finally, the SLR synthesis, which identifies current
issues, gaps in research and general findings.
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This research explores the duel contexts of Enterprise Architecture (EA) security
modelling and the emerging micromobility enterprise markets. With the develop-
ments of Internet of Things (IoT) and Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) technolo-
gies in the transport domain, two primary shifts can be observed – the establish-
ment of new forms of transport, and the emphasis on the secure and safe applica-
tion/implementation of these technologies. Part of this development was micromo-
bility vehicles such as electric scooters.
With the advent of micromobility vehicles came the wave of micromobility plat-
forms and industry, providing transport in urban centres through connecting con-
sumers with vehicles via smart phone applications. Enterprises offering Transport
as a Service (TaaS), micromobility enterprise in particular, are exposed, and ex-
pose to the public, a unique set of security and physical risk. Physical tampering
of provided vehicles, hacking and exploitation of application software, hacking of
the vehicle itself, and privacy concerns are primary considerations for this grow-
ing industry. Due to these unique risks micromobility enterprises need to provision
security as a primary aspect of their operation.
Enterprise describes an organisation or set of organisations which operate and
collaborate to provide a service or product to consumers. EA is one method which
has been leveraged in the past to provide governance of various aspects of an enter-
prises operation. Business process design, infrastructure design, development plans,
documentation, and identification of improvement opportunities are just some of the
benefits that enterprise architects enable through EA. Specific tooling has been de-
veloped alongside these methods in order to support their application. One primary
tool used by architects is modelling, in which aspects of the process are described
– either visually or formally. ArchiMate is a well regarded and widely cited ar-
chitecture modelling tool which is developed by The Open Group (TOG) for use
alongside their architecture framework and specialises in producing models which
describe, analyse, and communicate concerns of EA as they evolve over time [2].
ArchiMate, however, does not provide security as a primary concern within its
14
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
modelling framework making it difficult – if not impossible – to implement inte-
grated descriptions of security solutions, risk and possible attack vectors within its
overarching model. In the context of connected transport security governance and
development is a primary consideration for stakeholders within the enterprise. EA
and EA modelling is already poised to deliver value in regards to other aspects
of enterprise development at this level, so how can it be leveraged in the security
domain?
As well as answering this question, this research contributes as a first step in the
definition of the micromobility security landscape – an emerging conversation in the
wider context of connected and autonomous vehicles (AV’s). Micromobility offers a
unique instantiation of IoT/CPS/connected vehicle technologies due to its explosive
introduction and widespread utilisation in the last five years. The fast introduction
and implementation of these technologies, while beneficial in many aspects, has
also lead to security failures and dangerous scenarios. By utilising EA modelling
to provide security governance, these enterprises could perform agile adjustments
to their security posture and processes in a timely and cost efficient way, while
identifying security as a primary concern to their stakeholders.
This outlines the primary objective of this research – to identify how EA mod-
elling frameworks can be utilised to provide value to micromobility security concerns.
To achieve this objective three contributions are expected to be made. First, a con-
solidation of security in micromobility. Second, An understanding of current methods
of security modelling in both the EA context and wider modelling contexts. Finally,
an identification of the current EA security modelling solutions, their feasibility in
the micromobility context, and the identification of improvement opportunities.
This research is structured into seven chapters. Chapter two presents the his-
tory and background on the micromobility and EA concepts as well as framing the
research area. Chapter three presents the overall methodology followed during this
research and their justifications. Chapter four presents the results of the Systematic
Mapping Study (SMS). Chapter five presents the results of the Systematic Liter-
ature Review (SLR). Finally, Chapter six provides a discussion on the researches




This chapter presents the problem space the research is investigating, describing the
primary topics of Micromobility and EA. A history and description of these topics is
provided, enabling greater understanding of the motivation behind this topic – how
security, in the context of micromobility can be effectively and intuitively integrated
into ArchiMate.
2.1 Micromobility
The literal definition of micromobility describes travel (mobility) over a short dis-
tance (micro). Recently this word has been extended to the vehicle domain, denoting
a class of vehicle – supposedly first termed by Horace Dediu in 2017, a Romanian-
American industry analyst [3]. Micromobility, the class of vehicle, describes small
electric vehicles (EV’s) weighing below 500kg which implement some form of short
distance travel.
The growth in small connected EV’s has seen a steady increase in popularity
with governments and foundations, such as the Society of Automotive Engineers [4]
(SAE), providing further categorisation under the umbrella of micromobility. Along
side this, Micromobility Industries has provided a more detailed categorisation with
three characteristics that all micromobility vehicles fulfil. First, the vehicle must
weigh less than 500kg; Second the vehicle must be electric; and finally, the vehicle
must be utility focused [5]. Common vehicles conforming to this definition include
electric scooters, electric bikes, hover-boards and segways.
The definitions that micromobility institutions use, however, have been unable
to agree on one factor – whether or not micromobility vehicles are required to be
motorised (electric). On this topic Horace Dediu has written:
“This is the interesting thing, of course: we’ve had bicycles for a long
time. But what micromobility is, is a motorised vehicle. Earlier I said
micromobility is 500kg or less but I would amend that definition to
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include (a) having a motor and (b) being used for utility transport.”
[6]
In this way micromobility is not only a class of transport, but also a descriptive
term for the transformation happening within the transport domain. Some gov-
ernmental bodies and research agencies have defined micromobility as any form of
transport which weighs less than half a tonne. This would include, for example, push
bikes, skateboards and even roller-skates. This research uses the former definition,
including vehicles which are in some way enabled by an electric motor. The term
non-electric micromobility will be used to reference vehicles which are not enabled
by an electric motor.
Historically non-electric micromobility services were proposed for the first time in
Europe in 1975 in the form of a community bicycle program by Luud Schimmelpen-
nink [7]. Electric micromobility was first available to the consumer in 1996; however,
the wide adoption as seen today can be attributed to micromobility enterprise’s –
the first of which begun operations in late 2017.
2.1.1 Micromobility Enterprise
Micromobility enterprise has encouraged the wide spread adoption of micromobility
vehicles, providing mobility as a service (MaaS) to cities around the world. Busi-
nesses that provide these services are popping up around the globe (see Figure 2.1),
with many following Bird’s – a first mover and industry leader in micromobility
enterprise – lead in providing e-scooters to the public for rent.
Figure 2.1: New micromobility platforms per year (data extracted from [5])
MaaS business strategies integrate all stages of traditional travel – trip planning,
booking, ticketing and payments into one experience. A popular method of achieving
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this integration is through the mixture of smartphone applications and physical de-
vices in the public domain. Micromobility enterprises follow this strategy, providing
an app to consumers who can plan their trip, locate a vehicle, rent that vehicle and
arrive at their destination (see Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2: MaaS: Micromobility user timeline
The popularity of micromobility enterprise can be attributed to the increasing
desirability of short-distance transport in urban centres. Urban centres are becoming
increasingly congested, creating unpredictable travel times at peak hours and other
negative effects. Residents of Los Angeles, Sydney and Singapore spent an extra 25,
19 and 18 minutes respectively in traffic during rush hour [8] 1. In New Zealand,
Auckland residents spent 20 minutes longer travelling by car during congested times
– making micromobilities an attractive commute option for those who live there.
Other factors, such as cost and accessibility have also been cited in relation to
micromobilities new found popularity [9].
Other than benefits to the public, there are larger scale benefits that govern-
mental bodies are seeking from micromobility transport. For example, accessibility
of transport options for low-socioeconomic groups, reduction of pollution due to
transport and integration of last mile alternatives into the public transport system.
Perhaps the most widely cited benefit of micromobility transport is its environ-
mental impact. Micromobilities, by definition run off electricity, so in this sense they
are more environmentally friendly than vehicles which run off fuel, assuming an ap-
propriate portion of the electricity generated for the vehicle was generated through
sustainable means. This low emission running cost, coupled with the fact that short
trips in traditional vehicles generate the most emissions (see Figure 2.3) [10] has
poised micromobility to make substantial gains in this area.
1Statistics taken from 2019 due to COVID-19’s effect on 2020 data
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Figure 2.3: Short trips generate the most emissions (Extracted from [10])
Critics, however, have pointed to the short lifecycle that micromobility vehicles
often exhibit. Due to vandalism, theft and general environmental factors e-scooters
in August 2018 were shown to have an average lifespan of only 28.8 days [11]. Not
only does this produce more waste – and therefore more pollution – but it also affects
the profitability of the enterprise.
The poor lifespan of scooters is generally attributed to their design. Initial scoot-
ers deployed by the micromobility enterprise Bird were re-branded Xiaomi devices
intended for use on flat surfaces, in good weather and with a weight limit of 200
pounds [12]. These factors cannot be accounted for when running a business which
deploys these vehicles to anyone and everyone – potentially shortening the devices
lifespan. With the rise of micromobility enterprise however comes the rise of pro-
prietary supply chains. Enterprises such as Neuron [13] are selling vehicles like the
Neuron N3 e-scooter which are designed with the scooter sharing economy in mind.
With these adjustments, and the recycling of damaged vehicles, the lifecycle of mi-
cromobility vehicles will increase.
An overview of micromobility enterprises, and their supported transport tech-
nology is provided in Figure 2.1. This data is based upon the green paper provided
by Ramboll [14] and contains enterprises operating electric and non-electric micro-
mobility enterprises running around the world in 13 different cities.
2.1.2 Security in Micromobility Enterprise
With the advent of micromobility, the MaaS industry boomed with new and innova-
tive ways to provide transport to the public. Taking advantage of IoT technologies
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Table 2.1: List of micromobility companies (Extracted from [14])
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and cellular networks, each individual vehicle in an enterprise can be tracked through
Global Positioning System (GPS) data. This substantially lowers the risk of theft
and misuse through enabling non-repudiation. While the benefits afforded by con-
nected vehicles are great, with this added complexity comes security and safety
considerations.
IoT vehicles and micromobility vehicles contain tightly coupled security and
safety considerations due to their ability to cause physical harm to a user or a user’s
privacy. This is due to governance mechanics built into these devices in order to lower
the risk to an enterprise, effectively enabling the operation of MaaS business models.
Two primary governance benefits enabled by IoT/CPS technologies are the ability to
track vehicles through GPS data, and the remote access and/or control of vehicular
systems. These systems provide sufficient governance of an enterprise’s investment
to warrant providing expensive vehicles in the public domain – were tampering and
misuse are probable. These techniques, however, also introduce security concerns
tightly coupled to safety objectives. For example, the ability to remotely control
aspects of the vehicle requires an interface/API to be implemented, which exposes
the risk that this functionality is misused. A direct consequence of this is bodily
harm, which is represented as a safety concern. In this way, the coupling of security
and safety in the connected vehicles domain has grown in strength.
Micromobility enterprise, specifically, must be aware of security and safety as
licensing and operation agreements offered by governmental authorities, are depen-
dent on the perception of security and safety of the enterprise’s product. In this
sense, the business’ profitability relies on the perception of secure and safe systems.
Micromobility enterprises find themselves in a place of responsibility due to the
service they provide and must maintain high security and safety standards in order
to operate in a high risk context. This task is made harder due to the disruptive
nature of micromobility vehicles – infrastructure was not, and has not been provided
specifically for micromobility transport. There are no cycle-ways for micromobility
vehicles and the transport policy regarding how and where they should be utilised is
lacklustre. Collaborating with government transport departments to minimise these
risks should be considered as without proper precautions and policy in place the
view of micromobility may sour in the future.
A quick Google search of “e-scooter hack” will provide much evidence that the
security in regard to these scooters has been lacking. Exploits that range from re-
moval of a top-speed limiter to full theft and modification into personal devices can
be found on widely available networks such as YouTube, who seem to be ambivalent
regarding whether or not these videos are allowed on its platform. These exploits,
however, are comparable to ’script kiddies’ - that is, low skill exploits which are
inflexible. Due to the inherent inflexibility of these attacks it proves relatively easy
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to mitigate. More dangerous, in-depth exploits have been published such as the ap-
plication released by Zimperium, a mobile security company. The Zimperium blog
provides more context on the critical security failure:
“During our research, we determined the password is not being used
properly as part of the authentication process with the scooter and that
all commands can be executed without the password. The password is
only validated on the application side, but the scooter itself does not
keep track of the authentication state.” [15]
This exploit enables an array of attack scenarios, the most dangerous being
the ability to accelerate, or suddenly brake without the consent of the user. These
attacks were performed on a brand of personal scooter – the Xiaomi M365. This is
the same scooter that was repackaged for MaaS deployment, distributing vulnerable
units across the world.
For micromobility enterprise to be a sustainable business model in the future, the
security and safety of these systems needs to be demonstrable, warranting trust from
the public and governmental entities. An overview of the risk vectors associated with
connected vehicles is provided in Figure 2.4. Micromobility vehicles, as an instan-
tiation of connected vehicles, consist of similar vectors, however, the infotainment
systems and advanced/AV aspects are unlikely to be instantiated in micromobility
vehicles.
Figure 2.4: Connected vehicle risk vectors identified by Deloitte (Extracted from
[16])
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2.2 Enterprise Architecture
In 1987, John Zachman published the Zachman Framework, which has been cited as
the historical beginning of EA. From this point, EA gained popularity for its ability
to continuously integrate information systems into business processes, providing
strong governance over an enterprises business strategy.
In 1992, the first proposed EA planing methodology was published – providing
a method to create an instantiation of a target EA [17]. This method is abbreviated
into five steps provided in Figure 2.5 below [17].
Figure 2.5: EA planning methodology (Adapted from [17])
These steps define the “AS-IS” architecture and the “TO-BE” architectures,
identifying the transitional steps required to move from the fist state to the next. EA
saw a wide spread adoption past this point, with the American Federal Government,
through the Clinger-Cohen Act, requiring all its departments to develop consistent
architectures compatible with the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) EA model [18].
Modern EA practice has enabled a new role in the enterprise – the architect. The
architect is tasked with maintaining the organisation’s Information Technology (IT)
networks and services, and aligning them to business goals. This process involves
evaluating the current business structure, through metric and information gathering,
and identifying how the current “AS-IS” architecture needs to evolve in order to
support new business goals, aligning with industry best practice, providing process
optimisation and many other desirable objectives. During this process a model of the
current business is formed, which can also provide a means of evaluating efficiency,
security considerations, cost-effectiveness and other useful indirect metrics.
Over the years, industry professionals and academics have proposed EA frame-
works and methodologies, providing tools for architects. These tools help with stan-
dardisation, as well as quality control – identifying areas of enterprise which archi-
tects should focus on as well as methods of data collection and application. There
are several EA methodologies and frameworks available to enterprise architects to-
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day, with the most popular being TOG Architectural Framework (TOGAF), The








































EFigure 2.6: The history of EA (Adapted from [19])
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2.2.1 Visual Modelling Languages
Visual modelling is a well documented and utilised information communication for-
mat and is leveraged in many domains, including information visualisation, geo-
graphic information systems, software architecture, building architecture, among
others. Visual models provide a variety of benefits such as the ability to remove
or reduce complexity using abstraction, increase the understanding of the depicted
system through at a glance analysis by presenting information with low cognitive
overhead [20] and using intuitive modelling methods to provide understanding with-
out expert training.
Hall et al. [21] categorises visual modelling into three sets: Journalistic visuali-
sation, Scientific visualisation, and Critical visualisation. Journalistic visualisation
leads the narrative of the visualisation, telling a story of the data and leading the
reader to a predefined conclusion. It simplifies and explains complex processes and
lends itself to interactive mediums, such as interactive geolocation heat maps. Sci-
entific visualisation do not frame the data or processes they are representing and
provide an objective visualisation. As such they facilitate interdisciplinary commu-
nication between scientific communities, identifying a scientific principle or system.
Finally, critical visualisations enable user-lead enquiry and analysis. These methods
provide the tools and processes through which an user can enquire into aspects of
the visualisation.
Visual modelling languages have been researched and used extensively in software
modelling and constitutes a form of critical and scientific visualisation (depending
on the context) [22]. Visual models help ease understanding of complex systems,
explore and analyse design alternatives, provide an implementation road map, cap-
ture requirements, and communicate design decisions [23]. These benefits have been
leveraged in the EA method, providing critical visualisations and documentation of
EA systems. EA models facilitate analysis, communication and evolution strategy
between an architect and stakeholders. Visual modelling provides an unambiguous
specification of an EA AS-IS state which can then be used to elicit the next itera-
tion of the specification (the TO-BE state) and, in doing so, provide the road map
consisting of the required amendments to reach the TO-BE state.
2.2.2 Implementing visual modelling in EA
Visual modelling has been established as a valuable method of analysis and com-
munication in many contexts, and therefore there are many different methods of
implementing visual modelling. Yashchyshyn [24] provides three proposed frame-
works for modelling complex and heterogeneous systems.
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The three proposed critical visualisation frameworks are the multi-view mod-
elling, amorphous heterogeneity modelling, and hierarchical multi-modelling frame-
works [24]. Multi-view modelling proposes a set of distinct separate models which
represent different areas of the system which, when combined, provide a full de-
scription of the modelled system. To combine these models, a formal structure of
the model is defined, creating a structured and compartmentalised holistic model.
Amorphous heterogeneity modelling, similarly to multi-view modelling provides many
models, however, these are combined in an arbitrary way without regard to structure.
Finally, hierarchical multi-modelling combines multiple distinct modelling methods
using a hierarchical structure in order to take advantage of certain unique charac-
teristics at each level of the hierarchy.
Regardless of the chosen modelling framework, the specificity and generality of
the elements proposed within the framework is an important factor in dealing with
complexity. For example, composing a modelling language with general, unspeci-
fied elements provides the flexibility to deal with many modelling contexts. This
approach, however, can be prone to misrepresentation due to its lack of standardi-
sation and descriptive power. The opposite approach – providing specific elements
and relationships – improves understandability and descriptive power but can be
cumbersome and difficult for the layman to understand [24].
EA visual modelling is traditionally achieved through multi-view modelling due
to the layer conceptualisation of business processes and EA in standards such as
TOGAF, the Zachman Framework and the FEAF. ArchiMate is the primary EA
modelling language used today and is provided by TOGAF for use alongside their
architecture framework. Due to ArchiMates popularity it was chosen as the subject
of this research.
2.2.2.1 ArchiMate
ArchiMate was first proposed by a project team of Telematica Instituut in 2002 and
was acquired by TOG who re-released the modelling tool as ArchiMate 1.0 in 2009
(Figure 2.6). ArchiMate is specifically designed to be used alongside TOGAF, provid-
ing models and documentation supporting EAs. TOGAF is an enterprise framework
which describes methods and approaches for designing, planing, implementing, and
governing EA. The alignment of TOGAF and ArchiMate is shown in Figure 2.7.
While this alignment is not a one-to-one mapping of ArchiMate layers to TOGAF
processes, it does describe the general alignment between these concepts.
2.2.2.1.1 ArchiMate structure and elements
ArchiMate can be described at two levels of complexity. First, the ArchiMate core
framework which defines the concepts and relationships required to model EA. This
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Figure 2.7: TOGAF and ArchiMate alignment (Extracted from [2])
framework consists of three layers – Business, Application, and Technology, and
three cross cutting elements – Passive structure, Behaviour, and Active structure
(Figure 2.8a).
The Technology Layer identifies technology services (processing, sensing, storage,
servers, etc.) that support higher level applications. The Application Layer, enabled
by the technology layer, describes internal application services that support the
business. Finally, the Business Layer identifies the services and products offered to
consumers.
The three cross-cutting elements (Active structure, Behaviour and, Passive Struc-
ture) are classified as aspects. The Active Structure classifies structural elements and
processes which display actual behaviours (i.e. they are not acted upon, but act).
The Behaviour Aspect classifies structural elements which constitute the actions (or
behaviours) performed by actors classified in the Active Structure. Finally the Pas-
sive Structure classifies structural elements on which Actors classified in the Active
Structure perform behaviours upon [2].
The full ArchiMate framework provides three additional layers and one additional
aspect (Figure 2.8b). The layers are Strategy, Physical and Implementation & Mi-
gration. The Strategy Layer identifies capability, resources and course of action that
make up the overall strategies of the enterprise, supporting strategy execution. The
Physical Layer extends the Technology Layer providing a model which describes the
physical world - manufacturing, logistics and technology operating environments. Fi-
nally, the Implementation & Migration Layer relates elements (programs, projects,
and processes) to architecture which they implement, supporting migration planning
[2].
The additional aspect, Motivation, provides information on the motivational as-
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pects of each process/element in the architecture, providing traceability between the
underlying goals and reasoning behind its implementation.
In terms of the distinction of generalizable elements vs. specified elements dis-
cussed in Section 2.2.2, ArchiMate tends to provide general elements to allow flexi-









































(a) ArchiMate core framework
(b) ArchiMate full framework
Figure 2.8: Archimate core and full frameworks (Extracted from [2])
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2.2.2.1.2 Security modelling in ArchiMate
The Risk and Security Overlay (RSO) extension was proposed for ArchiMate 2.0 and
constituted the first direct component of ArchiMate to support security modelling in
EA. The RSO was developed in collaboration with security forums and TOG, based
on reviews of popular risk frameworks (TOGAF security guide, Sherwood Applied
Business Security Architecture (SABSA)) [25]. Using existing language elements,
the RSO specialises the element Business Event (from the business layer) into two
concepts; Threat Event and Loss Event. Elements from the Motivation layer are
also specialised into vulnerability, risk, control objective and control measure (see
Figure 2.9). These specialisations provide a notation and standardisation for risk
and security modelling in EA using ArchiMate.
Figure 2.9: ArchiMate RSO specialisation (extracted from [26])
The RSO has received criticism from academics who outline areas in which tra-
ditional risk management frameworks out perform it. Prince et al. [26] identifies
lacking areas by comparing the ontology of the RSO with the “common ontology
of value and risk”. The authors propose a redesign which includes new elements
to describe concepts such as threat capabilities, vulnerabilities of threat enablers
and assets at risk. One reason for why the RSO does not perform as well as these
other methods may be to do with TOG’s approach to ArchiMate. ArchiMate is a
lightweight modelling language, containing relatively few elements. This lends it-
self to simplicity, making the generated model easier for non-experts to understand.
Due to this simplicity, some of the required complexity in risk modelling may be
lost. The balance between simplicity and complexity is a distinguishing characteris-
tic of different modelling languages. For example, UML is complex and is afforded
greater flexibility for modelling complex processes. This, however, comes at the cost
of clarity – the relative opposite problem of ArchiMate.
Another criticism is the lack of a security aspect or layer in the ArchiMate
framework. This delegates RSO models to self-contained sub-models which are not
integrated into the holistic enterprise model. EA modelling methods need to be
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developed which integrate security modelling (risk and literal) into the holistic en-
terprise model, providing governance and evolution of these systems as an enterprise
grows.
2.2.3 EA security modelling and Micromobility
Micromobility enterprises, and MaaS enterprises generally, would benefit through
utilising EA methods due to their quickly evolving business models, complex supply
chain, third-party service integration, and complex governmental interactions. These
enterprises, however, are required to place more emphasis on the security of their
systems due to the safety implications of their service. EA modelling techniques,
while positioned to provide value in describing enterprise structure do not provide
sufficient methods of security modelling.
In EA models, security is often excluded from the wider description of EA and
regulated to self-contained models which do not facilitate the governance benefits
found within the primary holistic model. With the advent of MaaS and IoT/CPS
technologies, security has become a primary goal within these industries. This is
confirmed by observations within industry, which identified a growing interest from
stakeholders regarding governance of security processes [27]. EA methods need to
reflect this growing need and one way of doing so is extending EA modelling into
the security domain.
Providing a method of integrating security modelling into the EA methodology
would enable critical systems to be acknowledged, governance over the integration,
development, and implementation of new security measures while fitting within the




3.1 Epistemology and Ontology
The body of this research is based upon the theory of organisational knowledge
creation which constitutes a two-dimensional model of codification and abstraction
of knowledge. Using this theory, the method of combination – the creation of new
explicit knowledge from found explicit knowledge – is used during the synthesis of
information found within the SLR. Further, tacit knowledge is extracted from the
relevant domain through an interview methodology which, by using the method
of externalisation, is converted to explicit knowledge during the discussion section.
These concepts, and their underlying principles are given in [28].
3.2 Method Design
The research method followed in this research consisted of four phases. Phase one
involved a SMS study designed to identify the scope and appropriate configuration
of the larger SLR (Phase two), providing confidence in the correctness of the SLR’s
approach. Phase two used the findings of phase one to design a SLR study based upon
methods offered in [29] which provided the main outcome of this research. Phase
three supplements these findings with real world perspectives through interviews
with industry and government experts. Finally, the findings from these phases were
used to identify and analyse the research problem, providing insight on the solution
space and defining the unique security requirements of micromobility enterprises.
The overall method design is described in Figure 3.1
3.2.1 Scoping SMS
As micromobility enterprise and security modelling in EA are both emerging top-
ics a scoping SMS study was designed and performed to provide context on the
current state of research in these domains. The findings of this preliminary study
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Figure 3.1: Research Method
align the SLR to current research, providing the information necessary to mitigate
threats to its validity, such as potentially dismissing relevant research. The SMS also
considerably improved the quality of the search strategy used.
The SMS methodology was chosen due to its flexibility, relative overhead and
its well documented and defined method [30]. Unlike the SLR method, SMS’s are
primarily concerned with structuring a research area. This provides a good balance
between exploring the security modelling and micromobility research areas and pro-
viding actionable information for use in the SLR. Lower overheads in terms of quality
assessment, research rigour and the lack of synthesis - which is required in an SLR
[30], provides a method which can be completed in a timely manner while achieving
the required goals.
The SMS method was based on robust procedures defined in [30], providing
confidence in the procedures results and minimising the risk of researcher biases.
The SMS procedure itself is similar to an SLR’s procedure and requires search terms
and a search query to be defined. This query is executed on pre-selected databases
which return a set of research documents for further analysis. Through this method
research biases found within traditional thematic reviews are minimised and the
full range of research relating to the topics can be investigated. A further, in-depth
description of the SMS methodology is provided in the SMS chapter (Chapter 4).
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3.2.2 SLR
A hybrid SLR method (a method extending the traditional SLR methodology) was
selected for this research as it allows research from many domains to be collated and
synthesised together in order to provide an answer to the research question (RQ).
As this research spans many distinct domains (transport, connected technology, EA,
and modelling) the flexibility and completeness enabled by an SLR is beneficial.
SLR’s can be published as stand-alone contributions to their chosen field and
can help others understand a domain. They deliver concise overviews of the current
literature/evidence on a topic and through doing so can identify gaps in research,
providing valuable future research opportunities. No SLR (to the knowledge of the
author) has explored the emerging context of micromobility and EA, further consol-
idating the contribution such a work would bring. The chosen SLR method follows
procedures defined in [29], and minimises researcher and other biases to provide a
clear review of research related to the RQ. Different to SMS methods, SLR’s pro-
vide a synthesis of information gathered regarding the topic, providing a method to
identify and analyse the possible solution spaces for the RQ - one of the primary
goals of this thesis.
To extend this SLR and provide the most complete review, the forward snow-
balling method was implemented. Through utilising citation tracking provided by
Scopus, a wider array of research is able to be reviewed. This, in conjunction with
traditional SLR methodology (database searches), enables a complete and exhaus-
tive review of the literature. This additional process mitigates traditional limitations
of the SLR method, providing another avenue of research identification and enabling
greater recall of relevant research [31]. A further, in-depth description of the SLR
methodology is provided in the SLR chapter (Chapter 5).
Literature scope is defined by both recall – how much research is returned – and
precision – how applicable the returned research is. Three databases were selected
for the initial stage of the SLR (IEEE Xplore, Scopus, ACM DL) providing a large
recall of research. This is then followed by the snowballing mechanism with utilises
one database (Scopus) which has consistently provided the best precision, and recall
out of any database index [31]. Using this configuration good coverage of all rele-
vant research is achieved while also acknowledging diminishing returns when over
sampling from multiple databases.
3.2.3 Interviews
Interviews were selected as a method to enrich, corroborate and support the findings
of the SLR during the identification and analysis of the solution space. Interviews
provide valuable insight into industry and government, providing real world feed-
back on currently utilised solutions and needs. During the design of this research’s
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methodology, potential interview limitations such as low attendance were taken into
account due to the instability caused by the COVID-19 outbreak. To mitigate these
limitations more emphasis was placed upon the SMS and SLR which methods do
not rely on inconsistent factors.
3.2.3.1 Interview Protocol
Potential interviewees comprised of micromobility enterprises who operated within
New Zealand, academics who researched related subjects (security, transport, mod-
elling) and government departments who govern micromobility interactions within
urban centres. Contact information regarding these groups was identified through
either front facing interfaces (e.g. public emails) or was provided by contacts within
academia or industry.
After an expression of interest by the interviewees, an information and consent
form was distributed for signing and returning outlining the interview process, ex-
pected outcomes and information disclosure policy. All interviewees had the right to
withdraw from the interview at anytime, as well as the right to edit the transcription
of their interview in order to remove any sensitive information.
The interviews took place over the platform Zoom due to location and public
health circumstances. A recording of the interview was taken, and an automated
transcription was generated which was edited for readability and correctness. This
transcription was used for confirmation with the interviewees regarding the appro-
priateness of the data to be used, and for analysis purposes.
Finally, Excel was used to classify and breakdown each interview into useful
themes and observations on the research topic reported in Section 6.5.
3.2.3.2 Interview Structure
Due to the diversity of interviewees and discussion topics the semi-structured inter-
view method was selected due to its advantages. Semi-structured interviews combine
structured and unstructured interviews to promote an exchange of opinions and ideas
between both the interviewer and interviewee. This enables many topics to be ex-
plored through different perspectives, lending itself to a diverse range of interviewees
and topics. This also enables opinions on topics, of which the interviewee may not
be an expert on, to be explored.
Semi-structured interviews also lend themselves to a relaxing interview environ-
ment, stimulating interest in the research project and eliciting further information
than traditional structured interviews [32]. The overhead, however, for performing
these interviews is generally higher as the required research and planning before
hand is required to be more in-depth.
The interview consisted of three primary topics. First, a discussion on security
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in micromobility – its security concerns and aspects related to the unique security
proposition of micromobility enterprise was explored. Second, EA modelling – its ap-
plication and usage was explored. Finally, a discussion on the integration of security
into EA.
As these interviews followed the semi-structured methodology these questions
were subject to change during the interview based on respondents answers and
queries, as such the interview outline provided in appendix A serves as a general
framework, rather than an exact script used during the interviews.
3.2.3.3 Interview Analysis
Interview analysis was achieved through three steps. First, an automatic transcript,
generated by the Zoom service, was retrieved. This transcript was then cleaned and
edited for errors and readability. Finally, Excel was used to quantify each interview
into relevant statements on pertinent topics. In total, three interviews were held
with two interviewees from MaaS industry and one from a New Zealand government
agencies transport engineering department. Each interview took an average of 43
minutes.
3.2.3.4 Limitations
Due to contextual difficulties – COVID-19 affecting availability, large enterprise
mergers and general interview availability the sample size was negatively effected.
This impacted the diversity of responses which makes it unlikely to provide a com-
plete picture of industry. These effects were accounted for through strengthening the
contribution of the SLR through the addition of the snowball mechanism, mitigating
the lack of interview diversity, and increasing the SLR’s contribution.
As the interview structure covered heterogeneous topics, the semi-structured in-
terview format was selected providing the flexibility required when talking to domain
experts. A limitation of this approach is the lack of comparable interview answers.
This, however, was of little consequence when accounting for a small interview sam-
ple size.
As these enterprises are large, multi-national operations, their public facing cus-
tomer service and contact portals were often non-responsive or not responsible for
interview requests. Media contact portals offered similar service as interviews for
academic purposes was not their responsibility. These factors increased the diffi-
culty of contacting industry experts in these areas.
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3.3 Information synthesis
Phase four provides a synthesis of information gained throughout phase two and
three, answering the RQs and providing feedback on future research, trends, and
opportunities.
The synthesis method consisted of utilising the qualitative analysis tool Nvivo.
Nvivo enables the classification of textual information into nodes. Using this method,
data extraction can be performed by following a predefined set of nodes and cate-
gorisations, enabling a collation of like data. Once collated, a descriptive synthesis
on each node can be performed.
This method acts as the synthesis stage of the SLR, while also incorporating
interview findings through the externalisation methodology. Further details on the




This chapter presents the SMS and is divided into three primary sections. First the
SMS methodology is provided, identifying research questions, search strategy and
data extraction processes. Next, the results are presented, classified by each research
question. Finally a discussion and conclusion of the SMS is provided.
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 3, a preliminary SMS study was held to educate the larger
SLR study on its scope by identifying the current state of research. It also served
as feedback on possible search strings, terminology, and database selection further
minimising possible limitations of the SLR.
4.2 Methodology
An SMS was carried out in order to outline the current state of the art in the
EA, ArchiMate, security and micromobility intersection. The guidelines proposed
by Petersen et al. were followed [30], and a protocol was developed to support the
execution of the SMS.
4.2.1 SMS Research Questions
The research questions (RQs) stated in this study and their motivation are as follows:
RQ1. How are security aspects being incorporated into ArchiMate EA
models? To know what methods and techniques are being used to represent and
enable security modelling in ArchiMate.
RQ2. What elements are required in ArchiMate to model security
aspects in the context of micromobility? To identify a set of relevant security
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concepts needed to be supported by ArchiMate in order to fulfil a security model of
micromobility.
RQ3. What security pattern languages do micromobility companies
currently employ? To identify the security pattern languages used in the industry.
RQ4. What support do architectural modelling languages provide for
security in EA? To identify the reference architectures provided to support organ-
isations when modelling their EA.
4.2.2 Identification of primary papers
The main terms of the phenomena under study were: EA, ArchiMate, Security
and Micromobility. They were refined following an iterative approach based on pilot
searches. To improve the quality of the search, common keywords were collated from
directly relevant papers and standards such as ISO/IEC 25010 [33]. As suggested
by Kitchenham [34], we approached experts in the field as well as used other means
to increase the coverage of the keywords. The final terms used in the search string
are shown in Table 4.1:
Table 4.1: Search string terms
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The search scope was focused on peer-reviewed research papers published in
journals, academic conferences, workshops and books.
The inclusion criteria followed for the selection procedure were:
• Papers that satisfy the search string.
• Journals, conferences and workshop papers.
• Papers written in English.
• Papers published up to January 2020 (inclusive)
The exclusion criteria considered were:
• Papers not focusing on security and EA.
• Papers available only in the form of abstracts or PowerPoint presentations.
• Papers that present a summary of a workshop presentation.
• Duplicated papers (same papers in different databases).
Scopus, IEEE Xplore and ACM Digital Library were used as the main search
engines in order to preserve the quality of the papers. The fields used for retrieval
were title, abstract and keywords.
The search was executed on January 15, 2020. The total number of returned
documents was 987, with 883 from ACM Digital Library, 81 from Scopus and 23
from IEEE Xplore.
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After applying the inclusion and exclusion criteria 14 papers were identified as
primary papers. An expert on ArchiMate and security was consulted to recommend
papers for manual inclusion, resulting in additional two papers that were considered
for this review. However, none of them was accepted based on the inclusion and
exclusion criteria.
4.2.3 Data extraction
For data extraction purposes a template containing fields for paper ID, authors,
title, year of publication, publication title, document type, abstract, objective of
the paper, security aspects mentioned, application domain, methods or techniques
applied, and results was used.
The abstract of each study was analysed looking for keywords and their frequen-
cies. Once the keywords were found, they were grouped in four categories: process
area, application domain, security aspects and type of solution (see Table 4.2).
Table 4.2: Classification of keywords
Process area Application domain
Planning / Management / Control
Analysis / Design / Modelling CPS
Development / Implementation IoT
Validation / Evaluation / Assessment








After performing the data extraction phase, a descriptive synthesis was provided
in order to analyse each paper and discuss how they contributed to each research
question or background information in relevant domains.
4.3 Results
The results are organised by RQ while the primary papers are categorised by their
contribution to each RQs. Table 4.3 presents a mapping between primary papers
and each RQs.
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Table 4.3: Primary papers associated with the RQs
RQ Primary papers
RQ1 [35] [36] [37]
RQ2 [38] [39] [40] [41]
RQ3 [42] [43]
RQ4 [44] [45] [46] [47]
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of the papers per year and their publication
type. It can be observed that in the last six years the concentration of publications
has been at an average of 1.5 works per year. Only in 2016 no published studies
have been found.
Figure 4.1: Distribution of studies per year and type
In the next subsections, the primary studies are analysed in regards to their
contribution to each RQ.
4.3.1 RQ1. How are security aspects being incorporated
into ArchiMate EA models?
Three primary papers provided insight on “How are security aspects being incorpo-
rated into ArchiMate EA models?”.
The first two papers under analysis are authored by Korman et al., pursuing
a general idea of leverage for ArchiMate to provide security. Korman et al. [35]
investigate what data is required by a risk assessment (RA) process before it can
be executed. RA is a common process in cybersecurity and provides an outline of
different risk factors and a method to evaluate their influence on a system. Many
studies provide analysis of RA methods from the perspective of features offered,
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but none identified how much, or what kind of data was needed pre-execution [35].
Korman et al. provided a discussion on this topic and also explored how ArchiMate
2.0 could be used to model 12 RA process. The authors found that ArchiMate was
able to represent 7 of the 12 methods investigated with nearly full coverage, however
with varying confidence in their correctness.
Korman et al. [36] observed that authorisation and access control modelling was
rarely supported by EA modelling languages. To this end, the authors developed a
unified meta-model using ArchiMate which had the ability to describe a large set
of access control schemes. The paper also offers a set of examples in which this
meta-model is used to ascertain the correct configuration for access control.
In both papers, ArchiMate was used to model aspects of security RA and access
control schemes, however, neither used the RSO framework. The earlier paper [35]
was based upon the ArchiMate 2.0 architecture – before the RSO was released. The
later paper [36] was released at a time when the RSO was available, however, it is
not mentioned in the paper.
The third paper, by Mayer et al. [37], identified weaknesses in the Information
System Security Risk Management (ISSRM) model. The ISSRM model is a method
to identify and manage risks to the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA)
triad of an organisation’s assets. Some examples of weaknesses were: verbose doc-
umentation, inability to describe complex enterprise and difficulty in maintaining
continuous evolution. To improve upon these aspects Mayer looked towards EA man-
agement (EAM) to supplement ISSRM. The new model, EAM-ISSRM, was created
by identifying a set of four EA modelling frameworks, such as ArchiMate, and per-
forming a conceptual alignment of each to ISSRM. This comparison provided a set
of concepts which were not included in ISSRM, and thus were likely to be respon-
sible for the EAM languages superior performance in key areas. Drawing from this
set, the authors identified aspects of EA modelling to incorporate and produced the
EAM-ISSRM model. The model’s performance was found to be superior to ISSRM,
with better contextualisation, understanding of scope and maintainability of risk
management processes.
Mayer et al. [37] started with a security model (ISSRM) and improved upon it by
analysing EA modelling languages. This approach does not lend itself to identifying
how security aspects can be incorporated into ArchiMate, however, a conceptual
alignment is presented between ArchiMate 2.1 and ISSRM providing details on how
ArchiMate and ISSRM compare in their operation. ISSRM is a security-focused
domain model; therefore, this comparison provides insight on security concepts not
included in ArchiMate, similar to the method used to identify concepts that were
lacking in ISSRM.
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These papers outline some of the ArchiMate’s capability to represent security
concepts; however, each paper identifies limitations in the security modelling im-
plementation that TOG has proposed. It is also important to note that each paper
utilises different versions of ArchiMate, ranging from ArchiMate 1.0 to 2.1. The cur-
rent version of ArchiMate is 3.1, with flexibility in various areas. The improvements
afforded by v3.1 will need to be identified when applying knowledge from these
papers.
4.3.2 RQ2. What elements are required in ArchiMate to
model security aspects in the context of micromobil-
ity?
Five primary papers provided insight on “What elements are required in ArchiMate
to model security aspects in the context of micromobility?”.
Anwar and Gill [38] explored how Digital Ecosystems (DE) – systems which
support the interaction of people and third-party data service providers – can be
modelled using EA languages. ArchiMate and six other modelling standards were
compared to a well-established language in the DE domain – Adaptive Architec-
ture Meta-Model (AAMM). This evaluation outlines how EA modelling standards
often are unable to support DE modelling without modification due to DEs’ wider
scope. The authors define political and economic layers, which reside under the
environment scope of DEs. This wider scope introduces complexity, which is not
supported by many EA modelling standards. Anwar and Gill’s paper outlines the
differences between ArchiMate and other EA modelling standards such as SABSA,
Agent-oriented modelling Language (FAML) and AAMM. A comparison between
ArchiMate and SABSA – a well-known security architecture framework – can be
drawn in order to evaluate potential elements and concepts that should be included
in the ArchiMate language.
In a different paper, Pavleska et al. [39] developed a method to evaluate EAs
based on the Electronic Simple European Networked Services (e-SENS), a reference
architecture developed to provide cross-border and cross-sector digital services. The
method’s goal is to evaluate each architecture in terms of cybersecurity by analysing
their performance regarding a set of relevant security goals provided by the Refer-
ence Model for Information Assurance and Security (RMIAS) and the European
Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) guidelines. Pilot programs were run to
test the validity of the method, evaluating different e-SENS architectures in regards
to five aspects: security goals, countermeasures, information taxonomy, system se-
curity lifecycle and trust models. This paper demonstrates a method of evaluating
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an architecture using a set of security guidelines - a method that could lend itself to
identifying what elements ArchiMate needs to support for cybersecurity.
A desirable trait in computer systems and software is interoperability; however,
interoperability often comes at the cost of security as they embody opposing quality
attributes. In Shariati et al. [40], an analysis of a set of architectures and frame-
works is provided, investigating how these frameworks unify interoperability and
security. The selected frameworks all implemented versions of Enterprise Informa-
tion Security Architecture (EISA) and were, by the authors’ definition, holistic in
their approach. Each framework was evaluated on three interoperability aspects:
Technical, Organisational, and Semantic, with the authors concluding that security
was often overlooked for interoperability performance. This paper identifies EISA
as an important security reference architecture which should be investigated to as-
certain security requirements, and therefore security elements for ArchiMate. The
paper, however, does not describe in-depth the reasoning for evaluating frameworks
as supporting or not supporting each interoperability aspect.
Solhaug and Seehusen [41] investigated risk management in critical infrastruc-
ture. Critical infrastructure offers specific challenges such as the need to continuously
maintain the validity of the risk model. The authors offer a model which enables
the continuous analysis and re-analysis of the target system by addressing only the
risks that may be affected by any changes made. This streamlines the process and
increases the speed at which risks can be evaluated. The model also facilitates on-the-
fly modelling of syntactically correct CORAS diagrams [48] and supports arbitrary
languages for target modelling, among other advantages. The CORAS risk mod-
elling language is of particular note here as it defines a language (with extensions)
that can present threat scenarios. A conceptual alignment of this language with
ArchiMate would help indicate areas of improvement for ArchiMate and provide
additional direction in the creation of security elements.
Alhadad et al. [49] implemented risk management by first defining a method
for modelling a system – SOCIOPATH. The chosen modelling language is UML
class diagrams where the authors abstract systems into two “worlds”: first, the
digital world, which is concerned with computer-centric processes, and second, the
social world which is concerned with persons, physical resources and their relations.
Alhadad et al. [49] then propose SOCIOTRUST, a method for producing a trust
assessment of the model generated via SOCIOPATH, specifically by the derivation
of formal rules that define relations between elements in the model. These rules are
a complete way of defining the possible relations in the modelling language and are
a suitable method for the development of any extensions to the ArchiMate language.
The five papers summarised above outline a set of methods that could be used
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to elicit element requirements. A comparison or conceptual alignment could be done
between ArchiMate and other modelling languages that provide support in the secu-
rity domain, potentially identifying concepts that ArchiMate is lacking. From there
new elements would be investigated to achieve the required representation. These
steps should be taken, however, after the domain of micromobility has been investi-
gated and its security requirements considered. As a whole, there seem to be many
methods for improving frameworks and modelling languages, with most drawing
upon other languages or frameworks that achieve the desired effect.
4.3.3 RQ3. What security patterns languages do micromo-
bility companies currently employ?
Two primary papers provided insight on “What security patterns languages do mi-
cromobility companies currently employ?”.
In order to evaluate what elements are required in a modelling language, an
understanding of the domain to be modelled is paramount. This can be achieved
through looking at pattern languages.
In the first paper, Hafiz et al. [42] attempted to collate security patterns found
in software engineering into an ontology. In total, the authors unified 96 distinct
security patterns as well as described the method they used to create the ontology.
The authors discuss how patterns are harder to identify in the software domain
as software is intangible and difficult to measure. Because of this, they call for
other researchers to build upon their patterns to produce a more complete ontology.
Using this ontology as an evaluation tool, an analysis of a modelling language and
its coverage of the security domain can be conducted.
Pattern languages are more flexible as they do not utilise categories but rather
connections between patterns – a type of ontology. The authors utilised pattern
languages as other categorisation methods did not guide practitioners in selecting
the correct pattern. Sources of information, modelling languages and the cataloguing
of each pattern are all documented and would serve well as a reference for building
a security pattern language around micromobility.
In the second paper, Janulevičius et al. [43] produced another security ontology,
however, pertaining to a more specific cloud computing domain. Instead of evaluating
patterns used by practitioners, the authors elicited requirements from sources such
as the Cloud Security Alliance and other NIST recommendations. Many vendors
in the cloud computing domain develop unique implementations of security that
are not inter-operable because of their specific applications. This ontology seeks to
standardise the vendors’ approach in order to increase interoperability.
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4.3.4 RQ4. What support do architectural modelling lan-
guages provide for security in EA
Four primary papers provided insight on “What support do architectural modelling
languages provide for security in EA”.
EA modelling languages are designed to present EAs in a digestible, informative
and useful manner. Nakagawa et al. [44] presented the Knowledge-based Architec-
ture Framework (KRAF), which provides a method to identify the knowledge found
within reference architectures in the software domain. In this framework, knowledge
is decomposed into four elements: domain, application, infrastructure and crosscut-
ting elements, which are further decomposed into various attributes.
A reference architecture is considered complete when it provides coverage of all
knowledge attributes. KRAF does not specifically address security in its components,
rather, security is split among each of the elements. This supports the observation
made by Demir et al. [45] in which security is often not explicit in architectural
design, but is divided between components. As such, support for security elements
in EA languages is often underdeveloped. The KRAF framework could be used to
validate an EA language as the elements included in the language are required to
be able to express the four elements of knowledge and their respective attributes.
Baloyi and Kotzé [46] introduced ICAMP (IoT and CPS Architecture-based
Model for Data Privacy), a new reference architecture model designed to promote
privacy on both the technological layer and the organisational layer. ICAMP is a
promising reference architecture which enumerates upon many topics that are of
interest. For example, its data management perspective helps ask and answer the
questions mentioned above.
Demir et al., [45] and Pulkkinen et al. [47] consider transmission across bound-
aries at different levels of abstraction. Demir et al. [45] discussed the architecture
of distributed systems and how security features are often not self-contained com-
ponents but written manually into components of which security is a concern. The
authors proposed a new architecture DISCOA, which implements a conceptual unit
“aspects”. Aspects can modify the architecture of a distributed system, delivering
crosscutting functionality between components. This enables security to be removed
from individual components and unified. In [47] the authors discuss communication
at a higher layer of abstraction – between enterprises, and how security can be im-
plemented at the interface between enterprises as secure communication between
enterprises is beneficial to a large array of services.
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4.4 Discussion
Although the SMS identified relevant background information on the state-of-the-
art in ArchiMate, EA modelling and security, the results obtained outlined a gap in
current academic research around security practices that micromobility enterprises
employ.
The lack of research was expected as micromobility is a relatively young field of
transport. Nevertheless, it has been observed that last year (2019) resulted to be
the year with most number of papers published in regards to micromobility, which
points to an increasing interest in the topic. This impetus of the research is being
primarily generated by the transport sector, with more calls for papers regarding
micromobility being issued [50]. This “bubble” of research coincides with a shift to
alternative, sustainable transport initiating a mode shift in cities around the world
[51].
The lack of research into micromobility and security, as found by this SMS, is
due to the emerging nature of the topic in the security domain. Because of this,
the results underwent the necessary adjustments to provide useful information by
expanding the micromobility domain to its relevant components (i.e. IoT and in-
formation security). Since this SMS was performed, applicable papers have been
published, illustrating the growing research on the topic. Vinayaga-Sureshkanth et
al. published a paper discussing security considerations in the micromobility do-
main in 2020 [52]. The authors identify seven potential attack categories along with
their suggested countermeasures. The limitation of the report however stems from
its scoping of micromobility vehicle, solely focusing on e-scooters, and the fact – as
identified by the authors – that micromobility is a quickly evolving domain.
Li et al. released a ‘research-in-progress’ paper in 2019, discussing privacy im-
plications of micromobility enterprises [53]. The proposed study provides insight in
the perception of privacy regarding e-scooter enterprise. This will help define the
relationship between sharing economy businesses and privacy. Other recent research
regarding micromobility focuses on exploitation examples of micromobility vehi-
cles. Booth and Mayrany provide a report detailing the successful attacks against
e-scooters [54]. The authors also provide a DREAD RA of each threat identifying
spoofing and replay attacks as the most vulnerable.
Regarding RA and risk management, these resulted in the most common pro-
cesses to be considered by EA modelling languages. The only provided support that
ArchiMate features is that of the RSO. Even though security aspects must be con-
sidered when modelling an EA, the balance between simplicity and complexity is a
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distinguishing characteristic of different modelling languages. Using the context of
micromobility, ArchiMate’s limited security modelling can be improved while also
producing a timely security framework defining micromobility class vehicles and
their associated security concerns.
In addition, security aspects related to IoT and CPS as well as current security
practices performed by micromobility companies need to be investigated. Areas of in-
terest include data security, access control, tamper resistance, information protection
and RA, among others. There is discussion on using multiple modelling languages
simultaneously when implementing EA to provide the holistic view of the company:
BPMN for specific business processes and UML for complex low level processes [55].
This however requires an architect, or team of architects, to undergo significantly
more training. The resulting model is also likely to be overly complex, making it
difficult for the model to fulfill its purpose – a clear description of an enterprise that
non-experts can analyze.
To mitigate validity threats, this SMS was based on sound procedures [30], [34]. A
protocol for the study was created in order to minimize the impact of selection bias.
The paper selection was carried out by the first author, with subsequent verification
of the outcome by the second author. The same approach was followed for the
data extraction process, where a template was created for extracting the verbatim
data from each primary paper. Three databases were considered for mitigating the
publication bias while a manual search was performed through a consultation with
an expert in the field.
4.5 SMS conclusions and future work
The study revealed that the interest in modelling security in EA has increased
in the last six years. However, the proposed modelling alternatives still present
shortcomings related to the standardization, complexity and completeness.
There is a need for reference models, security standards and regulations in the
context of micromobility in order to enable an accurate and effective representation
through modelling languages. While the elements, extensions and frameworks found
in the literature are mainly focused on dealing with RA, there is a need to design
a methodology that allows enterprise architects to analyze and implement security
aspects. Moreover, by providing a way for representing security aspects, further
recycling and testing of existent solutions will be possible.
This SMS presented initial findings of the research area, providing valuable feed-
back on search strategy, research scope and expected results. Future work includes
an in-depth SLR (Chapter 5) drawing from these findings in order to answer the
50
CHAPTER 4. SMS 4.5. SMS CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
proposed RQs. There are four direct contributions this SMS provided for the future
SLR. First, a general overview of the research contexts and current academic work in
the area was provided. Second, analysis and procurement of the most representative
search terms for the selected contexts. Third, the refinement of proposed research
questions and, finally, improving search strings.





This chapter presents the SLR methodology in detail, and its associated limitations.
Next an analysis of the results is provided identifying trends of the retrieved primary
papers and relevant statistics such as citation count. Finally, the body of this chapter
provides the SLR’s qualitative synthesis in which the primary papers are explored
and discussed.
5.1 SLR Method
The SLR method carried out in this research followed the guidelines established in
Kitchenham’s report on SLR procedure [29] and was optimised with the previously
run SMS chapter (Chapter 4) and the associated paper published at the Software
Engineering and Advanced Applications (SEAA) conference in 2020 [1].
A primary influence the SMS scoping study had on the SLR was the widening of
the micromobility domain to include parallel domains like IoT/CPS and connected
vehicles. This decision was made after it was found that micromobility specific re-
search was scarce in academia [1] opening another contribution opportunity for this
research.
According to Kitchenham, the SLR method is composed of three phases. First;
the planning phase in which the need of a review is identified and the review pro-
tocol is developed. Second; the conducting phase of the review executes the review
protocol, selecting the primaries and providing data synthesis. Finally; the report
phase of the review in which the conclusions and discussion on the data are provided.
The planning phase will be discussed here, with the conducting phase described in
section 5.3 and the report phase discussed in Chapter 6.
5.1.1 Planning Phase – Review Protocol
During the planning phase a review protocol was defined before the SLR execution,
reducing the likelihood of selection, publication and other biases. Five components
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are included within the review protocol:
1. Research Questions
2. Search Strategy
3. Study Selection Criteria
4. Data extraction strategy
5. Data synthesis strategy
5.1.1.1 Research Questions
The objective of the SLR was to answer the four primary RQs of the thesis.
RQ1: How are security aspects being incorporated into ArchiMate EA
Models?
The SLR provides information regarding ArchiMate modelling techniques specif-
ically in the domain of security modelling.
RQ2: What elements are required in ArchiMate to model security aspects
in the context of micromobility?
The SLR provides information regarding relevant security concepts applicable to
micromobility vehicles and services. This information will help inform what types
of elements may be required to provide a security model of these systems.
RQ3: What security strategies do micromobility companies currently em-
ploy?
The SLR provides what mitigation processes and strategies that are likely to be
used in the micromobility context.
RQ4: What support do architectural design languages provide for security
in EA?
The SLR provides additional information on security modelling in the broader
context of architectural languages.
5.1.1.2 Search Strategy
The search strategy identifies what the process of the SLR will look like and also
what components of the process, such as the search string and data sources, will
include.
Search Terms
The search terms were developed by identifying the primary topics covered in the
RQs. Five topics were extracted:
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From these topics, alternative and descriptive search terms were identified draw-
ing from key words found in relevant literature, industry standards and finally, the
previously mentioned scoping study.
Once the unique set of string terms were identified, analogous terms were identi-
fied for each term to decrease the possibility of relevant literature being excluded. For
example, the term IoT has the analogous term “Internet of Things”. Further analo-
gous terms were identified through understanding each databases search algorithms,
and their specific syntax rules. This lead to terms that involve hyphens having two
additional analogous terms. An example of this is the term “non-repudiation” in
Table 5.1.
Implicit analogous terms were also included through database inclusion mecha-
nisms. For example, alternative spellings (US vs British spellings) are automatically
included within the search query. For example, including the term “modelling” au-
tomatically includes its US counterpart, “modeling”.
The final search string is shown below with Table 5.1 displaying the main search
terms and their accompanying alternative terms.
(“Enterprise Architecture” OR EA)
AND
(Archimate OR TOGAF OR “architecture framework” OR “modelling language” OR ontology)
AND
(“business modelling” OR “enterprise modelling” OR “conceptual modelling” OR
“meta-modelling” OR meta-modelling OR “meta modelling” OR modelling)
AND
(Security OR privacy OR dependability OR trust OR assurance OR integrity OR confidentiality
OR accountability OR authenticity OR “non-repudiation” OR non-repudiation OR “non
repudiation” OR “risk management”)
AND
(IoT OR “internet-of-things” OR “internet of things” OR internet-of-things OR IIoT OR
“industrial internet of things” OR “cyberphysical systems” OR CPS OR micromobility OR
“micro-mobility” OR micro-mobility OR “micro mobility” OR transport))
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Table 5.1: Search string terms
Begin of Table
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Three databases were chosen for the initial search, mitigating publication bias and
providing good quality material for the review. The chosen data sources were IEEE
Xplore, Scopus and ACM DL.
Snowball Strategy
The SLR was extended via a snowballing mechanism to increase the scope of the
review and to provide the most complete review possible. Forward snowballing re-
trieves all papers which reference the selected primaries of the previous iteration. In
this way an exhaustive search is possible, identifying all referencing articles until no
new articles are found.
In contrast to backwards snowballing, forward snowballing investigates progres-
sively more recent publications – a benefit in regards to the chosen contexts as
micromobility and EA are both recent phenomena.
Scopus was the chosen database for this method as it provides the tools necessary
to identify referencing publications and has access to a large amount of research on
appropriate subjects.
5.1.1.3 Study Selection Criteria
Selection criteria are divided between exclusion criteria and inclusion criteria. Three
exclusion criteria and two inclusion criteria were defined for the SLR:
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1. Exclusion Criteria
(a) Research which are duplicate entries
(b) Research that was categorised as book or book section results
(c) Research that had no available full text
2. Inclusion Criteria
(a) Research written and published in English
(b) Research that presents information aligned with the SLR RQ’s
Criterion 1a removes duplicate research results which were introduced either
by multiple databases reporting the same research or the introduction of already
excluded/included research by the forward snowballing process. Criterion 1b removes
research categorised as a book or book section as the SLR is reviewing research
papers (conference papers, journal articles). This provides research of reasonably
comparable scope and contribution. Criterion 1c removes candidate research if the
full text for the research was unavailable through university portals or open access.
Criterion 2a includes research presented in English due to time limitations and
translation quality/accessibility. Criterion 2b includes research who’s title, abstract
and full text align with the RQs and goal of the SLR. When a study is able to
pass all of the inclusion/exclusion criteria it is classified as a primary study for the
review.
5.1.1.4 Data Extraction Strategy
Nvivo was selected as the primary data extraction tool due to its ability to classify
qualitative data into contextual classifications. The data extraction strategy followed
four steps. First, each primary paper was classified into four categories denoting
which of the four RQs it contributed to.
Second, a thematic review of each RQ in regards to the primary papers was
performed. Third, the discovered themes were codified in Nvivo, providing nodes
of which sections of primary papers could be associated. An example classification
scheme is shown in Figure 5.1).
Finally, an exhaustive review of each primary paper – its contributions to one or
more themes and RQs were extracted for future synthesis. During this exhaustive
review supplementary sub-nodes were provided ad-hoc enabling the most complete
and valuable synthesis possible. Nvivo classification schemes for each RQ are pro-
vided in Appendix A.
5.1.1.5 Data Synthesis Strategy
Using the devised nodes for each RQ provided during the data extraction phase,
synthesis is able to be achieved through performing a descriptive synthesis on each
57
5.1. SLR METHOD CHAPTER 5. SLR
Figure 5.1: Classification scheme used to describe RQ2 themes
individual node. Each node contains the full set of information (as regarded by the
researcher) on the associated topic and, during synthesis, can be broken into smaller
individual nodes to aid in understanding and collation. As the returned primaries
from the SMS scoping study (Chapter 4) were mostly heterogeneous and qualitative
in nature, no strict meta-analysis process was pre-defined.
This process uncovers trends and information relevant to the RQ’s, providing a
platform for synthesis and discussion on the desired topics.
5.1.2 Limitations
Primary limitations of the SLR were addressed through the addition of the snow-
balling method, extending the search radius, providing an exhaustive mechanism
and identifying state-of-the-art research. Other limitations potentially include lack
of databases for the initial database search. The databases chosen for the SLR were
three well regarded databases that the University of Canterbury had access too
during the course of the research.
The selected snowballing mechanism’s limitations include being limited to one
database and not including backward snowballing. The effect of these limitations
however is theoretically negligible as shown by [31], which identifies Scopus (the
database used for snowballing) as being the database with consistently good recall
and precision in terms of returned literature. Not including backward snowballing
is negated by the relatively young field of research.
Non-English research was excluded through the inclusion/exclusion criteria, which
may exclude relevant research. This was necessary due to the complexity associated
with understanding non-translated works, and the time restraints associated with
such a task.
As the scoping SMS identified much of the returned research as qualitative, quan-
titative analysis has been excluded from the SLR synthesis. Quantitative synthesis
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in SLR’s can be a useful way to measure metrics of a given domain and also provide
a method of quality assessment. This leads to the difficulty associated with qual-
ity assessment in regards to heterogeneous, qualitative research. Quality assessment
requires a like aspect or metric to be measured between selected primary papers
which can then provide a relative assessment regarding the quality of the works [29].
This was implausible, as indicated by the SMS, as the heterogeneity of the search
domains (Micromobility, Security, EA) made it very unlikely to identify like aspects
between returned research. For this reason quality assessment was forgone.
5.2 Results and Analysis
Running the process as described above, a total of six snowball iterations were
required after the initial search in order for no more primaries to be selected. The
initial search yielded 943 references, with ACM DL providing 858, Scopus providing
56, and IEEE Xplore providing 28. A total of 27 were designated as primary papers
and were used as the seed for the first snowball iteration.
The snowball results were as follows:
• Snowball one yielded 264 references from Scopus with 16 of these designated
as primary papers.
• Snowball two yielded 175 references with 11 of these designated as primary.
• Snowball three yielded 72 references with 9 of these designated as primary.
• Snowball four yielded 26 references with five of these designated as primary.
• Snowball five yielded 19 references with three of these designated as primary.
• Snowball six yielded one paper which was not designated as primary, conclud-
ing the exhaustive snowball process.
A total of 72 primary papers were extracted for their contributions to answering
RQs one through four. A detailed breakdown of this process and results can be found
in Figure 5.7, providing metrics at each stage of analysis per snowball. Figure 5.7
also provides information on references that were excluded due to their full texts
being unavailable through the University of Canterbury portals.
5.2.1 Meta analysis
The following meta-analysis consists of four sections. First, a discussion on the pub-
lication years of the primary papers and their trends. Second, predominant authors
are outlined, providing an overview of authors who contributed the most to the set of
primary papers. Third, primary paper types and their associated citation statistics
are discussed, and finally, a contribution analysis is provided discussing the overall
contributions of the primary papers to the RQs and topics.
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5.2.1.1 Publication Year
Figure 5.2: Publication years of primary papers
The overall publication years of the primary papers is provided in Figure 5.2. A
general trend shows more recent papers being included in the study. There are two
primary factors for this. First, forward snowballing was used during the collection
process, which specifically identifies papers who cite the previous iterations primary
papers. This method will always identify more recent papers than the previous
primaries.
Second, the domain that is being investigated is relatively new. Information
security and cybersecurity in general has gained traction over the last 10-20 years
with security related to IoT and CPS applications being even more recent. EA,
architectural modelling, and security modelling are also a more recent phenomena.
Supporting the duel nature of these factors, the initial search of the collection
process (which does not rely on forward snowballing) identified papers from 2005
onward, highlighting the emerging nature of these domains.
Figure 5.3 identifies this trend in terms of RQ contribution. As expected RQ1,
which relies on ArchiMate, only saw research contributions from 2014 onward, with
an increase in the later years. This is due to the publication timeline of ArchiMate
standards, and the release of the RSO, a TOG supported risk overlay for ArchiMate.
RQ2 and RQ4 both have the earliest contributions in the form of some formative
work regarding architectural modelling and information security. All RQs show an
increasing amount of interest in the academic domain, as security and methods of
governing security become more important in the industry domain.
5.2.1.2 Predominant Authors
Authors who were involved with the writing of 3 or more primary papers are pre-
sented in Figure 5.4. A more detailed table containing these authors and their asso-
ciated publications can be found in Appendix B.
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Figure 5.3: Contributions per year per RQ
Figure 5.4: Predominant Authors and their associated publications
Figure 5.4 visualises all publications that each author worked on. As can be
seen, these authors who contributed three or more primaries often worked on joint
papers, publishing 19 of the 71 primary papers in this study. Two of these authors,
Lagerström and Mathias, where involved in nine papers each, co-authoring four
papers together on the topic of security modelling, and security modelling tools.
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5.2.1.3 Primary Paper Types and Citation Statistics
A total of 29 papers were journal articles and another 42 were conference papers
(Figure 5.5a).
The citation statistics for this section were collected from Scopus on February
04, 2021. The average citations for the primary papers was 9.9 citations per paper,
with a median of four. A total of 12 papers had zero citations while seven papers
had over 20 citations each. The citation distribution is provided in Figure 5.5b and
shows the majority of primary papers maintain ten citations.
Papers with zero citations tended to be recently published, with nine of the 12
papers being published in 2019 and 2020. This may explain the lack of citations of
these works.
(a) Categorisation of Primary Papers
(b) Distribution of citations over all primary
papers
Figure 5.5: Primary paper type and citation statistics
5.2.1.4 Contribution Analysis
This section describes major contributors to the SLR, as well as a general overview
of the contributions in each RQ.
5.2.1.4.1 Overall Contributions
In total, six primary papers contributed to RQ1, 29 to RQ2, 32 to RQ3 and 26
to RQ4. A set of 22 primary papers contributed to more than one RQ - a more
detailed analysis is provided in Table 5.3. Figure 5.6 provides an overview of the
percent contribution by primary paper to each RQ.
RQ1 has relatively few primary papers associated with it due to its narrow scope.
RQ1 specifically identifies papers discussing ArchiMate in the context of security
modelling, a topic with a more direct scope than the other RQs.
RQ2 and RQ3 were found to account for a substantial portion of the 22 primary
papers who contributed to more than one RQ. This is due to the similarity of their
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Figure 5.6: Contribution percent per RQ
domain - many papers which identify security requirements of systems (and thus help
answer RQ2 ) also provide overall frameworks and security methodologies (helping
answer RQ3 ).
Finally, RQ4 exhibits the most self-contained papers, that is the primary pa-
pers referenced within this RQ are not shared across RQs, and only appear once
within sub-sections of the RQ (Table 5.3). The scope of RQ4 contained that of RQ1,
identifying generally what security mechanisms architectural description languages
afforded, and thus more primary papers were associated with it.
5.2.1.4.2 Topics by contribution
Metrics can be derived from each topic by analysing the number of primary papers
which contribute to each. Through this method, topics with the highest contributions
and lowest contributions can be identified.
Table 5.2a identifies sections and topics which received the most contributions
from the primary papers. These sections constitute the Method of Security (3.2.1,
e.g. RQ3, Topic 2, Section 1), Attack Vector Considerations (2.1.3), Element design
(2.2), and Security Standards (3.3.1). In general, RQ2 and RQ3 contain the most
contributions in this research as discussed above.
Sections which contained the least contributions were Application domains (2.1.5),
Architectural Standards (3.3.4), Other Standards (3.3.5), and Literature Reviews
(4.5.1), see Table 5.2.
These findings, while indicating sections with high and low levels of contribution
do not indicate a definite cause for this, as categorisation bias can play a major role
in the classification of contributions. As such, this section only intends to identify
sections of dominance within this research, and perhaps indicate the possibility of
areas of research which are more common than others but does not conclude this.
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Table 5.2: Highest and lowest contribution by topic
(a) Highest Contributions








































































Table 5.3: Contribution of each primary paper to each RQ
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5.3 Qualitative Synthesis
The qualitative synthesis is structured by RQ, describing primary papers and their
contribution. The RQs are grouped by like themes with RQ2 and RQ3 being pre-
sented together, discussing security and micromobility, and, RQ1 and RQ4 discussing
Archimate and modelling.
Each RQ will consist of smaller, contextual contributions which the primary
papers provide. Each of these contributions will have contextual analysis provided
to emphasise their contributions to the RQs.
5.3.1 RQ2: What elements are required in ArchiMate to
model security aspects in the context of micromobil-
ity?
To provide distinct contributions to RQ2, three topics were identified of which var-
ious primary papers provided information on. Each topic is further enumerated by
its components, which were developed to provide meaningful contributions to the
RQ.
These topics and their components are as follows:




• Security Quality Attributes
• Application Domains
2. Element Design
3. Overall Design Factors
• Layers of Frameworks
• Design Objectives and Considerations
These topics, and their components, are educated by primary paper contribu-
tions, and contain an aggregated contribution and general discussion of each con-
tributing primary.
5.3.1.1 Topic 1: Attack Vectors and Considerations
The 19 primary papers which contribute to this topic are best described with five
components:
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1. Privacy
• Discusses attack vectors and considerations in regards to privacy
2. Vulnerable Components
• Discusses vulnerable components provided by literature
3. Attack Vectors
• Discusses common attack vectors discussed in literature
4. Security Quality Attributes
• Discusses quality attributes identified in literature
5. Application Domains
• Discusses the application domains of IoT/CPS technology, and its vul-
nerable application domains
Privacy, as a contribution, was divided from the general contribution “Attack
Vectors” due to its prominence in the returned literature. Privacy is also distinct
from traditional vulnerabilities as it is more an implicit goal than an instantiated
vulnerability - separating these contributions provides a clear distinction between
them and also offers more detailed analysis of both.
Vulnerable Components were extracted as a contribution as attack vectors
are often directly related to certain technologies which are included in certain techno-
logical components. For example, the concept of an Electronic Control Unit (ECU)
which are commonly used in smart vehicles often provide the vulnerabilities which
bad actors exploit. By extracting the components, a more detailed understanding of
security and vulnerability can be created.
Attack Vectors identifies all non-privacy attacks on IoT/CPS systems and
their associated application domains. This provides real world attacks and scenarios,
identifying possible vulnerabilities in the micromobility application domain.
Security Quality Attributes identify the goals that security elements and
components are attempting to achieve. These help define the contextual goals of
security in different application domains.
Application Domains extracts information provided by the primary papers
regarding security critical application domains of IoT/CPS technologies.
5.3.1.1.1 Privacy
Five primary papers discuss privacy in the context of attack vectors and consider-
ations.
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Ntsako Baloyi and Paula Kotzé contribute heavily to this subtopic with three of
their papers being included. Their least recent paper, published in 2018, discussed
privacy considerations in relation to IoT and CPS technologies [46]. IoT and CPS
technologies, by nature, can be problematic in regards to the possible covert nature
of data collection. Because of this, a subject may have not given consent to the
collection of their data. The authors cited aspect of IoT and CPS privacy concerns
is the natural ability for these technologies to capture and/or record vast amounts
of personal information at a scale that has not been implemented before. This vast
amount of data can violate personal privacy in ways that were not previously possi-
ble. One method that can violate personal privacy through mass data extraction is
the method of inference - a simple example of this would be “Shadow Profiles” on
Facebook which can identify an individual without them ever creating an account
[56].
The duos next paper, published in 2019, provides a set of data privacy guidelines
for organisations in the application domain of CPS and IoT [57]. The authors dis-
cuss an intrinsic right for an individuals privacy, and the trust individuals place in
organisations to respect this right. CPS and IoT data lifecycles are explored as the
authors stipulate that data privacy necessitates the investigation and design of data
lifecycles in order to address privacy concerns. There is a large variance in how data
lifecycle is handled between technological domains. CPS specific lifecycles are com-
prised of three phases - data preparation and persistence, data visualisation and core
data analytics, and data exchange. This varies from an IoT lifecycle which can be
categorised into eight stages - create, collate, cleanse, store, archive, retain, process
and purge. These lifecycle frameworks offer a perspective on potential privacy risk in
the lifecycle process, which can further be used to identify security considerations.
Finally, Baloyi and Kotzé’s most recent paper, published in 2020 offers a report
on data privacy, and what benefits are afforded to organisations that take a preemp-
tive approach to complying with regulatory policy [58]. While the work is focused
on the reasoning behind privacy compliance, the authors offer context regarding
the importance of privacy in the CPS and IoT application domains. These domains
intrinsically collect an process vast amounts of personal information. This is done
to provide utility in various applications however it increases the risk to privacy
breaches. The authors identify that privacy compliance is often seen as an extra
burden to organisations, resulting in negative consequences and lost opportunities.
Generally, these three papers identify the overall characteristics of the IoT and
CPS domain which cause an elevated risk to privacy, namely - the opportunity for
the incognito recording of peoples information and the opportunity to record vast
amounts of information. The pairs later work identifies how and why regulatory
policy should be enforced within an organisation and encourages enterprises to do
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so.
A more technological perspective regarding how emerging technologies are af-
fecting privacy risk is offered by Whitman, Hsiang and Roark [59]. They described
how the mixture of machine learning, big data and ubiquitous data collection have
lead to discriminatory outcomes with disparate impact and material consequences.
The authors offer the concept of collaborative development between enterprises, the
public and governing bodies in which transparency enables healthier data practice
in industry.
Finally, [60] discussed the threat modelling of connected vehicles, and how these
can be utilised to provide privacy analysis. During this work the authors defined
four types of vehicle data in order to identify how privacy can be compromised.
These four types of data are geolocation data, vehicular sensor data, biometric data
and behavioural data. A breach of geolocation data would provide an adversary
with the location of the vehicle, vehicular sensor data is susceptible to false data
injection attacks, biometric data contains personally identifiable information used
for security purposes and behavioural data can be misused by an adversary to infer
private information about an individuals life.
5.3.1.1.2 Vulnerable Components
Four primary papers provide discussion on non-generalised vulnerable components.
All papers discussed in this section were written for the vehicle application domain.
The components provided by the primary papers are presented in List 5.3.1.1.2
below.
List of non-generalised vulnerable vehicle components:
• Airbag System [61]




• ECU [61] [62]
• Steering system [63]
• e-powertrain system [63]
• Break system [63]
• Geolocation Data [60]
• Vehicular Sensor Data [60]
• Biometric Data [60]
• Behavioural Data [60]
• Software [60]
• Protocol [62]
• Wireless component [62]
Melek and Kaya [61] provides a list of security vulnerabilities found in vehicles
and their affected components. Some examples of vulnerable components are the
Airbag System, Keyless Entry, Telematics Control Unit (TCU), Bluetooth, OBD-II
and ECU Gateways. A unique aspect of vehicle attack vectors as discussed by the
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author is the inclusion of an OBD-II port, required to be installed in all cars in
the U.S. from 1996. The authors found that this port had the largest number of
vulnerabilities out of all considered components making this a unique security risk
to cars.
Messnarz et al. [63] considers fail operational states in highly AVs. Specifically,
the authors discuss three AV systems - Steering, E-Powertrain, and the Break Sys-
tem. These systems are discussed in the context of fail-operational states - that is,
systems that continue to operate when their control systems fail.
Xiong et al. [62] explores threat modelling and attack simulations in the appli-
cation domain of connected vehicles. The authors provide the primary assets that a
connected vehicle consists of - ECU, SoftwareProduct, Dataflow, Protocol and Net-
work. These critical components are vulnerable to cyberattacks as shown by ethical
hacking performed on the 2014 Jeep Cherokee and 2015 Cadillac Escalade vehicles,
enabling in one case, full remote control over critical systems.
Xiong and Lagerström [60] discuss threat modelling. they provided four types of
vehicle data in order to identify how privacy can be compromised. These four types
of data are geolocation data, vehicular sensor data, biometric data and behavioural
data. Aside from these data classifications the authors also provide a definition of
the main technological assets of connected vehicles. The four primary assets are
provided - ECU, Network, Data and Software.
5.3.1.1.3 Attack Vectors
Ten primary papers discuss attack vectors. The attack vectors and considerations
provided by these papers are summarised by Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6. These provide
each attack vector from the perspective of what domain it is initiated from (so-
cial, physical or cyber) and also provides what application domain the attacks are
discussed in.
Two of these primary papers identify attack vectors and considerations within
the CPS application domain.
Chong et al. [64] offers a tutorial introduction to security and privacy in the
CPS application domain, providing an overview of security concerns and possible
attack vectors. The authors describe four key attack scenarios in the CPS context -
eavesdropping, open-loop false-data injection, replay and denial-of-service (DoS) at-
tacks. Eavesdropping attacks have an adversary secretly collecting information from
a network and therefore violating the confidentiality of this data. Open-loop false-
data attacks involve the adversary corrupting the integrity of the transmitted data.
Replay attacks have the adversary attempt to achieve a desired effect by recording
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Table 5.4: Attack Vectors identified in the social domain
Domain Attack Vector
IoT Privileged Insider Attack [65]
RA
Personnel Background [66]
Awareness and Training [66]
Access Control [66]
Loyalty and Well Being [66]
Table 5.5: Attack Vectors identified in the physical domain
Domain Attack Vector
AV
Direct Physical Attacks on internal sensors [67]
Direct physical attacks on ECUs [67]
Direct attacks on Controller Area Network (CAN)
bus [67]
Direct physical attacks on on-board computer [67]
Direct physical attacks on external sensors [67]
Direct physical attacks on Human Machine Interface
[67]
Direct physical attacks on brought-in devices [67]
Attacks via USB [67]
DBaaS Physical access control to hardware [68]
IoT Damage and modification of hardware [69]
RA
Physical access control to hardware [66]
Obsolete Hardware [66]
Counterfeit Hardware [66]
Portable Devices (USB) [66]
CPS Resource Depletion (CAPEC-119) [70]
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Co-located application data [68]
Modification of configuration [68]
SV




Permissions, privileges, and access control [61]
Input validation [61]
AV
Deception and DoS attacks on internal sensor mea-
surements and control actuations [67]
Deception and DoS attacks on inter-ECU communi-
cations [67]
Deception and DoS attacks on CAN bus communica-
tion with ECUs [67]
Deception and DoS attacks on CAN bus communica-
tion with on-board computer [67]
Attacks on Ethernet [67]
Attacks on WiFi [67]
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Data Leakage (CAPEC-118) [70]
Open-loop false-data injection attack (CAPEC-152)
[70] [64]
Exploitation of Authentication (CAPEC-225) [70]
Fuzzing (CAPEC-28) [70]
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Continuation of Table 5.6
IoT
Node Capturing [65]
Malicious Code Injection [65]
False Data Injection [65]
Side-Channel Attacks [65]
Eavesdropping and Interference [65] [71]
Sleep Deprivation [65]
Booting Attacks [65]
Phishing Site Attack [65]
Access Attack [65]
DDoS/DoS Attack [65] [69]
Data Transit Attacks [65]
Routing Attacks [65]
MITM Attack [65] [69]
SQL Injection Attack [65]
Signature Wrapping Attack [65]
Cloud Malware Injection [65]
Flooding Attack in Cloud [65]
Replay Attack [65]
Impersonation Attack [65] [71]
Data Thefts [65]
Access Control Attacks [65]
Service Interruption Attacks [65]
Malicious Code Injection Attacks [65]
Sniffing Attacks [65]
Reprogram Attacks [65]
Attacks on V2X network [65]
End of Table
a previous interaction and executing this interaction at a later date. Finally, DoS
attacks seek to tie up all available resources of a system by sending many superfluous
requests of which the system must service. The authors also provide a quick discus-
sion on undetectable and stealth attacks in which specific types of false-data attacks
are used. These attacks are designed to be analogous with the natural behaviour
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of the system, and in that way are stealthy as the system may have no means of
identifying if it is under attack or not.
Ouchani and Khaled [70] discuss the modelling of threats in the CPS application
domain. When generating their threat behaviours for the CPS system the authors
identify six primary attack vectors: Spoofing, Data Leakage, Resource Depletion,
Injection, Exploitation of Authentication, and Fuzzing. These attack behaviours
were extracted from the Common Attack Patterns Enumeration and Classification
assurance strategic initiative (CAPEC) and are classified as software attacks and
communication attacks.
Five of these primary papers identify attack vectors and considerations within
the IoT application domain.
Mahbub [65] provides a considerable study on IoT security, identifying many
vulnerabilities and considerations. A generalised IoT framework is provided which
describes IoT infrastructure in five layers. Using this framework the authors classify
attack vectors by layer, identifying seven vectors in the sensing layer, five in the
networking layer, eight in the middleware layer and six in the application layer.
The authors provide mitigation techniques in the gateway layer however do not
provide attack vectors or considerations for this layer. Example attack vectors are
Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks, network flooding attacks, and code injection
attacks.
Kulik et al. [71] considers a threat-driven security framework for IoT Systems,
specifically designed to provide verification on the systems security posture. During
the design of this framework the authors identified two probable attack vectors of IoT
systems. The first attack vector is eavesdropping - the act of an adversary secretly
obtaining information and data from a network. The second attack is identity faking
- when an adversary poses as a trusted source or user in order to trick the system
into servicing their phoney requests.
Shaaban et al. [68] discusses the proposed IoT reference model CloudWoT for the
IoT application domain. The authors discuss security challenges and attack vectors
in relation to the model, drawing on the traditional CIA triad. Further attack vectors
are identified, specifically in the sub-domain, Database as a Service (DBaaS) context.
DoS, physical attacks, modification of configuration, access control, privacy leakage,
and co-located application data are mentioned as being vulnerable attack vectors
of DBaaS. The authors briefly mention vulnerabilities associated with the semantic
web, stating that several attacks in this context can disclose sensitive information -
violating privacy.
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Augusto-Gonzalez et al. [72] presents the “GHOST” security framework. The
authors cite the heterogeneous, dynamic and internet connected nature of IoT envi-
ronments as some of the leading aspects that make smart homes vulnerable. During
the validation phase of the new security framework “GHOST” the authors propose
three attack vectors. First, physical attacks in which physical damage is caused by
the removal of the battery, shut down of the device, breaking of the device, injection
of another device into the network, or mechanical exhaustion of physical buttons
leading to the inoperability of the device. Second are network attacks in which net-
work traffic is tampered with in order to provide a malicious affect. This includes
impersonation attacks, sniffing attacks, DoS attacks, as well as many other well
known network exploits. The last category is software attacks in which an adver-
sary gains access to a device within the network and either modifies or installs new
software to achieve a desired effect. These attacks can often enable network attacks
such as compromising a gateway to achieve a form of eavesdropping.
Omoniwa et al. [69] explores the merits of the Fog and Edge Computing (FEC)
based IoT (FECIoT) architecture in regards to its security issues. The authors iden-
tify three attack vectors in FOCIoT the architecture - Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS), MITM, and physical attacks. DDoS is specifically effective against FE-
CIoT as the availability of these systems is usually critical to their application. This
attack is also relatively easy to implement once a sufficient bot net has been ac-
quired. MITM attacks are particularly damaging to privacy as they have the ability
to disclose sensitive information, such as the location and identify of FEC devices.
The FECIoT application domain is particularly susceptible to this as, due to the
devices resource constrained nature it has have particularly weak encryption for
communication. Finally, the physical attack vector consists of a bad actor(s) dam-
aging/modifying the devices in order to achieve their goals.
Two of the primary papers identify attack vectors and considerations in the
vehicle application domain.
Cui et al., [67] explores security considerations in the application domain of AVs.
The authors provide two overarching categories of attacks in this domain - physical
and cyber. Further they identify two primary cyber-attacks - deception attacks and
DoS attacks. Deception attacks are when an attack is able to use unauthenticated
data to deceive vehicle systems or other entities. DoS attacks have particularly
high risk in the context of AVs. If jamming is successful, real-time information will
be delayed which can impact the behaviour of the vehicle. The authors identify
vulnerable components in the AV ecosystem and 16 distinct attacks that can affect
these systems. These range from direct physical attacks and modifications of internal
sensors/actuators, to deception and DoS attacks and are included in tables 5.4, 5.5
and 5.6.
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Melek and Kaya [61] provide a list of security vulnerabilities found in vehicles
and their effected components. The authors analysis provided information on the top
25% of Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) consisting of protection mechanism
failure, buffer errors, Information leak/disclosure and other attack vectors.
Finally, one of the primary papers identified attack vectors and considerations
in the context of RA.
The last primary paper in this section discusses a proposed decision framework
for cybersecurity RA which quantifies threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences [66].
The authors define threats as “a person or an organisation that intends to cause
harm”. This is further quantified into two factors - ease of attack and benefits of a
successful attack. These factors were described further below:
• Ease of attack - the perception of how easy it is to carry out an attack. This
perception is realised through three factors:
– Information held by the attack regarding the target system.
– Technology that the attacker has access too.
– Delivery options available to the attacker.





The authors also enumerate upon the possible vulnerabilities within the cyber-
security landscape. Three overarching vulnerability domains are classified; The phys-
ical domain, information domain and social domain.
5.3.1.1.4 Security quality attributes
Five primary papers provide discussion on general security quality attributes.
All five primary papers include the traditional security attributes - CIA, however
some more specific attributes were also offered (Table 5.7).
Janulevičius and Šiaudinytė [73] considers security diagnostics in distributed
systems. The authors characterise security challenges in this area with eight aspects
- identification, entity authentication, data authentication, authorisation, integrity,
confidentiality, non-repudiation and execution safety. The authors then design a
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security device which consists of four primary elements - Security Agent, XML-
Binder Agent, Admission Agent and Queue Agent.
Omoniwa et al. [69] explores the merits of the FECIoT architecture in regards to
its security issues. The authors identify seven considerations; trust, authentication,
integrity, confidentiality, privacy, availability and access control.
Trust, in an FECIoT application, is more of a state that an element or node can
achieve than a quality it possesses. Elements require sufficient security mechanisms
promoting them to trusted elements within an IoT network.
Next, authentication in an FECIoT application involves unique constraints. IoT
devices are often resource constrained, making the resource heavy private-public key
method cumbersome. This requires specific authentication methods and protocols
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to be implemented in this context. Availability is also of unique significance in this
application domain due to the correlation between this domain and latency-sensitive
applications. Integrity, confidentiality, privacy and access control considerations are
all similar to other technology.
Ganin et al. [66] propose a decision framework for cybersecurity RA which quan-
tifies threats, vulnerabilities and consequences. To measure the impact or conse-
quences of a successful attack the authors use the CIA triad. Vulnerability’s and
attacks provided by the authors were then measured against these metrics.
Kavallieratos et al. [74] provide a method which elicits both security and safety
requirements in the CPS application domain. To do this the authors define seven
security attributes and 11 safety attributes. These attributes are used in the process
of elicitation, providing aspects of the subject that need to be evaluated. The seven
security attributes and 11 safety attributes were defined as shown in Table 5.8 below.





Information exchanged, and communication links be-
tween CPSs and services offered by CPSs should be pro-
tected against unauthorised access.
Integrity
Information exchanged, services, CPSs, and communi-
cation links should be protected against unauthorised
modifications or manipulations.
Availability
Information exchanged, services, CPS, and communica-
tion links should be available to authorised entities when
requrested by such entities.
Authenticity
The management, the configuration, and operation of
the onboard CPSs and services offered by CPSs should
be performed by authorised entities.
Possession and
Control
Information exchanged and communication links be-
tween CPSs and services offered by CPSs should be pro-
tected against the possibility that confidential data be
possessed or controlled by unauthorised entities.
Utility
Information exchanged and communication links be-
tween CPSs and services offered by CPSs should be use-
ful.
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Continuation of Table 5.8
Non-Repudiation CPSs should not refute responsibility.
Safety Attributes
Controllability
The ability to bring a CPS’s/vessel’s process into a de-
sired state and handle hazardous events during the ves-
sel’s operations.
Observability
CPSs should be able to determine their state to enhance
the situational awareness of the shore control centre.
Operability
The CPSs should be able to operate within the con-
straints imposed by the vessel’s state.
Resilience
The CPSs should be able to absorb any disturbance
caused by faults.
Survivability
The CPSs should be able to maintain the vessel’s oper-
ations at some predefined acceptable level.
Graceful Degrada-
tion
The CPSs should be able to maintain possibly limited
but still safe functionality.
Quality of Service
CPSs data should arrive in time and serve their purpose
to perform the necessary safety functions and produce
the safety messages that are needed.
Availability
The CPSs should be able to provide a stated function
if demanded under given conditions over their defined
lifetime.
Redundancy
The systems architecture of the C-ES should be redun-
dant (CPSs, equipment, part and data redundancy)
Fault tolerance
The CPSs of the C-ES should continue to be operational
in the event of a hardware of software failure.
Integrity
The vessel’s CPSs and functions should be durable and
stable.
End of Table
Interestingly, two attributes are shared between security and safety - integrity
and availability.
Shaaban et al. [68] discusses information security in the context of the cloud
IoT application domain. The authors state that information security is primarily
described by three main dimensions; CIA. Further distinctions are made providing
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attributes application security, management of security and compliance with security
standards.
5.3.1.1.5 Application Domains
Two primary papers identify the security critical application domains of IoT.
Mahbub [65] provides a considerable study on IoT security, identifying many
vulnerabilities and considerations by application domain. The authors identify 12
security vulnerable applications of IoT including intelligent transport, smart cities,
smart metering and more.
Security critical application domains of IoT ([65]):
• Smart Cities
• Smart Home
• Smart Environment Monitoring
• Intelligent Transportation
• Smart Metering and Smart Grid
• Industrial Automation




Omoniwa et al. [69] discusses application domains in regards to their research
on FECIoT. They identify six practical applications for the technology which are
provided below.






5.3.1.2 Topic 2: Element Design
Nine primary papers contribute new modelling elements. These papers have been
categorised by their application domain - Vehicle, IoT and Other - to enable com-
parisons to be made between elements offered in the same domain.
In the vehicle domain, five primary papers propose new elements for security
modelling in the vehicle application domain. Five common elements and 32 unique
elements were defined by these primary papers. These elements are listed below.
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List of common and unique vehicle modelling elements:
• Common Elements:
– ECU [75] [62]
– CANNetwork [75] [62]
– FlexRayNetwork [75] [62]
– LINNNetwork [75] [62]













– GPS Server [70]




















Ouchani and Khaled [70] created a simulation language for analysing cyber-
physical systems and their threats, specifically in regards to the AV application
domain. To achieve this they first present a meta model of the CPS domain, iden-
tifying six generalised elements - entity, object, device, social actor, protocol and
server (Figure 5.8). Through this meta-model the authors created an instantiation
of an AV, including the elements listed in Table 5.3.1.2. Aside from these models the
authors also define other holistic aspects such as the operating environment, threat
environment, countermeasure environment, and attack behaviour.
Katsikeas et al. [75] provide a new modelling language, VehicleLang, which de-
scribes probabilistic models of cyber-attacks in vehicles. This language is based off
previous work done on the Meta Attack Language (MAL, [77]) which provides a
meta-language and attack logic for cyber attacks. The authors extend this into a
domain specific language (DSL) for the simulation of known attacks on connected
vehicles. When doing so the authors identify aspects and elements that are needed
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Figure 5.8: CPS Meta-Model (extracted from [70])
in order to accurately and fully describe a connected vehicle when identifying attack
vectors (Figure 5.9).
Figure 5.9: Model of VehicleLang (extracted from [75])
Xiong and Lagerström [60] extended VehicleLang, developing a privacy analysis
extension for the modelling language. To do so the authors also define data types
stored and accessed by connected vehicles. Four overarching categories were iden-
tified; geolocation, vehicular sensor data, biometrics data, and behavioural data.
Further, through the specific extension of vehicleLang into the privacy domain, pri-
vacy specific modelling elements can be identified. The authors identify the need
for two additional elements to VehicleLang; Geolocation and UntrustedNetworkSer-
vice. Geolocation represents geolocation data, which implicitly identifies this data
category as the most at risk for privacy concerns as the other three data types were
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not instantiated within the new extension. UntrustedNetworkService identifies the
fact that networks may not always be trustworthy, and by transmitting information
over these networks may increase the risk to geolocation data being exposed. The
extension to vehicleLang and vehicleLang itself is provided in Figure 5.10.
Figure 5.10: VehicleLang architecture with proposed privacy extension elements (ex-
tracted from [60])
Xiong et al. [62] model threats and attacks against connected vehicle using the
tool securiCAD. SecuriCAD enables the modelling of home Local Area Networks
(LANs), large corporate networks, and supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems. In securiCAD, defence strategies are selected for each compo-
nent/asset. The simulation engine can then use these to illicit probabilities regard-
ing the likelihood of attacks succeeding. The authors utilise this to provide threat
modelling and in doing so provide the security critical vehicle elements. These five
elements are; ECU, softwareproduct, Dataflow, protocol and network.
Two threat models were created; a threat model for the 2014 Jeep Cherokee
model and a threat model for the 2015 Cadillac Escalade Model. Each were created
according to their respective network typologies.
During the discussion the authors outline the importance of the firewall element
in securing a connected vehicle. A keyless entry control ECU and similar assets are
often entry points for attackers - access control enabled by a firewall is a strong
countermeasure.
Koschuch et al. [76] discusses how safety and security are linked in the context of
AV. To facilitate this the authors provide a combinatory view of safety and security
best practices (Figure 5.11). The authors retrieved causation chains in regards to
security and safety from various references and collated these into an initial model
as shown in Figure 5.11. This model defines the elements and relations identified
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between safety and security processes. The authors identify the difficulty of defining
whether a security incident only leads to an error or if there are cases where a
security incident could lead directly to a failure. It was decided that, while this
can be contentious, all security incidents result in an error in the system and have
included relation “A” to represent this.
Relation “B” identifies situations in which hazards cause a vehicle to perform
an action which could be considered a threat to the security of the vehicle. The
example given is if a plain text communication is sent from the vehicle in a moment
of duress - enabling a threat in which information could be leaked to a bad actor.
Figure 5.11: Combined safety and security view with possible causal chains (adapted
from [76])
Two papers discuss element contributions in the IoT application domain. Two
common elements were shared between these papers, while seven unique elements
were identified. These elements are listed below (list 5.3.1.2).
• Common Elements
– Computation [65] [78]




– User Interface [65]
– Device [65]
– Software Component [65]
– Identification [78]
– Communication [78]
Mahbub [65] studies IoT protocols, vulnerabilities and preemptive architectonics
and offers some classification regarding the structure and elements that constitute
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an IoT instantiation. Four elements are classified; identification, sensing, communi-
cation, and computation.
Identification outlines how IoT technologies recognise themselves and how other
entities can identify IoT devices. Many methods have been identified such as elec-
tronic item codes and uCodes. An IoT device can be identified through a tag such
as Temp1 - which identified the node as a particular temperature sensor as well as
identifies its position in the network.
Sensing describes how IoT devices are able to detect information within their
allotted network and the transmission of this information to a data centre. Sensing
IoT devices can be utilised in a wide spectrum of domains such as actuators, wearable
detecting gadgets and audio sensing.
Communication underpins IoT’s ability to work alongside heterogeneous appli-
cations in order to communicate specific cognitive resources. Communication stan-
dards often associated with IoT technologies are Bluetooth, IEEE 802.11, IEEE
802.15.4, Z-Wave and Long Term Evolution Advanced (LTE-A). Further, communi-
cation technology such as Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), Near Field Com-
munication (NFC) and Ultra Wide Band (UWB) have been developed for use in
IoT.
Finally, computation describes the computational component of IoT devices.
Raspberry PI, Arduinos, Gadgeteer, and T-Mote Sky technologies have all been
used to operate IoT technologies.
Zimmermann et al. [78] developed a model extraction and integration approach
for EA viewpoints, models, standards, frameworks and tools in the context of IoT.
A meta-model of the IoT domain is provided which defines common elements in IoT
architecture - sensors, actuators, storage and user interfaces. IoT resources and their
associated physical devices are differentiated in the context of locations and regions
providing more explanatory power.
Finally, two papers are applicable in the general domain and discuss distributed
control systems modelling and security visualisation respectively.
Janulevičius and Šiaudinytė [73] considers an EA analysis method for diagnosing
security considerations in distributed systems, see Security Quality Attributes in
Section 5.3.1.1 for more detail. The authors identify a distributed control systems
model from the perspective of an EA technical layer (Figure 5.12). Using this model,
the authors can elicit the security issues born from the inter-communication between
entities via networks.
Latvala et al. [79] introduce The Metrics Visualisation System (MVS) - a vi-
sual modelling tool specifically used to facilitate the perception of security metrics
and measurements. The tool operates in two stages - first, the designing of security
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systems and second, the monitoring of these systems. The authors discuss visual-
isation techniques such as using colours to indicate changes in the value of some
security metrics, guiding the user to place more attention in this area. They also ex-
perimented with element design, identifying shapes that were easily distinguishable
from each other to promote visual immediacy. An example of the visual modelling
technique is shown in Figure 5.13.
Figure 5.12: Distributed Control Systems Model (adapted from [73])
Figure 5.13: Example of MVS modelling (extracted from [79])
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5.3.1.3 Topic 3: Overall Design Factors
The 15 primary papers which contribute to this sub-contribution are best described
with two categorisations:
1. Layers of Frameworks
2. Design Objectives and Considerations
5.3.1.3.1 Layers of Frameworks
Six primary papers provide discussions on frameworks and layers.
Frameworks and the layers contained within them provide information on the
domains technological structure and abstraction levels providing another aspect to
educate potential element selection and design.
All six primary papers provide examples of IoT application domain frameworks
and their associated layers. In total, 16 IoT frameworks were identified with seven of
these being three layer architectures (Table 5.9), five being four layer architectures
(Table 5.10), two being five layer architectures (Table 5.11) and finally two being
seven layer architectures (Table 5.12).
One primary paper provides nine different CPS application domain frameworks.
These constitute three, three layer architectures (Table 5.13), two four layer archi-
































Table 5.9: Three layer IoT architectures
Referencing Article Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3
[80] from [46] Perception Network Application
[81] from [69] Sensing Network Application
[82] from [69] Sensing Network Application
[83] from [69] Sensing Network Application
[84] from [65] Sensing Network Application
[80] from [65] Sensing Network Application
[85] from [65] Sensing Network Application
Table 5.10: Four layer IoT architectures
Referencing Article Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3 Layer 4
[86] from [46] Device Network Service Support Application
[68] Field Communication Data Processing Cloud Computing
[87] in [69] Sensing Network Service Application
[65] Sensing Network Middleware Application
[88] in [89] Implementation Functional Usage Business
Table 5.11: Five layer IoT architectures
Referencing Article Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3 Layer 4 Layer 5
[90] from [46] Perception Network Middleware Application Business
[91] from [69] Sensing Network Service Application Business
Table 5.12: Seven layer IoT architectures
Referencing Article Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3 Layer 4 Layer 5 Layer 6 Layer 7












[93] from [65] Physical Devices Connectivity Edge computing
Data Accumula-
tion































Table 5.13: Three layer CPS architectures
Referencing Article Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3
[94] from [46] Physical entities Network Application
[95] from [46] Device and Process Controller Enterprise
[96] from [46] Devices and Process Controller Enterprise
Table 5.14: Four layer CPS architectures
Referencing Article Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3 Layer 4
[97] from [46] Device and Process Controller Manufacturer Enterprise
[98] from [46] Implementation Functional Usage Business
Table 5.15: Five layer CPS architectures
Referencing Article Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3 Layer 4 Layer 5










Data Management Advanced Analytics Digital Interface
Business Opera-
tions Evolution
Table 5.16: Six layer CPS architectures
Referencing Article Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3 Layer 4 Layer 5 Layer 6
[101] from [46] Asset Integration Communication Information Functional Business
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Omoniwa et al. [69] examines FECIoT applications in the context of IoT. As
part of this, they describe different methods of structuring the IoT architectures.
Figure 5.14 identifies general IoT architectures and their layers.
Figure 5.14: Example of MVS modelling (adapted from [69])
Three layer architectures consist of:
• Physical Layer
– This layer is responsible for data collection, measurement and extraction
of physical devices.
• Network Layer
– This layer provides support for data to be transmitted over multiple net-
works and typologies.
• Application Layer
– The layer supports the system’s functionalities to the end user.
Four layer architectures provide the additional service layer:
• Service Layer
– This layer provides a variety of services, of which can further be broken
down into four categories; Service discovery, service composition, service
management, and service interface.
Five layer architectures provide the additional Business Layer:
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• Business Layer
– The primary role of this layer is to record and analyse all IoT operations.
In this way analytics can be carried out and models can be created which
can illicit optimisation data and general benefits.
Mahbub [65] provides a detailed analysis of IoT security and while doing so pro-
vides examples of IoT frameworks and their associated layers. The author discusses
how older frameworks are more generic in their expression of IoT, usually implement-
ing a three-layer framework with no contextual aspects. More recent frameworks
however, are tailored to specific application contexts [102], [103], [81].
Zimmermann et al. [78] developed a model extraction and integration approach
for EA viewpoints, models, standards, frameworks and tools in the context of IoT.
The authors method provides a discussion on IoT architecture, citing many frame-
works and models designed for the IoT application domain. One specific architecture
[104] provides a development framework for the IoT. This framework provides a set
of domain-specific modelling languages and a deployment language for deployment
features.
Shaaban [68] provides the CloudWoT framework, which was developed to address
three key challenges. The first challenge is the structure of data within the IoT as
the heterogeneity of the data in this domain makes processing this data impractical.
Secondly, data formats are also heterogeneous due to the diversity of devices in IoT.
Finally, IoT devices are often limited in terms of processing capacity. CloudWoT
identifies four architectural layer classifications found in Table 5.15.
Figure 5.15: CloudWoT Framework (adapted from [68])
Baloyi and Kotzé [46] provides a data privacy model for application in the IoT
and CPS domains. The authors draw upon IoT and CPS architectures to educate
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their proposed solution and in doing so provide a discussion on these architectures.
This discussion lends itself to identifying abstraction layers and relationships that
are applicable in the modelling domain.
Figure 5.16: Five layered IoT architecture (adapted from [90])
Three IoT reference architectures were discussed, each with varying levels of
granularity. The first architecture [105] provides three layers - perception, network
and application. Next, the IoT reference model of the Telecommunication Standard-
isation Sector [86] contains four layers - application, service support and application
support, network and device. Finally [90] provides an IoT architecture which consists
of five layers - perception, network, middleware, application, and business (Figure
5.16).
CPS architectures are also discussed, analysing a range of architectures which
support three to five layers. The authors conclude that CPS architectures are gen-
erally able to be characterised as a super set of IoT architectures - that CPS archi-
tectures contain all the elements required to fully realise an IoT application.
The authors make two indicative statements regarding IoT and CPS frameworks
stating: “Based on our review of literature, we concur with [106] that there is cur-
rently no commonly agreed upon standard reference architecture for IoT” ([46] pg.
3) and “Although various architecture frameworks have been proposed for CPS,
there is also no agreed upon standard reference architecture” ([46] pg. 4).
Morkevicius et al. [89] contributed an alignment between an Industrial Internet
of Things (IIoT) framework and the unified architecture framework (UAF) to enable
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traceability and interoperability in the IoT application domain. The authors based
their IIoT framework instantiation from research presented in [88]. This IIoT frame-
work consists of four layers - implementation, functional, usage, and, the business
layers. These four conceptual layers were mapped to five of the offered layers in the
UAF (Figure 5.17).
Figure 5.17: IIoT to UAF layer mapping (adapted from [89])
Five layers of the UAF were not identified within the IIoT framework - the meta-
data, security, projects, standards, and, actual resources layers. The authors identify
the inclusion of the security layer as a major advantage of this joint approach, as
many IIoT frameworks do not address security separately from other system com-
ponents.
5.3.1.3.2 Design Objectives and Considerations
Six primary papers identify design objectives and considerations in the context of
modelling.
Kavallieratos et al. [107] provide a comprehensive review of cybersecurity and
safety co-engineering methods, extracting insight into the strategies used to execute
these methods. From the 68 methods reviewed, 52 of these methods were found
to use a form of modelling. 23 of the 52 methods provided graphical modelling
capabilities while 18 of the 52 employed formal modelling. The last 11 methods used
a combination of graphical and formal modelling. The popularity that modelling has
seen in this domain was attributed to the ability to scale up complex systems and
being able to represent different aspects related to safety and security with different
viewpoints and levels of detail.
Boucké and Holvoet [108] discuss crosscutting elements and their problematic
nature in architectural descriptions. Crosscutting elements of an architecture are
elements which cut across multiple layers of the architecture. An example of this can
be found in [68] in which the proposed security architectural concern is crosscutting
the IoT architecture layers (Figure 5.18).
Another example is provided in [63] where during a discussion of AV design
patterns the authors find that AV systems are highly impacted by cross-cutting
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Figure 5.18: CloudWoT architecture with crosscutting security architectural concern
(extracted from [108])
cybersecurity elements. The negative consequences of crosscutting elements offered
by the authors are as follows:
• Since no single architectural view, or a set of views is identifiable as the descrip-
tion of the architectural driver, advantages of distinct design and development
are lost.
• Before being able to update the design for a particular architectural driver,
an architect must review all views because there are few guidelines on where
to search, preventing traceability from architectural drivers to architectural
elements.
• The standard notion of views does not allow explicit definitions of “open spots”
(like abstract classes or parameters) that should be filled later - hampering
reuse or architectural design in other applications.
Security is often a crosscutting element of architectural descriptions because the
concept of security is applicable to many different technological layers.
Boucké and Holvoet [108] also discuss the underlying principles and design pro-
cess behind architectural descriptions. Views, utilised in multi-view modelling and
multi-view architecture, are the method that is employed to handle complexity in
an architecture by improving the separation of concerns. These views are related to
architectural “drivers” - the motivation behind how the architect wants to describe
the architecture.
For example, a simple architectural description of IoT contains three layers;
sensing, network and application. An architects driving motivation could be to con-
textualise this in the banking domain and attempts to include the architectural
concern of security. Security is a crosscutting element of these three provided layers,
and by including it, the architect has caused misalignment between the architectural
drivers and architectural views. In this way complexity is added to the previous IoT
architecture.
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Yashchyshyn [24] examines aspects of heterogeneous modelling and methods that
have been used to deal with a diversity of requirements. The author discusses com-
plexity of design languages and how, intrinsically, a simple design language with
fewer elements is desirable. There are benefits, however, to more complex notations
- providing redundancy, flexibility, and diversity. The author also discusses types of
modelling, including multi-view modelling, amorphous heterogeneity modelling and
hierarchical multi-modelling.
Latvala et al. [79] introduces the MVS. The tool operates in two stages - first,
the designing of security systems and second, the monitoring of these systems. A
hierarchical graphing technique is used to provide distinction between abstract con-
cepts such as authentication and confidentiality, as well as concrete security metrics
such as number of failed attempted password inputs. During the design phase of this
project the authors developed a list of design requirements of which the MVS tool
would achieve.
The nine requirements were:
1. It should be easy for the user to shift from design-time usage of the MVS to
the run-time useage and vice versa.
2. The core of the MVS should be separate from the model, the visualisation,
and other possible modules.
3. The MVS should work on multiple platforms.
4. The MVS should help enhance the meaningfulness of security metrics.
5. The MVS should help enhance the situational awareness of the user during its
run-time.
6. Calculating the value for a node from the values of its child nodes should be
scriptable.
7. Node values and types should have intuitive visualisations.
8. The model used in the MVS should be saved in an Resource Description Frame-
work (RDF) compliant format.
9. Open source third party components are preferred.
Requirements three through nine are directly applicable to the modelling aspects
of MVS and identify the thought process behind the chosen modelling method. The
authors also discuss how modality was achieved with their tool, allowing users to
create their own extensions providing flexibility.
Kulik et al. [71] create a framework for threat-driven cybersecurity verification
of IoT architectures. To do this a tool named “Alloy Analyser” is used to provide
modelling and analysis capabilities in the new domain. An alloy model is able to
be expressed at three distinct levels of abstraction. The highest level of abstraction
provides a means to establish an overview of the system. The next level of abstraction
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provides the models set theory and finally the lowest level of abstraction provides
the models atoms and relations.
5.3.2 RQ3: What security strategies and mitigation tech-
niques do micromobility companies currently employ?
To provide distinct contributions to RQ3, three topics were identified. Each topic is
further decomposed into its associated components, which were developed to provide
meaningful contributions to the RQ.
These topics and their components are as follows:
1. Privacy
• Methods of Privacy
• Technical Solutions of Privacy
2. Security
• Methods of Security
• Technical Solutions of Security
3. Industry Standards
• Security Standards




These topics, and their components, were educated by primary paper contribu-
tions, and contain an aggregated contribution and general discussion of each con-
tributing primary.
5.3.2.1 Topic 1: Privacy
5.3.2.1.1 Methods of Privacy
Of the five primary papers contributing to privacy methods, four identify methods
for application in the CPS/IoT domain, and one identifies methods in the vehicle
domain.
Three of the four papers which provide methods of privacy in the CPS/IoT
application domain are authored by Baloyi and Kotzé in 2018, 2019 and 2020. These
are presented in chronological order below.
Baloyi and Kotzé [46] developed a consolidated technical architecture by iden-
tifying similar behaviours and layers between IoT and CPS technical architectures.
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The authors note that IoT architectures can be instantiated via CPS architectures,
effectively making CPS architectures meta-architectures of their IoT counterparts.
The proposed consolidated reference architecture is shown in Figure 5.19.
Figure 5.19: IoT and CPS consolidated technical architecture. Adapted from [46]
Using this consolidated architecture the authors propose the ICAMP model.
This privacy model contains the layers from the consolidated architecture showed
in Figure 5.19, however, the business operations evolution layer is divided into two
complementary layers; the business imperatives layer and the self-adaptation layer.
These layers are further cross-cut by six viewpoints; Who, What, When, Where,
Why and How (5W1H). Privacy is enforced in the business imperatives layer, giving
the CEO - or acting authority - oversight responsibilities. Further, process privacy
compliance and Data privacy compliance are addressed in the self-adaptation layer
and advanced analytics/data management layers respectively.
Baloyi and Kotzé [57] provides a discussion on organisational compliance in spe-
cific regards to the African Protection of Personal Information Act (APPI). They
created a set of guidelines which identify the technical, organisational and legal
requirements when operating under this act. A total of 43 data privacy legal com-
pliance guidelines was defined:
1. Define purpose of collecting and process-
ing personal information
2. Identify and categorise personal informa-
tion to be or which is currently collected
or processed
3. Determine if children’s personal informa-
tion will be collected or processed
4. Determine if you will use data subject’s
financial account details
5. Establish whether you conduct exception-
based processing or are a responsible
party with exceptions
6. Determine means of collecting and pro-
cessing personal information
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7. Determine or establish legal grounds for
collecting and processing personal infor-
mation
8. Determine whether there are applicable
exclusions
9. Determine whether there are required
prior authorisations
10. Determine whether there are general au-
thorisations for special personal informa-
tion
11. Determine whether there are specific au-
thorisations for special personal informa-
tion
12. Identify parties that personal information
may be shared with
13. Determine whether you will be consid-
ered a responsible party, joint responsible
party or operator in respect of each pro-
cessing activity or piece of personal infor-
mation
14. Determine whether there will be third
parties exposed to or dealing with per-
sonal information or third-party systems
processing or aiming to collect and pro-
cess personal information
15. Determine if there will be any profiling or
automated decision-making
16. Conduct privacy risk or impact assess-
ments
17. Define appropriate security safeguards for
all personal information, identified risks
and processing activities
18. Ensure that there are contracts to govern
the data privacy relationship with opera-
tors and third parties
19. Ensure that third party hardware and
software do not prejudice data privacy
20. Ensure that personal information is used
for specified or compatible purposes
21. Ensure that the repurposing of the pro-
cessing of personal information is done
lawfully
22. Ensure that personal information col-
lected from other sources is collected law-
fully
23. Establish data privacy policies and no-
tices
24. Maintain documentation
25. Establish measures to support business
continuity
26. Establish retention and disposal/decommissioning
policies and procedures for personal infor-
mation and devices containing personal
information
27. Ensure that there are data privacy train-
ing programmes and awareness cam-
paigns within an organisation
28. Establish measures to ensure quality of
personal information
29. Define personal information flows
30. Design systems with privacy in mind
31. Configure systems with privacy in mind
32. Support user-centred data privacy
33. Ensure that there are appropriate safe-
guards for transborder transfers
34. Establish communication mechanisms for
data privacy
35. Establish breach management processes
for data privacy
36. Enable data subjects to exercise their
data privacy rights
37. Establish mechanisms to locate all data
subject personal information within an
organisation
38. Determine which personal information to
disclose on access requests
39. Authenticate data subjects when they ex-
ercise their rights
40. Define staff members’ responsibilities and
accountability for data privacy
41. Ensure that staff members understand
their data privacy roles
42. Conduct data privacy audits
The authors then align these legal guidelines to a new set of operational guide-
lines. The operational guidelines provide actions and operational methods to im-
plement the legal guidelines, allowing for a non-ambiguous understanding of whats
required in relation to the APPI.
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Baloyi and Kotzé [58] extend their previous work [57] by providing enterprises
a set of benefits in regards to privacy compliance. 18 benefits were provided in this
aspect:
1. Legal Compliance
2. Data Subject Trust and Confidence
3. Data Subject Retention
4. Public Trust
5. Consumer Trust and Confidence
6. Respect for Consumer Privacy
7. Improved Service Provision
8. Reducing Organisational Reputational
Risk
9. Improved Risk Management
10. Data Privacy Risk Minimisation
11. Reduction of Complaints and Disputes
12. Public Perception of Transparent Prac-
tices
13. Reduced Risk of Collateral Intrusion
14. Regulated Data Sharing
15. Better Data Security/Protection
16. Encourage Adoption of CPSs and IoT
17. Improved Trade Relations and Invest-
ment
18. Organisational Management Efficiency
These two papers together [57] [58] provide a methodological framework for pri-
vacy compliance, mapping required actions and the benefits afforded to the comply-
ing enterprise.
Mahbub [65] provides a comprehensive review of IoT security. They also outline
two threat modelling frameworks which emphasise privacy as a primary concern.
The LINDDUN framework is classified as a framework for modelling privacy threats





• Disclosure of the information
• Unawareness
• Non-compliance
Finally, One paper identifies privacy methods in the vehicle domain.
Xiong and Lagerström [60] developed an extension to the vehicle modelling lan-
guage “vehicleLang”. This extension provides a method of modelling privacy ele-
ments in vehicular systems to enable threat modelling of the system. During the
execution of this threat modelling method three items need to be defined; the assets
of the system, the relationships between assets and a set of assertions regarding
the system. Once defined, the MAL compiler can be used to analyse the effect of
the privacy extension on the system. Simulations can be compared by removing a
defensive asset or relationship, providing an analysis of the relative risk between
attacks.
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5.3.2.1.2 Technical Solutions of Privacy
Six primary papers identify technical solutions to privacy risk. The extracted tech-
nical solutions can be found in Table 5.17.
Table 5.17: Privacy Technical Solutions
Domain Technical Solution
CPS
Privacy-preservation by Noise Injection [Prevention] [64]
random perturbations [64]
estimation problems [64]
minimising directed information in control loops [64]
minimising fisher information [64]
IoT
Standard Cryptography for IoT Device Location Infor-
mation Privacy [65]




Privacy Preserving Subset Aggregation (PPSA) [109]
Vehicle
Modified oblivious transfer [110]




One paper identifies a solution in the CPS application domain.
Chong et al. [64] develop a risk management framework for application in the
CPS domain. The objective of the risk framework is to reduce the overall risk of
attacks by deploying targeted risk mitigation strategies. To do this, cyber attacks
were identified in terms of their likelihood and impact on a system. Respective
mitigation strategies were then applied to these attacks. During this process the
authors discuss the “Privacy-preservation by Noise Injection” technique. In this
scheme, privacy is preserved via the addition of noise to a signal of sufficiently high
variance that the de-scrambling of the initial data is difficult for an attacker. This
is commonly known as differential privacy. Other methods of privacy preservation
are briefly mentioned such as the use of random perturbations, estimation problems,
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the act of minimising directed information in control loops and minimising fisher
information in estimation.
Two papers identify technical solutions in regards to privacy in the IoT appli-
cation domain.
During Mahbubs’ [65] IoT literature review, the authors provided several tech-
nical solutions mitigating privacy risk. Interestingly the authors also outline some
of the secondary benefits to privacy in regards to fog computing. Specifically, fog
computing mitigates MITM attacks, data transit attacks, eavesdropping attacks
and finally resource-constraint attacks. These attacks, specially the first three, lend
themselves to violating personally identifiable information in an IoT context so mit-
igating them can be considered privacy risk mitigation.
Mahdikhani et al. [109] develop an aggregation scheme for use in Fog-Enhanced
IoT which specifically addresses privacy issues in the area. This is reflected in one
of the primary goals of the scheme which is to provide “different levels of privacy
preservation in a user’s query, the IoT devices’ responses and the intermediate results
among the fog nodes in the fog layer.” Specifically, the issue the authors are solving is
that of intermediate privacy - privacy of IoT nodes to fog nodes and fog nodes to the
user. For example, the user wishes to receive some information from a subset of IoT
nodes. Their request, in this scheme, is encrypted with the Paillier cryptosystem and
by utilising the unique aspects of this cryptosystem this request is indistinguishable
under plaintext attack.
Two papers provide technical solutions to privacy in the vehicle application
domain.
Ming and Yu [110] present a prototype method which provides privacy and el-
evated efficiency for vehicles which query databases regarding road conditions on
various routes. The authors define seven design goals of which the proposed data
sharing scheme should meet; authentication and data integrity, confidentiality, lo-
cation privacy preservation, identify privacy preservation, traceability, unlinkability,
and Resistance to attacks. To achieve these goals the authors utilise super-increasing
sequences (sequences where each number is greater than the sum of all numbers be-
fore it) providing superior efficiency and the modified oblivious transfer method -
providing privacy.
Xiong and Lagerström [60] During the design of this extension the authors pro-
pose LDP. LDP is a privacy mechanism that provides a method for vehicles to defend
their sensitive geolocation data, protecting privacy information of drivers. To achieve
this, vehicles are able to introduce a type of noise into their data - protecting the
confidentiality of the information during transit.
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Finally, one paper provides technical solutions to privacy in the software appli-
cation domain.
Hafiz et al. [42] identified two primary security patterns designed to mitigate
attacks on privacy in software. Information Obscurity, generally, identifies meth-
ods in which information is hidden through zero knowledge communication and
other methods. The second pattern is Pseudonymous Identity in which anonymity
is achieved, providing confidentiality of an individuals data.
5.3.2.2 Topic 2: Security
In total 16 primary papers provide methods and mitigation strategies for security.
5.3.2.2.1 Methods of Security
Two papers provide security methods in the CPS application domain. Both of these
papers where written by Kavallieratos, Katsikas and Gkioulos in 2020 and involve
safety and security co-engineering.
Kavallieratos et al. [107] provide an in-depth survey on cybersecurity and safety
co-engineering methods. These methods generally fit into three categories; security-
informed safety approaches, safety-informed security approaches, and combined safety
and security approaches. Each of these categories identify the primary objective of
the approach - security or safety, or both. In total the authors identified nine co-
engineering methods (Table 5.18) with their survey.




Analysis safety hazards and security threats









graphical approach for analysis of safety and
security in the CPS domain.
CRAF [114]
The Cyber RA Framework provides a method
to elicit how a loss of data security can affect
safety.
UFoI-E [115]
The Uncontrolled Flows of information and
Energy method provides a diagrammatic rep-
resentation of CPS systems for risk analysis.
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Continuation of Table 5.18
AVES [116]
The Automated Vehicles Safety and Secu-
rity Analysis Framework creates four relation-
ship matrices and a cybersecurity deployment
model. The method leverages these to provide




The CPS master diagram is a hierarchical
three-layer representation of the studied sys-




This method specifically identifies security
threats that would force IoT medical devices
to violate their functional safety
SARA [119]
The Security Automotive Risk Analysis pro-
vides a method of threat modelling and RA
for driver-less vehicles.
End of Table
Next, Kavallieratos et al. [74] provide their own safety and security elicitation
framework offering a method based upon the Secure Tropos and Systems Theoretic
Process Approach (STPA) methods (see Figure 5.20). SafeSecTropos addresses five
key limitations with other safety/security co-engineering methods:
• Objectives-driven method
– Other methods do not elicit requirements based on safety and security
objectives.
• System Models
– Safety and Security models differ greatly in their representation, SafeSec-
Tropos provides one model for use in both domains.
• Documentation
– Documentation between safety and security methods differ greatly, Safe-
SecTropos provides interoperability between documentation.
• Conflict Resolution
– In SafeSecTropos, each requirement can be traced back to the objectives
and goals that generated it, providing a resolution mechanism for poten-
tial conflicts between safety and security.
• Representation of complex systems
– By combining the geographical aspects of Secure Tropos and the system-
atic perspective of STPA, SafeSecTropos is able to present and analyse
complex and interdependent systems.
Seven papers provide security methods in the IoT application domain.
As well as providing privacy frameworks, Mahbub [65] also provides two general
security frameworks used in the IoT application domain. The STRIDE framework
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Figure 5.20: SafeSecTropos method consolidated from the Secure Tropos and STPA
methods. (Adapted from [74])
has been leveraged in the IoT application domain to provide a threat model ([120]
from [65]). STRIDE is a Microsoft-developed program for Security Development





• Denial of Service
• Elevation of Privilege
The second framework described is the CORAS framework; This framework is
uniquely structured such that developers are treated as distinct persons, rather than
a singular group. Research performed with CORAS has yielded work describing and
analysing the health of connectivity between IoT gadgets and smartphones ([121]).
Kulik et al. [71] develop a threat driven modelling framework for application in
the IoT domain. The authors build upon the modelling language Alloy - a language
designed to describe structural constraints in software - and its analysis tool Alloy
Analyser. Alloy Analyser is a tool which is used to verify models created with the
Alloy language, checking for correctness and whether the system meets the desired
properties. The authors extend the application of these tools into the IoT domain,
providing a set of system actions that occur with IoT technology (see Table 5.19),
designating the rules of the new system. With these behaviours defined, common
attack patterns can be applied to the model, providing a method that can define
possible mitigation strategies in these systems.
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Table 5.19: System actions defined in [71]
Action Parameter(s) Description
generate(d) d, data
Action representing a subsystem generating




Action a representing subsystem sending data




Action representing a subsystem obtaining
data d from the communication channel c
accept(d) d, data
Action representing a subsystem accepting the
data d sent by another subsystem
discard(d) d, data
Action representing a subsystem discarding
the data d sent by another subsystem
connect(c) c, communication channel
Action representing a subsystem connecting to
the communication channel c
disconnect(c) c, communication channel
Action representing a subsystem disconnect-
ing from the communication channel c
recover()
Action representing recovery of a subsystem
from compromised to normal mode
compromise()
Action representing a subsystem becoming
compromised, i.e. malicious activity is present
on the subsystem
Griffy-Brown et al. [27] develop an information security framework, specifically
for executives, for application in the IoT domain. To do this the authors surveyed 59
firms, from small enterprises to large enterprises, and interviewed business leaders.
Risk based approaches were identified as the most prevalent security strategies used
in these enterprises, with over 80% of respondents indicating that some form of
risk-based approach was implemented. To this end, the authors offer an extended
risk-based method (see Figure 5.21) which provides a better estimation of cost due
to risk for use in budgeting.
Finally, the authors offered emerging themes drawn from their industry inter-
views which were further refined into three recommendations:
• Take an Extended Risk-Based Approach
– Cyber-security best practice is to implement a holistic risk evaluation
method which provides accurate budgeting constraints.
• Be Data-centric
– The IoT application domain specifically handles vast amounts of hetero-
geneous data, often increasing the difficulty of handling and processing.
Data indexing and protection should be of higher consequences for enter-
prises operating in this domain.
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• Don’t forget the basics
– Follow proven security practice and reduce risk appropriately.
Figure 5.21: Proposed extended risk-based method (extracted from [27])
Shaaban et al. [68] present a reference model for IoT based technical solutions.
During this work the authors provide some general security methods that are rec-
ommended for enterprises operating in the IoT domain. The recommended method
for security in IoT is to divide the IoT system into several components or zones
able to mitigate the security risks from the other parts in the system. These zones
are allocated a security level, which determines the security goals and therefore
the capabilities that are required to secure each zone. The authors also discuss the
Microsoft threat modelling tool as a method of identifying various threats to the
provided system (Figure 5.22).
Figure 5.22: Microsoft Threat Modeling Example (Extacted from [68])
Papke [122] argues that model-based system engineering (MBSE), coupled with
EA modelling languages provides a solution to agile security architecture. Agile
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security, as a method, is an answer to agile threats, providing security systems
that adapt to the threat landscape around them - providing flexible and timely
protection against new and novel attacks. The authors argue that MBSE enables
an effective implementation strategy of agile security as MBSE methods include a
modelling language, modelling method and modelling tool. The combination of a
semi-formal language, a defined method, and tool provides powerful benefits to the
system architecture team - allowing for detailed modelling with inbuilt traceability
and design consistency. This provides the engineers with the ability to modify the
system and understand the implications of the modification throughout.
Augusto-Gonzalez et al. [72] present the security project GHOST designed to
provide real time risk control for home-based IoT technology applications. During
the discussion of this tool the authors provide seven security frameworks discussed
in literature and implemented in industry (Table 5.20).
Table 5.20: Frameworks discussed in [72]
Framework Description
IoTGuard [123]
Utilises Bro Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
to detect abnormal behaviours in an IoT en-
vironment
IDS Framework [124]
Based on Anomaly Behaviour Analysis, this
framework provides security for existing smart
home installations.
Agent based modelling [125]
agents inside the smart home environment
make observations and implement intended
behaviour.
Heimdall [126]
A whitelist based intrusion detection tech-
nique designed for IoT devices.
Policy-based whitelisting [127]
A network layer architecture which provides
mitigation implementations
Traffic filtering and anomaly de-
tection [128]
Enforces a rule based method where every IoT
device is only allowed to perform a specified
behaviour.
Blockchain based smart home
framework [129]
Utilising blockchain technology to provide de-
centralised security and privacy in a smart
home environment
GHOST itself, implements a network monitoring and anomaly detection ap-
proach, providing the flexibility required from the heterogeneous IoT ecosystem.
Security is compartmentalised into a five layered system architecture, enabling the
independent development of each system, while preserving inter-dependency within
the framework. The full architecture can be found in Figure 5.23.
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Figure 5.23: GHOST architecture (extracted from [72])
Li et al. [130] provide an improved security RA method through utilising a heuris-
tic technique based on the Cuckoo Search (CS) algorithm. The authors provide im-
provements to the original CS algorithm, reducing the time needed to find an optimal
solution. The authors then provide the RA method consisting of six steps. Steps one
and two initialise the back-propagation neural network (BPNN) and improved CS
algorithm respectively. Steps three and four process the input (risk factors) and op-
timise the fitness of the solution. Finally, steps five and six determine if the solution
conditions are meet, and output the best solution in the set of proposed solutions.
Three papers provide security methods in the vehicle domain.
Cui et al. [67] integrate safety engineering processes (ISO 26262) with secu-
rity engineering process (SAE J3061) to create a safety and security co-engineering
framework. To do this a six step method was proposed which generates a safety and
security model consisting of six hierarchies describing system functions - functions,
structure, failures, attacks, safety countermeasures - as well as relationship matrices
between these functions (see Figure 5.24).
The authors then provide a Collaborative Analysis Framework which outlines the
methods required to elicit the information required by the safety and security model
drawing from the previously mentioned industry standards (Figure 5.25). In doing
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so the authors contextualise the use of the safety and security model in a holistic
security and safety engineering method.
Figure 5.24: S&S model (extracted from [67])
Figure 5.25: Associated Collaborative Analysis Framework (extracted from [67])
Xiong et al. [62] provide a method of simulating attacks and modelling threats in
the connected vehicle domain. The authors discuss the increasing number of meth-
ods that combine threat modelling with attack simulations to provide quantitative
security measurements. To implement a similar solution in the connected vehicle
domain the authors utilise the threat modelling and risk management tool, securi-
CAD. Using securiCAD ’s inbuilt simulation engine, a probabilistic attack graph can
be formed containing the probabilities of a certain attack succeeding in the mod-
elled system. By providing components of connected vehicles, security settings of
these components, and possible attacks, secureCAD is able to produce a risk matrix
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and attack path providing information on the effectiveness of in place mitigation
strategies and potentially new areas of concern.
Riel et al. [131] discuss how both IT security requirements and functional safety
can be included during the design of IIoT/smart devices. The method is based off
two primary components - axiomatic design (AD) and signal flow analysis (SFA).
Using SFA, safety goals are able to be decomposed into functional requirements
(FRs) which need to be met in order for the system to meet its safety goals.
Cyber-security requirements can then be elicited through the application of a
threat analysis and RA process. These security requirements, along with the safety
FRs, can then be mitigated during the design process. The authors also provide a
discussion on how this joint safety security process can be integrated into applicable
industry standards.
Four papers provide security methods for general application over many appli-
cation domains.
Islam et al. [132] explores overall security orchestration techniques through an
SLR, identifying 95 primary papers. During their review the authors identified six
security automation strategies and methods found in literature (see Table 5.21).
Table 5.21: Security Automation Strategy [132]
Strategy Description
Auto Integration
Tools and methods that automatically connect existing security
tools through APIs to streamline an incident response process.
Workflow
Workflow tools are a solution to gather and enhance alerts that
automatically send instructions to analysis, auditors, and other
security systems.
Scripting
Scripting tools perform actions based on custom code written by
security staff, who use the scripting tools to configure existing
playbook, security tools and policy.
Prioritisation
Prioritisation tools help security teams to decide critical security
alerts.
Learning
Utilising Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques and game theory
models to make security systems intelligent.
Plugin & Module
Small programs of software that organisations can independently
select an install based on the required configuration.
Solhaug and Seehusen [41] develop a continuous risk analysis process based on
the risk analysis framework CORAS. The objective of this solution is to enable
the continuous maintenance of risk models, lowering the overhead of this process.
The proposed process is divided into two phases - the initialisation stage and the
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continuous risk management stage, with each phase consisting of steps (see Figure
5.26).
Figure 5.26: Model Driven Risk Analysis Process (Adapted from [41])
The initialisation phase consists of two steps producing five outputs. Two of
these outputs are unique contributions by the authors, Target Description and Trace
Model. These enable the continuous risk analysis method which is enacted during a
context change. Once a context change occurs a new, updated Target Description
is generated, which enables new risks to be calculated.
This method provides traceability from the target of analysis to its associated
risks through the generated Trace Model ’s. By doing so automated support for
tracing changes and identifying risks that need to be reassessed is available.
Yigit Ozkan et al. [133] devise a method of developing customised information
security focus area model (ISFAM) maturity models for Small to Medium Enterprises
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(SMEs). The authors chose to base their method off of the ISFAM maturity model
[134] as it is the only existing focus area maturity model (FAMM) for information
security in literature. Example maturity models are provided in Table 5.22.
Table 5.22: Information and cybersecurity maturity models (extracted from [133])
Maturity Model Purpose/Target
Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (ES-
C2M2) [135]
Assessment of critical infrastructures
Open Information Security Management Maturity
Model (O-ISM3) [136]
Any type of organisation
National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education –
Capability Maturity Model (NICE) [137]
Workforce planning for cybersecurity
Information Security Focus Area Maturity model
(ISFAM) [134]
Any type of organisation
The finalised cluster-adapted ISFAM (CA-ISFAM) creation method consisted of
five steps which constitute their methodology. First, characteristic data is collected
from the target SMEs. This data is used to construct a profile that represents the
SME population in a cluster. Second, the frequency of individual characteristics in
the SME profile are calculated. Third, these characteristics are used to create a
characteristics heat map which graphically represents the data to aid in the analysis
of frequencies. Forth, using the highest frequency values found in the previous steps
the maximum maturity levels are calculated. These levels are then encoded into a
model. Finally, a cluster adapted ISFAM model is generated after identifying how
the organisational characteristics of the SMEs in a cluster affect the focus areas and
the capabilities of the information security FAMM.
Ganin et al. [66] provide a risk mitigation assessment framework, analysing what
countermeasures provide the most benefit - in terms of effectiveness and stakeholder
interests (time, cost, complexity, maintenance) - for their associated risks. To do
this the authors developed a set of criteria of which to analysis each risk against.
These criteria were categorised into three groups: Threats, vulnerabilities and con-
sequences.
Threats were found to be largely underrepresented in cyber RA models due
to their complicated nature - threats require a form of probabilistic quantification
which vulnerabilities and consequences do not. Vulnerabilities were found to gener-
ally be identified through a white box perspective, analysing known vulnerabilities
and their effectiveness against a system. This method does not include the notion
of an unknown vulnerability. Consequences in cybersecurity models were frequently
described as a monetary value - that is, the cost of rectifying the situation once an
event has occurred.
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Using this base of information the authors developed a novel classification of
threats, vulnerabilities and consequences - defining a set of criteria of which risks
can be measured against. This classification is provided in Figure 5.27.
Figure 5.27: Proposed RA criteria (extracted from [66])
During the risk decision analysis these criteria are given a score either by experts
or based off a set of measurable metrics. Scores assigned to the effectiveness of
countermeasures are calculated using the Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA)
approach. In this way solutions and mitigation strategies are able to be compared
over multiple stakeholder interests and effectiveness metrics.
5.3.2.2.2 Technical Solutions of Security
Eight primary papers contribute technical solutions and mitigation techniques to
security. Primary technical solutions, grouped by their application domains, are
provided in Table 5.23.
115
5.3. QUALITATIVE SYNTHESIS CHAPTER 5. SLR




Tuning of Detector Thresholds [64]
Secure State Estimation [64]
Watermarking and Moving Target Defence
[64]
Coding and Encryption Strategies [64]
Game-theoretic DoS protection [64]
Event-triggered control DoS protection [64]
Distributed Algorithms [64]
Robust Statistics [64]







Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
[69]
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [69]
Trust-management through AI, fuzzy meth-
ods, game theory and Bayesian estimation
[69]
FEC-based authentication servers [69]
Sampling and Signature [69]
Access Control [69]
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Header or Timed Response [75]
Address Space Layout Randomisation [62]
AntiMalware [62]




Static Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)
Tables [62]





Integration Reverse Proxy [42]
Brokered Authentication [42]
Single Access Point [42]
Authentication Enforcer [42]
Role Based Access Control [42]
Compartmentalisation [42]




One primary paper identifies technical solutions in the CPS domain.
Chong et al. [64] provide discussion on security in the CPS application domain
elicited nine technical security solutions. Generally, these solutions are low level,
theoretical solutions providing methods to detect, prevent and treat various cyber
attacks. Descriptions of each technical solution are given in Table 5.24.
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Table 5.24: Technical solutions identified in [64]
Technical Solution Description
Tuning of Detector Thresh-
olds
Anomaly detectors which raise an alarm if a received signal is
sufficiently far away from nominal trajectories.
Secure State Estimation
State observers monitor the CPS system and identify how se-
cure the current state is.
Watermarking and Moving
Target Defence
CPS signals in the system are Watermarked by superimposing
a globally known signal onto the carrier signal. Observers can




Coding an encryption strategies are employed to protect data
in transit between nodes, assuring confidentiality.
Game-theoretic DoS protec-
tion
Interaction between adversary and controller is formulated as
a zero-sum dynamic game. In doing so the optimal strategy for
the adversary to cause a DoS attack can be formulated. From
here, mitigation strategies can be implemented.
Event-triggered control DoS
protection
Explicit characterisation of the adversaries frequency and du-
ration of implementing the DoS attacks in order to adversely
affect stabilisation, or consensus of the dynamical system.
Distributed Algorithms
As CPS is often decentralised, centralised mitigation strategies
are ineffective. Distributed algorithms have been applied to
CPS to provide mitigation techniques that are effective in this
context.
Robust Statistics
Designing filters in a way which provides estimates that are
insensitive to large fractions of faulty or attacked sensors -
treating these as outliers.
Rational Security Allocation
Changing the system, physically or otherwise, in order to re-
duce the likelyhood of a cyber incident
Three primary papers identify technical solutions in the IoT domain.
During Mahbubs’ [65] comprehensive review of IoT security the authors pro-
vide five technical security mechanisms. The authors discuss how fog computing, by
nature, can help mitigate security vulnerabilities found within the IoT application
domain. Four general cyber-attacks are mitigated through the implementation of a
fog architecture, MITM attacks, data transit attacks, eavesdropping attacks, and
finally, resource-constraint attacks.
As fog-computing’s primary purpose is not security, it has been excluded from
the general technical solutions table (Table 5.23). Descriptions of the five technical
solutions can be found in Table 5.25.
Omoniwa et al. [69] provide six technical solutions during their discussion on
FEC and IoT. Two of the solutions are well known, widely implemented general
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solutions to internet security: DTLS and TLS. Both of these are security solutions
to user datagram protocol (UDP) communication and transmission control protocol
(TCP) communication respectively. The remaining four solutions are more specific
to the IoT and FEC application domain. Descriptions of these solutions are given
in Table 5.26.
Hernández et al. [138] discuss the limitations of security in resource constrained
devices, and how secure communication can be achieved at low cost. The authors
identified two primary resources whose consumption needed to be minimised - pro-
cessor speed and memory consumption. Example security mechanisms that impact
these resources are asymmetric cryptography, which requires further processor com-
putation than symmetric cryptography. The authors use these, and other factors,
to educate an encryption protocol mediated by a new element in the network - the
security management console. Primarily, this solution relies on an instantiation of
symmetric cryptography in which two keys, K1 and K2, are agreed upon in the
secure network. The redundant key allows for new key generation in the case of key
exposure, providing a secure method of communication during the key generation
process.
Three primary papers identify technical solutions in the vehicle domain.
Katsikeas et al. [75] provide three technical solutions during their discussion
on the security modelling of vehicles. The first, BusOffProtection, defines how the
ECUs of smart vehicles are protected by analysing incoming traffic behaviour on the
CANNetwork. Next, Message Confliction mechanisms provide host-based Intrustion
detection and prevention system (IDPS) monitors which monitor internal computing
systems and network traffic. Finally, Header or Timed Response defends against
vulnerabilities introduced by the LINNetwork protocol.
Xiong et al. [62] explore threat modelling and attack simulations in the con-
nected vehicle application domain. The authors provide an analysis of the software
AUTORSAR used in the selected vehicles for modelling - the 2014 Jeep Cherokee
and 2015 Cadillac Escalade. This analysis provided a list of seven security mecha-
nisms included in the software which are further described in Table 5.27.
During the discussion on AUTOSAR, nine other, internal, security mechanisms
are described. These solutions are not included in Table 5.23 as they are not technical
in nature - they more identify practices which, if done correctly, can mitigate security
risk. These are given below:
• Properly Configured
– Protects against human error
• Vendor Support
– If the software is supported/has ac-
cess to latest patches and updates
• No Patch-able Vulnerability
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– If the software has no known vul-
nerability
• No Un-Patchable Vulnerability
– The software product is not inher-
ently vulnerable
• Software Language
– The software is written in a lan-
guage which has a low error rate,
and performs checks on memory
• Scrutinised
– If the software has been thoroughly
tested to ensure correct behaviour
• Secret Binary
– Protection of the binary to make it
difficult for attackers to utilise it to
find new vulnerabilities
• Secret Source Code
– If the source code is protected from
unwanted scrutiny
• StaticCode Analysis
– If there is a tool that provides pen
testing of the software
Messnarz et al. [63] describes how fail operational states can be reached in AVs,
and while doing so provides a list of cybersecurity design considerations, some of
which are technical solutions. Three technical solutions were identified and described
in Table 5.28. The authors, similarly to [62], provide non technical mitigation strate-
gies alongside these technical solutions. In total, four non-technical solutions were
identified:
• Secure development
– Verified and secure development of
the control APPs
• Secure Socket Layer (SSL) Libraries
– The manufacturer will provide SSL
libraries to be used inside the car.
• Industry best practice and security gov-
ernance
– Security requirements for access to
in-vehicle data and resources and
the security requirements for ap-
plications and services are based
on advanced industry best practice,
standards and recommendations.
• Kerckhoffs Principle
– Security elements should be de-
signed assuming the attacker has
full access to the system.
Finally, one paper identified technical solutions for application in the software
domain.
Hafiz et al. [42] provided a holistic security pattern language for the software do-
main. The authors originally planned on contributing a collation of security patterns
however, they decided to utilise pattern languages as other categorisation methods
did not guide practitioners in selecting the correct pattern. Pattern languages are
more flexible as they do not utilise categories but rather connections between pat-
terns – a type of ontology. The process of generating the pattern language is well
documented and provides the methodology they used during the creation of the
pattern language.
The pattern language describes many technical and process based security so-
lutions in the software domain. Table 5.23 includes the proposed unified patterns
(Figure 5.28) which the authors have collated. These unified patterns provide an
abstracted representation of technical solutions to security.
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The authors also defined a set of higher level patterns, identifying processes and
methods which are used when assessing what security solutions should be imple-
mented (Figure 5.29).
Figure 5.28: Unified Security Patterns (extracted from [42])
Figure 5.29: High Level Patterns (extracted from [42])
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Table 5.25: Technical solutions described in [65]
Technical Solution Description
Secure Onboarding
Maintaining encryption keys at the stage where another device
or sensor is inserted into an IoT environment.
Extra Interfaces
Limiting the attack surface by reducing the facilities and func-
tionalities to end-clients.
End-to-End Encryption
End-to-end protection is required in the application layer to
facilitate confidentiality and integrity
Firmware updates
Due to the context IoT devices are frequently used in they
often are unable to update frequently and regularly. Pipelines
need to be in place to install new firmware once it is available.
Intrusion Detection
Fog nodes may recognise assaults based on city infrastructure
by teaming up with their neighbouring hubs.
Table 5.26: Technical solutions described in [69]
Technical Solution Description
Trust-management through
AI, fuzzy methods, game the-
ory and Bayesian estimation




Rather than centralised methods for authentication, dis-
tributed FEC authentication methods are more effective.
Sampling and Signature
Provides integrity via a local collector who acts as coordina-
tor and periodically transmits the sampled packets to a global
traffic analytic.
Access Control
Strategies and methods used to implement access control need
to be lightweight as IoT devices are resource constrained.
Table 5.27: Technical solutions described in [62]
Technical Solution Description
Address Space Layout Ran-
domisation
Hardens ECUs against buffer overflow attacks
AntiMalware Detects and removes malicious malware
Data Extraction Prevention
Protects against buffer overflow by making memory areas non-
executable
Hardening
Disabling unused services, ports and hardware outlets to re-
duce risk area
Host Firewalls Management of traffic shared between hosts
Software Patch Host runs the latest security patch
Static ARP Tables Protects against ARP table spoofing
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Table 5.28: Technical solutions described [63]
Technical Solution Description
APP command encryption
APP commands are encrypted, with different encryption meth-
ods used per communication media
Dedicated Gateways
Dedicated gateways are used during communication to a cloud
network.
Mutual authentication
Mutual authentication to verify that the received.transmitted
data sources and destinations are legitimate.
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5.3.2.3 Topic 3: Industry Standards
In total 12 primary papers discussed industry standards. Each standard is enumer-
ated with their titles and referencing articles in Table 5.29.
5.3.2.3.1 Security Standards
nine primary papers provide standards for use in the security domain. In total, 8
industry standards were identified.
ISA/IEC 62443 is a series of standards providing frameworks which address
and mitigate security vulnerabilities in industrial automation and control systems
(IACSs) [139]. This is discussed in [68], who create an IoT reference model, [107],
who produced a survey on safety and security co-engineering methods, and, [74] who
provide a method of joint safety and security requirements elicitation.
ISO 21434 provides details on cybersecurity engineering in the vehicles applica-
tion domain. This standard is under development at time of writing, and will provide
details on vehicle lifecycle from design to decommission in regards to cybersecurity
engineering [140]. This is discussed in [63], who provide discussion on AVs and how
they can achieve safe fail operational states.
ISO 27000 is a widely cited series of information security management stan-
dards which provides terms, definitions and information system security methodolo-
gies [141]. This is discussed in [68], who create an IoT reference model, [107], who
produced a survey on safety and security co-engineering methods, and, [74] who
provide a method of joint safety and security requirements elicitation.
ISO/IEC 27034 is a family of standards which provide guidance on information
security in regards to designing, programming, implementing and utilising applica-
tion systems. This enables applications to provide the necessary level of security
to support organisations information security policy [142]. This is discussed in [74],
who provide a method of joint safety and security requirements elicitation.
ISO/IEC 29100 provides a high-level privacy framework enabling the protec-
tion of personally identifiable information transmitted in communication and IT
[143]. This is discussed in [57], who provided a set of guidelines for data privacy and
compliance for enterprise.
NIST 800-30 provides guidance in regards to RA of federal information systems
and organisations [144]. This is discussed in [145], which provides a SLR on safety
and security co-analyses.
NIST SP 800-53 contains a catalogue of security and privacy controls for
federal information systems and also, an elicitation process for selecting controls
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to protect organisational operations, assets and individuals [146]. This is discussed
in [76], which discusses joint modelling of safety and security in the context of
autonomous driving.
SAE J3061 outlines recommended practice in regards to vehicular cybersecu-
rity. These practices cover a wide range of vehicles from commercial to military [147].
This is discussed in [131], discussing the integration of safety and security in the IoT
domain, and, in [148], who provide an analysis framework for safety and security in
AVs.
5.3.2.3.2 Joint Security and Safety Standards
five primary papers provided combined security and safety standards. In total, Five
industry standards were identified.
ISO 31000 addresses operation continuity and reassurance in terms of economic
resilience, professional reputation and environmental/safety outcomes through cus-
tomisable risk management solutions [149]. This is discussed in [41] in which a
method of agile, model-driven risk analysis is proposed.
IEC 62645 is an industry standard providing information on nuclear power
plants, specifically on their control and electrical power systems [150]. This is dis-
cussed in [107] who provide a survey on safety and security co-engineering methods.
IEC 62859 provides more information on nuclear power plants, outlining a
framework designed to manage the interactions between safety and cybersecurity
systems and methods [151]. This is discussed in [74], providing a method for joint
safety and security requirements elicitation.
EN 50126:1999 defines the concept RAMS: Reliability, Availability, Maintain-
ability and Safety for application in the railway domain. These concepts define re-
quirements for all major railway systems: from major systems down to combined
individual components and sub-systems (including software) [152]. This is discussed
in [76], providing a joint modelling method for safety and security in the context of
AVs, and [145], who provides a SLR on safety and security co-analysis techniques.
EN 50128:2011 builds upon the EN 50126 standard, specifying the process and
technical requirements for developing software in the railway application domain. It
provides specific emphasis on the safety implications of these systems [153]. This
was discussed in [76], who provide a joint modelling method for safety and security
in the context of AVs.
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5.3.2.3.3 Safety Standards
Six primary papers provided safety standards. In total six industry standards were
identified.
EN 50129:2016 outlines safety-related electronic system requirements, specif-
ically signalling systems, in the railway application domain [154]. This is discussed
in [76] who provide a joint modelling method for safety and security in the context
of AVs.
ARP* 4761 describes guidelines and methods for safety assessment for the
certification of civil aircraft. This is discussed in [76] who designed a joint modelling
method of safety and security in the context of autonomous driving.
IEC 61508 defines basic functional safety, applicable in all industries. Functional
safety is defined as “part of the overall safety relating to the EUC (Equipment Under
Control) and the EUC control system which depends on the correct functioning of
the electrical, electronic, or programmable electronic safety-related systems, other
technology safety-related systems and external risk reduction facilities”” [155]. This
is discussed in [131], outlining the integration of safety and security in the IoT
domain, [107], who provides a survey of safety and security co-engineering methods,
and finally, [76] who designed a joint modelling method of safety and security in the
context of autonomous driving.
ISO/PAS 21448 provides guidance to engineers on the design, verification and
validation measures to achieve safety of the intended functionality (SOTIF). SO-
TIF is defined as “the absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards resulting from
functional insufficiencies of the intended functionality or by reasonably foreseeable
misuse by personnel” [156]. This is discussed in [76] who designed a joint modelling
method of safety and security in the context of autonomous driving.
UK Defence Standard 00-56 sets out all safety requirements for all contrac-
tors providing products, services or systems to the Ministry of Defence (UK), and
guides the “managing of Risk to Life associated with operation of military systems”
[157]. This is discussed in [76], discussing joint modelling of safety and security in
the context of AVs.
ISO 26262 is a widely cited standard which defines functional safety for elec-
trical and/or electronic systems in road vehicles [158]. Six primary papers discuss
this standard, all of which provide research on either the integration of safety and
security, or discuss safety and security co-engineering literature. These papers are
([131] [148] [107] [63] [76] and [145])
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Mil-Std 882 outlines the Department of Defence (US) systems engineering ap-
proach designed to eliminate hazards, where possible, and minimise risk where haz-
ards cannot be eliminated [159]. This was discussed in [76], discussing joint modelling
of safety and security in the context of AVs.
5.3.2.3.4 Architecture Standards
Two primary papers provided architectural standards. These papers identified two
industry standards.
IEC/PAS 61499 provides a generic architectural description and guidelines for
the use of function blocks in distributed industrial-process measurement and control
systems [160]. This is discussed in [73] in which a method of security issue diagnostics
integration into EA is proposed.
ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010 identifies the requirements of the description of sys-
tems, software and EA. It standardises the practice of architecture description by
providing a standard conceptual foundation for these methods [161]. This is dis-
cussed in [46] in their discussion on IoT and CPS privacy.
5.3.2.3.5 Other Standards
Two primary papers provided other standards. These papers identified three in-
dustry standards.
ECSS-Q-ST-80C defines a set of software product assurance requirements.
These requirements provide ease of maintenance for space system software [162]. This
is discussed in [74], who design a joint safety and security requirements elicitation
method.
ISO/IEC 25010 provides leading models for the assessment of a software prod-
uct. This provides measurable metrics, establishing performance of software pro-
cesses leading to improvement propositions [163]. This was discussed in [74], who
design a joint safety and security requirements elicitation method.
SAE J3016 provides a classification taxonomy for vehicle automation, identi-
fying levels of automation from full to no automation [164]. This was discussed in
[148] who provided an analysis of safety and security in AVs.
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Table 5.29: Referenced Standards
Begin of Table





Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation, con-




Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and
control systems - Requirements for coordinat-
ing safety and cybersecurity
[74]
ISA/IEC 62443
Security capabilities for control system com-
ponents
[68] [107] [74]
ISO 21434 Road vehicles - Cybersecurity engineering [63]
ISO 27000
IT - Security techniques - Information security
management systems
[68] [74] [76]
ISO 31000 Risk Management [41]
ISO/IEC 27034 IT - Security techniques - Application security [74]
ISO/IEC 29100 IT - Security techniques - Privacy framework [57]
NIST 800-30 Guide for Conducting RAs [145]
NIST 800-53
Security and Privacy Controls for Federal In-
formation Systems and Organisations
[76]
SAE J3061
Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical
Vehicle Systems
[67] [131]
Security & Safety Standards
EN 50126:1999




Railway applications - Communication, sig-
nalling and processing systems - Software for
railway control and protection systems
[76]
EN 50129:2016
Railway applications - Communication, sig-
nalling and processing systems - Safety related
electronic systems for signalling
[76]
Safety Standards
ARP* 4761 Aerospace Recommended Practice 4781 [76]
IEC 61508
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Continuation of Table 5.23
UK Defence Standard
00-56
Safety Management Requirements for Defence
Systems
[76]










Function blocks for industrial-process mea-
surement and control systems
[73]
ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010 Architecture description [46]
Other
ECSS-Q-ST-80C Software product assurance [74]
ISO/IEC 25010
Systems and software engineering - Systems
and software Quality Requirements and Eval-
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5.3.3 RQ1: How are security aspects being incorporated
into ArchiMate EA Models?
This RQ identifies primary studies which utilise ArchiMate to provide value in the
area of security. In total six primary papers were identified. Each of these papers
offer unique applications of ArchiMate and as such, no meta categorisation is made.
Each paper is discussed individually, identifying the authors objectives, methods
and outcomes below.
Berkel et al. [165] integrates threat analysis methods and EA modelling tech-
niques to mitigate security challenges in the smart city domain. The authors decided
upon EA modelling as it is designed around the multi-view modelling paradigm, en-
abling viewpoints such as data, security, governance, and business to be represented
in the same model. ArchiMate, specifically, was chosen for this method as it is
widely used in industry [165] and provides the RSO extension which facilitates risk
modelling.
To facilitate the threat analysis of smart cities the authors provided a baseline
architecture defined in ArchiMate that consists of four layers - Business Layer, Ap-
plication Layer, Technology Layer and the Physical layer. Also, a five step elicitation
method was applied to this architecture, identifying security requirements, controls
and risk responses.
Using this process the authors produce seven risk, requirement and response
models which constitute an information security architecture for smart cities. These
models identify likely attack vectors and their associated security measures. These
models provide stakeholders with a method to monitor security requirements and
integrate these into the overall EA.
Hacks et al. [166] provides a translation method which is able to convert models
developed in ArchiMate to MAL instances. The authors identify the difficulty of
understanding MAL DSLs due to their code like complexity. It was found that
translating ArchiMate models into MAL instances reduces its complexity, providing
a platform which is widely understood. The authors propose three advantages to this
method. First - tool support for ArchiMate is widely available, second - researchers
have already proposed methods of security modelling in ArchiMate and, finally, EA
models containing IT assets and modelling in ArchiMate can serve as input, avoiding
the need to model them twice.
The solution can be divided into two distinct problems - threat modelling in
ArchiMate and translation/alignment with MAL concepts. The authors decided to
provide a comparatively simple threat modelling method consisting of one new ele-
ment - threat, and a set of relations which are translated into OR and AND gates
for the MAL translation. Once the translation is completed, attack simulations can
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be run on the resulting model.
Närman et al. [167] utilise the ArchiMate language to enable availability analysis
through fault trees. ArchiMate is extended to incorporate a Probabilistic Relational
Model (PRM) enabling analysis to take place on the modelled system. Similarly to
[166], the authors define two new classes to the ArchiMate meta-model, providing
support for AND and OR gates, enabling more effective representation of fault trees
and therefore availability. In total four class attributes were implemented in order





Each attribute has two states - up or down with each element having a certain
probability of being in either state. By embedding this information in ArchiMate
models, the authors are able to predict availability of services within enterprise.
Korman et al. [35] provide an alignment of ArchiMate with various RA methods
in order to identify input information for each method. The authors discuss how
RA methods are often compared in terms of features offered, and contribute an
analysis of the required input data and effort for each method. The chosen strategy
of analysis was to model each method’s input suggested in ArchiMate to afford a
standardised comparison. In doing so the authors also provide an analysis of how
these methods align to the concepts and elements provided by ArchiMate.
Of the twelve selected RA methods, seven were successfully mapped to the core
concepts of ArchiMate (2.0). Due to the generality of ArchiMate however, these
results have varying levels of confidence between reviewers regarding their correct-
ness. For example, the researchers were able to map the RA method CORAS to
ArchiMate with a confidence of 80%.
Zhi et al. [168] provides a solution to the cognitive and operational dissonance
created when manipulating and interpreting independent diagrams. Traditionally,
quantitative evaluation of an architecture is achieved through a DSL, distinct from
the language used to describe the EA or its associated security cases. The authors
unify these processes into one method which leverages ArchiMate, effectively reduc-
ing the number of distinct languages required during these processes. As ArchiMate
is directly poised to model EA the authors provide new methods for the other two
processes - quantitative evaluation and security assurance cases. Quantitative eval-
uation is achieved through integrating Soft goal Interdependence Graphs (SIG) into
ArchiMate’s respective elements, enabling the analysis of various aspects of an ar-
chitecture depending on what factor is measured. Security cases are introduced by
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Figure 5.30: Architectural classification scheme based off cyclic groups (adapted
from [170])
integrating ArchiMate with the Intra Model Security Assurance (IMSA) method.
Drawing on previous research in the area [169] an alignment of ArchiMate’s ele-
ments to IMSA’s concepts is defined. Further, the authors extend this definition to
include concepts relevant to SIG, enabling a joint IMSA/SIG modelling approach
in ArchiMate.
Xiong et al. [170] defines a method of architecture analysis, leveraging the Hid-
den Structure Method (HSM) and Dominator Analysis (DA). This approach relied
on transforming an architecture into a Design Structure Matrix (DSM) through the
HSM, enabling a description of the architectures overall coupling between compo-
nents and cyclic groups. Once performed, the architecture can be classified as either
a core-periphery architecture - an architecture with an identifiable and substantial
cyclic core, a multi-core architecture or a hierarchical architecture - an architecture
with very few, small cyclic groups (Figure 5.30).
Once classified, the architecture can be re-visualised, revealing its hidden struc-
ture and enabling DA, a form of graph theory which outlines what elements are
dominators, and therefore corner stones of the architecture. The authors utilise
ArchiMate in their case study as it provides relationships and elements which can
be identified by DSM from its solution architecture. Once the above process is run
on an architecture, the new architecture and created output matrix can be used to
provide mitigation opportunities and strategies for the next architecture iteration.
132
CHAPTER 5. SLR 5.3. QUALITATIVE SYNTHESIS
5.3.4 RQ4: What support do architectural design languages
provide for security in EA?
To provide distinct contributions to RQ4, eight topics were identified with their










Each topic was educated by primary paper contributions, and contain an aggre-
gated contribution and general discussion and description of each primary paper.
5.3.4.1 Topic 1: Attack Description
Attack descriptions are methods of understanding and documenting how attacks
are carried out, and their possible effects on the target system. They describe each
variable and element that constitute an attack path in order to achieve their attack
goal.
5.3.4.1.1 Attack Trees
Five primary papers provided insight into graphical attack trees and their applica-
tions.
Nagaraju et al. [171] provides a survey of fault and attack tree modelling, identi-
fying the many additions and iterations each modelling method have received. The
authors cite ever increasing complexity in CPS and information systems as reasons
for employing these techniques. Fault tree and attack tree modelling are very sim-
ilar to each other, utilising the same top down tree structure with the root of the
tree being an undesirable state. The authors identified the primary defence between
these two methods as their application context. Fault trees are used to enumerate
different scenarios in which the reliability and/or safety of a system is compromised.
Attack trees, however, enumerate possible attack vectors to exploit a system.
This review offers an in-depth description of each modelling method as well as
many examples of how new behaviour was Incorporated into each. Two well known
and implemented improvements were the addition of a dynamic behaviour into fault
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trees, enabling the modelling of probability based behaviours, and the creation of
Attack-Defence trees (AD trees) which include countermeasures.
Al-Dahasi and Saqib [172] leverage attack trees to provide mitigation suggestions
for SCADA systems, specifically in the context of systems related to oil/gas, water
and petrochemical industry. Two primary categories of vulnerability were classified
- general attacks and DDOS attacks. These categories were then instantiated into
two classification trees - the first of which is provided in Figure 5.31.
Figure 5.31: SCADA attack tree - potential attacks (adapted from [172])
The authors provide eleven general vulnerabilities, the first of which (ATK 1,
Figure 5.31) identifying how physical damage to an IoT sensor can create a cascade
effect through deception, DoS or the lowing of system integrity. In addition to the
attack tree and the associated DDoS attack tree, they demonstrated how these can
be used to identify adversary objectives and aid in countermeasure design.
Buldas et al. [173] describe a method which enables quantitative analysis based
off attack trees. The authors identified how current quantitative analysis was unable
to handle values of intermediate nodes as well as being unable to represent additional
constants obtained from external sources of information, rather than being derived
from the tree itself.
To enable this analysis, an attack tree is represented as an attack tree decoration
problem, which can then be treated as a constraint satisfaction problem - a well
known problem in which a solution is an instantiation of each variable that satisfies
a set of constraints. To convert the attack tree into an attack tree decoration problem
a set of Boolean expressions are derived. The names of the Boolean variables are
drawn directly from the labels of each element on the tree. These variables are
categorised as Hard predicates - predicates that the user have no say over - as
they constituted the original attack tree. Soft predicates can then be defined by
the user - these can constitute historical data (such as relevant probabilities) and
domain knowledge constraints (such as one event being more likely than another).
With these variables defined an analysis engine can classify the problem into three
categories:
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• Determined
– There exists one viable instantiation of variables
• Inconsistent
– There exists no viable instantiation
• Undetermined
– The problem is neither Determined or Inconsistent
If the problem is not Determined the authors provide methods of loosening Soft
predicates in order to satisfy the problem. This gives the user a method to iden-
tify any inconsistency between their historical statistical knowledge and domain
knowledge constraints. The authors also provide examples, proofs, and semantic
definitions.
Widel et al. [174] reviews literature on attack trees, identifying five areas of
research which were popular in either extending attack trees or improving their
negative aspects. The primary contribution of this work was the categorisation of
research domains and their associated methods. A list of each domain and their
associated contributions is given below.
1. Formal Interpretations of Attack Trees
• Series-parallel Interpretation
• Linear Logic Interpretation: Specialisation of attack trees
• Path Interpretation: Correctness of an attack tree with respect to a system
2. Generation Approaches
• Process Algebra-based generation of attack trees
• ATSyRA Methodology: Generation of attack trees for physical systems
• TREsPASS: Generation of attack(-defence) trees for socio-technical systems
• Biclique Problem for a refinement-aware creation of attack trees
• Guided Design of Attack Trees by Tracking Useful Positions
3. Static Analysis
• Pareto Efficient Strategies in AD trees
• Selection of an Optimal Set of Countermeasures using Integer Linear Programming
• Efficient Approximation of the Cost of a Cheapest Attack
• Quantitative Analysis of AD trees with repeated actions
4. Timed Automata-based Analysis
• Attack Tree Analysis with Priced Timed automata
• AD tree analysis with timed automata
• Attack-defence Diagram’s Analysis with Stochastic Timed automata
5. Probabilistic Analysis
• Propagation of Probability Distribution on Attack Trees
• Combining Bayesian Networks and AD Trees
• Stochastic Game Interpretation of AD Trees
• Probabilistic Model Checking for Attack Trees
Formal Interpretations of Attack Trees and Probabilistic Analysis align with pop-
ular methods used to extend modelling languages to include security.
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Kordy et al. [175] provide a method which integrated Bayesian networks into
AD trees in order to evaluate probabilistic factors in an attack-defence scenarios,
while removing the traditional assumption that all actions involved in the model are
independent. The proposed framework is described in Figure 5.32.
Figure 5.32: Proposed Bayesian/AD Tree Framework (extracted from [175])
As shown in Figure 5.32, a Bayesian network is created alongside the traditional
AD tree. From this point conditional probability tables are created which are edu-
cated through domain experts and historical statistics. The Bayesian model provides
additional probabilistic dependencies between attack steps, enabling attack steps to
be dependent on each other - a weakness of traditional AD trees. Finally P(t) (the
overall probability the root node - the attack - is successful) and P max(t) (the
success probability of the most probable attack) can be calculated. The authors also
offer discussions and methods of increasing the efficiency of probabilistic computa-
tions through their provided fusion algorithm and the semiring valuation algebras.
5.3.4.1.2 Attack Graphs
Three primary papers provided insight into attack graphs.
Mao et al. [176] extends the cybersecurity modelling language securiCAD, which
is based off the well known Computer Aided Design (CAD) modelling pipeline,
with a method of condensing and abstracting models created in the language. The
authors identified that securiCAD, and attack graphs in general, often become large
and complex - making comprehension of the graphs difficult. To remedy this, they
propose a method specifically built for securiCAD of abstraction, reducing the total
number of elements and relations shown in the attack graph.
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Figure 5.33: securiCAD aggregation extension (extracted from [176])
Figure 5.34: Abstracted attack step of Access Control (extracted from [176])
The method relies primarily on two additional elements to securiCAD’s meta
model (Figure 5.33). Abstract Attack Step and Abstract Asset enable an aggregation
of like attack steps and assets. The abstraction decisions are contextually based
on the original securiCAD model and require an expert or analyst to identify like
elements and abstract them correctly. An example abstraction is provided in Figure
5.34.
Zhang et al. [177], similarly to [176], discusses attack graph abstraction citing
visualisation as a major problem due to the multitude of attack paths in an attack
graph. Due to the complexity of attack graphs, and how they are visualised, a
distorted risk picture is rendered to both human users and quantities vulnerability
assessment models. To remedy this the authors propose a method of abstracting the
input data to an attack graph generator, reducing the problem before it has been
processed. For example, if their are five identical servers set up on the same network,
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these can be abstracted into one entity as any exploit that works on one, will work
on all.
Expanding upon this, the authors provide three algorithms designed to identify
what elements and relations should be abstracted together. The first: Reachability-
based grouping identifies hosts with the same network reachability and groups them
together. Next, Vulnerability grouping identifies similar vulnerabilities on each host
and groups them together. Lastly, Configuration-based breakdown groups hosts to-
gether who are in the same reachability group and have similar configuration (and
therefore similar vulnerabilities).
Using these algorithms a complex attack graph can be reduced to vital compo-
nents for better visualisation and risk estimation.
Khouzani et al. [178] provide a solution to the control selection optimisation
problem in attack graphs. The authors provide three primary challenges that effect
control selection. First, the effect of security controls is probabilistic and usually
mitigate risk rather than remove the threat. Second, controls can affect multiple
vulnerabilities and each vulnerability may be affected by multiple controls. Finally,
there can be a prohibitively large number of attack paths, making control selection
difficult.
The provided solution transforms this problem into an optimisation problem by
defining two methods. The attack problem is defined as a probabilistic attack graph
which describes the source of an attack (the initial privilege state of the attacker),
its edges (vulnerabilities that an attacker may exploit) and target (potential end
goals of an attacker). The measure R can then be taken, which describes the attack
path of highest probability.
The second method is the defence problem. Utilising the previous measure R,
the enterprise wishes to minimise this risk by introducing defensive controls. Each
control has a set of variables: Cost - the implementation cost of the control, indirect
cost - the negative impact on the enterprise that deploys the control, and efficiency
- the effectiveness of the control.
Both these problems are transformed into simple linear programming problems
and solved for maximising control effectiveness and minimising cost.
5.3.4.2 Topic 2: Risk Assessment (RA)
Four primary papers contributed to RA modelling.
Sommestad et al. [179] devises a new method of analysing security risk in a system
architecture by utilising PRM’s and their ability to include probability metrics. The
authors identify how, while decision makers usually have a reasonable understanding
of the system architecture, their understanding of the interactions between security
measures, threat environments and sensitive assets is ambiguous. To help remedy
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this, they first provide a method of instantiating PRM’s into system architecture,
and then provide a package of abstract PRM classes which can be used to infer
security risk from architectural models.
To include PRM’s into an architectural model the authors provide a set of meth-
ods describing how causal relations and abstract/concrete PRM packages can be
defined - an example is provided in Figure 5.35.
The attribute Availability in Figure 5.35 provides an example of how a PRM is
able to infer a probability value for the availability of the system through aggregating
probabilities from the associated attributes Reliability and Competence.
Figure 5.35: Example PRM meta-model (extracted from [179])
Lamine et al. [180] discuss risk management in the context of enterprise engineer-
ing and architecture. With the growing interest of risk in enterprise engineering, the
domain of risk-aware business process management (R-BPM) has become popular
in the academic domain. The authors provide their own contribution in the form of
a new management framework and modelling language, Business Process Risk In-
tegrated Method (BPRIM), which complements both business process management
(BPM) and risk management.
First, BPM and Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) lifecycles are integrated,
creating a joint life cycle (Figure 5.36) consisting of four phases: Contextualise,
Assess, Treat, and Monitor.
Next, a meta-model was defined for BPRIM based off the devised life cycle
containing the primary concepts handled during each stage and their associated re-
lationships. Finally a modelling language was devised to support BPRIM’s elements
and relations, drawing upon the Extended Event-Driven Process Chain (eEPC) mod-
elling language. eEPC was decided upon as it already incorporated the majority of
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Figure 5.36: Joint BPM and ERM lifecycles (extracted from [180])
the required concepts while also supporting a view based approach. The authors
also designed and implemented tooling to support this modelling language, proving
a means for their approach to be utilised.
Latvala et al. [181] develop a risk visualisation technology to describe and map
risk elements and their associated relations. The authors identify that risk visuali-
sation can be difficult due to the huge number of risks with diverse causalities. To
remedy this a tool is designed which enables the user to expand upon a certain
element via clicking on the element in the interface. They are then presented with
the associated risks, security objectives and mitigating controls and how they inter-
act. In this multiple levels of complexity are able to be condensed into a tree like
structure.
Hall et al. [21] provide a discussion on risk visualisation from the perspective of
a wider information visualisation framework. The authors introduce three categories
of visualisation, Journalistic, Scientific and Critical visualisations. Risk visualisa-
tion falls into the last of these categories, Critical, enabling user-lead enquiries into
technical and cultural risks of a system. The authors provide a case study, in which
they enable critical risk visualisation through a series of Lego scenarios, allowing
users to work collaboratively in identifying cultural and safety risk scenarios.
5.3.4.3 Topic 3: Architectural Automation
Three primary papers contributed to architectural automation.
Buschle et al. [182] develops a method of automating the creation of EA models
through utilising a network scanner, EA analysis tool and security modelling lan-
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guage. The authors provide a solution to the complexity of EA models. The creation
of EA, organisation-wide models often culminates in cumbersome models due to the
nature of including multiple aspects of an organisation into one model. To combat
this the authors provide a method of automating the process through a pipeline
with two components.
The first component, the vulnerability scanner NeXpose, provides information on
the networks architecture, identifying all devices on the network which are commu-
nicating over either the TCP or UDP protocols. Credentials are able to be given to
NeXpose in order to map protected environments to produce a complete architecture
of the network.
Next, a previously developed EA analysis tool [183] is used to both create a
meta-model of the architecture and create the actual instantiation of the architec-
ture which is compliant with the previous meta-model. The authors extended this
previous work with an extension designed to take advantage of the NeXpose scans,
using these scans to automatically instantiate the meta-model.
The authors offer another advantage born from NeXpose, showing how the NeX-
pose output can also automatically generate a set of entities, relationships and at-
tributes for the modelling language CySeMoL. While not producing a full model,
the generation of these select items reduces the effort required to generate the entire
model.
Lagerström et al. [184] explores the idea of automating architectural “to be”
models by using value heuristics and learning algorithms. While other works have
provided methods of automating the creation and analysis of architectural models,
methods that automate the improvement of architectural models are scarce. Ex-
perts in the field are required to perform manual improvements on the architecture,
offering insight into cost effective and efficient solutions for the Enterprise.
To automate this process the authors provide an algorithm that proposes changes
to an existing architectural model. Based on the Markov Decision Process the algo-
rithm is given a finite set of actions it can perform on the model, and a heuristic
to guide the algorithm on which action to perform. The heuristic chosen to educate
the algorithm is a multi-factor joint utility function (example in Figure 5.37) which
can replicate an expert’s understanding of the domain area. For example, the utility
function can take factors such as time to compromise, cost of implementation and
availability of the system into account.
Finally, the reinforcement learning algorithm State-Action-Reward-State-Action
(SARSA) is used to identify the security policy that outperforms all other possible
policies, maximising the total reward based off the above heuristic.
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Figure 5.37: Example joint utility heuristic (extracted from [184])
Falessi et al. [185] builds on their previous work, [186], and develops a tool
to automatically extract safety-relevant elements of a systems architecture to aid
safety assessors in inspections. The authors highlight the difficulty faced by safety
assessors as they are often required to browse through extensive system models in
order to identify safety-relevant aspects to ensure they are up to standard. To reduce
this overhead, SafeSlice was designed which automatically highlights and extracts
safety relevant elements ready for inspection. This is achieved primarily through
strong traceability enabled by both SysML (a de-facto system modelling language)
and, the authors own traceability extension to SysML discussed in [186]. Through
traceability, safety requirements are linked to their associated system elements. An
element of SafeSlice, Rule Assistant, is also enabled through traceability, providing
the ability to apply rules to safety elements thus, guiding the user to conform with
safety standards.
Once traceability is established, slices are able to be generated which extract re-
lated elements from the system in regards to safety requirements. These can then be
inspected through a provided tool, inspection Assistant, enabling the quick inspec-
tion of all safety related elements. An overview of SafeSlice’s architecture is provided
in Figure 5.38.
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Figure 5.38: SafeSlice architecture (extracted from [185])
5.3.4.4 Topic 4: Cybersecurity Modelling Languages
Five primary papers contributed cybersecurity modelling languages.
Easttom [187] defines a set of new security diagrams and elements, based of
SysML and UML, for application in the cybersecurity domain. The authors identi-
fied how, as cybersecurity is a relatively younger domain than computer and software
engineering, there are less modelling tools afforded to it. To design a new mod-
elling paradigm the authors took inspiration from the SysML and UML modelling
language, using diagrams described in these standards to educate their proposed
modelling language. In total, four new/modified diagrams for application in cy-
bersecurity were proposed: the Misuse Diagram, Security Sequence Diagram, Data
Interface Diagram, and the Security Block Diagram.
The Misuse Diagram extends SysML and UML’s case diagrams, providing four
new contextual elements enabling the modelling of misuse cases. The Security Se-
quence Diagram contributes a slight adjustment of the traditional sequence diagram
found in SysML, providing one new contextual element which describes an unau-
thorised sequence. Next, the Data Interface Diagram is a completely new addition
to this language. It was designed to provide information on incoming and outgoing
data flows in order to describe security vulnerabilities during data transit. Finally,
the Security Block Diagram was based off UML’s component diagram. The authors
modified this diagram with three new block categories designed to enable a data flow
oriented diagram, assisting analysis’s with data flow from component to component.
Ekstedt et al. [188] present a CAD tool, securiCAD, designed for application in
the cybersecurity domain. The original goal of this application was to provide tools,
similar to CAD tools used by traditional engineers, for IT professionals in order to
aid in the design and testing of networks and EA’s. SecuriCAD provides four value
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propositions - Access to expertise, Improved cyber security management efficiency,
Improved visualisation, and Improved cyber security ROI. To enable these securi-
CAD provides a framework of asset types (protocols, web applications, operating
system, etc.) and associates each asset with its applicable cyber attacks, vulnerabil-
ities and security controls. The probabilities associated with an attack are elicited
from experts and scientific studies which further enable RA, providing the analyst
with information on the most vulnerable elements in the architecture.
Sommestad et al. [189] develops the cybersecurity modelling language CySeMoL
and provides a validation of the underlying PRM used in its operation. CySeMoL
utilises a PRM structure defined in previous research [179] which outlines a meta-
model for a cybersecurity based PRM. This meta-model can enable two types of
analysis. the first type of analysis provides expected economic losses due to a suc-
cessful event and requires all conditional probabilities of the PRM to be defined.
The second analysis provides a probability indication regarding the likelihood of a
successful attack. CySeMoL enables the second analysis through identifying a subset
of classes, attributes, and dependencies identified in [179].
The authors offer a set of classes with their associated reference slots and at-
tributes educated through a literature study and domain expert reviews. These
provide the qualitative structure of the new PRM, identifying what probabilities
need to be elicited before analysis can begin. Further defining of the PRM is per-
formed through identifying what quantitative parameters will need to be elicited.
This is done through two methods - identifying Logical Deterministic Dependence’s
and identifying Probabilistic Uncertain Dependence’s. Once done, the defined prob-
ability variables can be assigned through expert judgement (using Cooke’s classical
method), scientific experimentation and data collected through previous work. In
total the developed PRM and CySeMoL contained 22 classes, 102 attributes and 32
class relationships (reference slots).
Holm et al. [190] extend CySeMoL, discussed in [189], in order to remedy lim-
itations relating to the scope and implementation of the modelling language. The
authors provide three primary motivations and advantages for their new extension,
P2CySeMoL. The first motivation is that CySeMoL was originally introduced in
the context of SCADA cyber security modelling. Because of this, an emphasis was
placed on security attributes critical to SCADA systems, for example, availability
and integrity. P2CySeMoL remedies this by including a wider scope of elements and
relations, for example the addition of the element NetworkVulnerabilityScanner and
WebApplication. These additional elements widen the application scope of the lan-
guage and provide more contexts in which it can be utilised. The second motivation
was that during attack path calculations, CySeMoL assumed a work week worth of
time for the attacker to compromise the system. P2CySeMoL has customisable work
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hours per attacker which can be prescribed by the user, enabling contexts in which
prolonged attacks may be realistic. The last motivation was due to CySeMoL’s poor
computational cost when computing larger models. This limitation was due to the
PRM which was switched out for a Predictive, Probabilistic Architecture Modelling
Framework (P2AMF) which allows the attack step domain to be pruned by excluding
all non-reachable attack steps. While this method leads to a larger computational
cost on very small models, it provides a massive decrease in computation cost in
larger models.
Demir et al. [45] builds upon their previous work, [191], adding functionality to
abstract cross cutting features, such as security, from the architecture. The authors
identified that, when security features are integrated into distributed systems, they
are often written into each module individually - even through they constitute the
same security control. To abstract these security features into their own model-driven
compliant module, the authors provide a theoretical new cross-cutting module that
can facilitate these cross-cutting features. The new tool, DISCOA, implements a
module that can be inserted into an architecture between communication paths
of other modules, allowing an action or check to be executed before processing
continues. For example, a client needs to provide payment information to a server
however there are no security checks on what the client is sending the server. Using
DISCOA, an architectural adaptation can be designed and bound between these two
roles which provides the required security.
This method allows for reuse - the solution can be bound between different sets
of roles, providing the security abstraction that the authors sought. The solution
also benefits model-based engineering, providing a separation of concerns and the
ability to specify security features as a module in the architectural description.
5.3.4.5 Topic 5: Other
5.3.4.5.1 Literature Reviews
Zhou et al. [192] provide an SLR created to reduce the gap of knowledge between
the purpose and means of EA visualisation methods. The authors identify EA visu-
alisation as a primary enabler of EA, and developed a study to identify its current
state in literature. Six RQs were defined, three of which are of primary relevance -
RQ1, RQ2 and RQ5.
RQ1 identified the main purposes and motivations of EA visualisation. The
authors identified six primary purposes and motivations for EA visualisation in
academia. The most relevant of these motivations is security analysis, which the au-
thors identified as being a dominant theme in the literature. Much of the literature
follows similar themes to reviewed literature in 5.3.4, using Bayesian statistics and
graph theory to enable risk analysis.
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RQ2 identified trends in the historical development in EA visualisation. Two
trends were identified. First, a large growth of publications regarding EA visual-
isation was found past 2009 which the authors attributed to two possible causes
- the publication of ArchiMate 1.0, and the growing need for governance in large
enterprises. The second trend where research dropped off substantially during 2014
and 2016, the authors were unable to identify any possible cause for this.
Finally, RQ5 identified techniques that are used in the study of EA visualisation,
and their pros and cons. The authors offer comparisons of both visualisation lan-
guages (ArchiMate, UML) and associated EA frameworks (TOGAF, DoDAF) using
criteria based on the 5W1H interrogatives. ArchiMate, in general, was found to be
the most expressive visualisation language.
The last contribution of this paper is a meta-process of EA visualisation, ed-
ucated from the SLR content. The authors identified six phases that define the
majority of visualisation approaches (Figure 5.39).
Figure 5.39: Proposed EA visualisation approach (extracted from [192])
Finally, an important analysis to highlight in this work is the dominance of
ArchiMate in the EA visualisation domain. ArchiMate was utilised in 41 of the
found primary papers with UML being the second most utilised at 13 papers.
Maz̆eika and Butleris [193] provide a review of security requirements engineering
processes and modelling methods in order to educate a new MBSE security profile.
The motivation for this work stems from the lack of representation security aspects
are afforded by both the SysML language or MBSE methodologies. By integrating
security aspects more directly into MBSE, the advantages afforded to MBSE (re-
duced risk, managed complexity, reuse) can be applied to the security domain. To
do so, the authors propose a review process comprised of four elements. First, an
analysis of related work, followed by a conceptual alignment between modelling ap-
proaches, creation of a security domain model, and finally, the creation of a security
profile for MBSE.
During the literature review the authors identified four modelling approaches,
the UAF, the Combined Harm Assessment of Safety and Security for Information
Systems (CHASSIS), SysML Sec, and UML Sec. These four approaches are com-
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pared through a conceptual alignment, identifying which, out of eight concepts, each
approach supports.
A security domain model is presented, consisting of three elements - security
assurance concepts (concepts that ensure system security or mitigate risk), items to
be protected (vulnerable assets in the system), and risk-related concepts (risks and
system weaknesses).
Finally, a security profile/framework is presented basing its propositions on the
ISO/IEC 27001 standards, and the previously created security domain model. The
profile consists of five steps - define the RA approach, identify the risks, analyse
and evaluate the risks, identify and evaluate options for risk treatment, and finally,
select control objectives and risk controls.
Xiong and Lagerström [194] discusses a SLR in the domain of threat modelling
in order to answer the two RQs, “What is threat modelling?”, and “What is the
state-of-the-art work in this field?”. This work was motivated through an observa-
tion that threat modelling was widely applied in many contexts, providing many
different interpretations of what threat modelling indicated. To produce a unified
understanding of threat modelling, the authors performed a SLR which identified
three clusters of research - C1: The application of threat modelling, C2: Threat
modelling methods, and, C3: Threat modelling processes. C1 and C2 constituted
the majority of the selected primary papers, with C3 only making up five of the fifty
four primary articles.
The authors identified that, generally, threat modelling “is a process that can be
used to analyse potential attacks or threats, and can also be supported by threat
libraries or attack taxonomies.”
Overall, the authors found that the future research on threat modelling was
revolving around automation, validation, inclusion of defensive measures, and ex-
pansion of threat categories in specific application domains.
5.3.4.5.2 Miscellaneous
Santos et al. [195] develop a functional system architecture for Air Traffic Man-
agement (ATM) designed to provide support for safety related functions. The au-
thors cite an increasingly complex, automated and tightly coupled ATM systems
increasing the difficulty of providing safety management as their motivations for in-
troducing the Model of ATM Reality in Action (MARIA). To handle the increasing
complexity of safety management, MARIA aims to provide an architectural basis
for system analysis, primarily for safety, by describing ATM system components and
their relationships.
The authors deliberated over three possible modelling methods to utilise in their
research - BPMN, Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM), and, Structured
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Analysis and Design Technique (SADT). BPMN was discarded due to three primary
reasons - its relative complexity requires training, the inability to model stochastic
events, and, the functionality of BPMN being based around a start event and end
event. FRAM was discarded primarily due to its exponential complexity found in
bigger models, and, ambiguity regarding elements and their contextual meaning.
SADT was the chosen modelling methodology for the solution.
To populate the model with elements and relations the authors used expert
knowledge, a literature review and exploratory interviews. Once developed, the
model was verified internally and externally - offing the model for evaluation to
enterprises who had not part in its development. In total, nine abstract functions
were identified in the ATM domain (Figure 5.40).
Figure 5.40: Top level ATM functions (extracted from [195])
Buschle et al. [183] design a tool to integrate PRM functionality into EA models
to support analysis and decision making. The introduction of a PRM into EA enables
an array of analysis options dependent on the context the model was created in. For
example, if an EA model had the goal of providing improvements in the cybersecurity
domain, elements relating to this context would be included in the model which can
then be instantiated into a PRM which allows analysis of the cybersecurity in that
model. In this way, many different types of analysis are enabled, dependent on the
structure of the model.
The authors define EA analysis as a three phase process consisting of the Assess-
ment Scoping, Evidence Collection, and, Analysis Phases (Figure 5.41). Assessment
Scoping refers to goals the architect wishes to represent in their model, denoting
their understanding of the domain and the relationships between elements and their
attributes. Evidence Collection produces quantitative information to facilitate their
analysis. Evidence collected is often not infallible, and as such a credibility rating
can be applied to each instantiated attribute, allowing these uncertainties to be rep-
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resented in the model. Finally the PRM can be used to provide comparative analysis
on the current model and a next possible iteration.
Figure 5.41: The EA analysis process (extracted from [183])
Chung et al. [196] utilises architecture descriptions to provide a platform for
penetration testing. The authors present a pen-testing methodology which recon-
structs a software’s architecture in order to enable efficient decision making by the
pen tester. The provided methodology includes a methodology for re-documentation
described in [197], which describes how to backwards engineer software into a doc-
umented architecture consisting of 4+1 views [198]. These views are then used to




This chapter provides a discussion on the research questions through synthesising
information found during the SLR combined with interview findings through the
method of externalisation. First, each RQ is enumerated upon, discussing findings
and meaning drawn from its associated primary papers. Next, insights are extracted
from the interviews. Finally a set of observations are made regarding the research
domain and future research opportunities are identified.
6.1 RQ1
How are security aspects being incorporated into ArchiMate EA Models?
Three general research trends were identified from the six primary papers who
constitute this research question: ArchiMate’s coverage of certain security applica-
tions, the incorporation of new behaviours in ArchiMate and finally, agile processes
utilising ArchiMate.
6.1.1 ArchiMate’s coverage of security applications
Three primary papers utilise ArchiMate to enable threat analysis [165], security
assurance cases [169] and, risk assessment modelling [35].
Two of these papers apply ArchiMate in the duel contexts of EA and security
modelling [165], [169]. Berkel et al. [165] utilise ArchiMate to provide a framework
architecture for smart cities which includes a cross cutting column in the architec-
ture - security (Figure D.1). Implementations of security or other viewpoints with
opposing architectural drivers often constitute a cross cutting viewpoint or column
in the framework. Various issues arise with this method which is further explored in
section 6.6.6.
Zhi et al. [169] provides a visual assurance method utilising ArchiMate in the
context of EA. This solution provides assurance cases and goals to be integrated
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into an EA, giving assurance arguments between enterprise elements. The method
used to achieve this, similarly to [165], results in a cross cutting architectural driver
(Figure D.2).
These two papers were both published in the second wave of research on this topic
(2018-2020, see Figure 5.3) after the inclusion of the RSO by TOG in ArchiMate
3.0. Korman et al. [35] identified ArchiMate’s capability in regards to modelling risk
assessment methods. As this was published in 2014, the RSO was unavailable, and
as such, the authors developed their own alignments between ArchiMate elements
and the required risk constructs. This research, however, did not include the context
of EA, which could be due to the emerging nature of the joint ArchiMate, Security
and EA topics.
A fundamental issue with these approaches is the divergence from the quality
attribute compartmentalisation which is achieved through the traditional EA layer
approach. Compartmentalisation plays a large role in complexity management –
a fundamental design consideration for multi-view modelling approaches, and by
including a cross-cutting layer which intersects with multiple layers, this quality
is lost. This outlines one primary future work opportunity – identifying how cross
cutting elements can be included within a multi-layer modelling method without
sacrificing the benefits.
ArchiMate 3.0’s full architecture specifies the inclusion of the aspect, “Motiva-
tion”, which is instantiated in the framework as a cross-cutting element. Comparing
the motivation aspect with the security layers proposed in [165] and [169] provides
context on how TOG engineered cross cutting elements into the framework while
maintaining compartmentalisation. Figure D.3 describes the meta-architecture of
the motivation aspect and shows that each motivational element is associated to
one stakeholder, who is associated to a structure element. In this way, cross cut-
ting relationships between core elements are avoided as each core element would
instantiate its own motivation aspect; i.e., motivation aspects are not shared across
core elements. This method, while useful in the context of motivation elements, is
inoperable in regards to security elements as security often spans many affected core
components.
6.1.2 Incorporating new behaviours into ArchiMate
Hacks et al., [166] and Närman et al. [167] provide extensions to the ArchiMate
language in order to enable quantifiable security evaluations of different systems.
Hacks et al. [166] provides a translation method, converting ArchiMate models into
MAL models in order to simulate attacks on the chosen system. Närman et al. [167]
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proposes a method for availability analysis, integrating a PRM structure into Archi-
Mate in order to provide a statistical quantitative model. Statistical measurement,
and PRM implementations especially, are often presented as options for security
based model analysis and are discussed in more detail in section 6.6.3.
Papers which extend the ArchiMate language follow a trend, often aiming to
provide a form of quantifiable evaluation to the modelling language. This is due
to the lack of these measurement systems in the modelling language itself, which
is an opportunity for the enrichment of the language. However, there may be a
disconnect between the objectives of these applications. Formal Modelling, in this
context, identifies models in which you seek quantifiable information, such as statis-
tical models. ArchiMate, while being able to support these systems, may not benefit
from these inclusions as it is contextually utilised as a tool to present a visual di-
agram of an enterprise. The enrichment of these evaluation methods may prove to
be both cumbersome and unnecessary in this context.
Formal Modelling methods are useful in many contexts. However, integrating
them into ArchiMate is inefficient as the application domain, and thus the design
of ArchiMate, is specifically for communication and visual modelling. Incorporating
formal modelling into ArchiMate through a different mechanism may be useful. For
example, a core element could describe a statistical model which is used to generate
a performance metric. Including this model as an element in the architecture ac-
knowledges its utility within the enterprise, and can potentially represent complex
decision processes such as risk posture.
6.1.3 Agile security processes using ArchiMate
While only one paper discusses using ArchiMate in an agile context, it is increasingly
important to understand the limitations of EA, and the benefits of re-usability and
modularity. EA documentation, which ArchiMate models are classified as, requires a
large amount of investigative work and investment by an enterprise architect in order
to implement iterative improvements. With the rise of quickly evolving technologies,
enterprises have the ability to evolve their IT and technological systems at a fast rate,
increasing the overheads required to ensure that the EA model and its associated
documentation is kept up-to-date.
Xiong et al. [170] proposes an agile threat modelling method which utilises Archi-
Mate. The agility of this method is based on an EA-repository, which stores pre-
computed information, enabling the analysis of components and architectures. The
primary limitation of this method is the reliance on the repository, which would
require significant on going work and input data in order to be functional.
152
CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION 6.2. RQ2
ArchiMate enables agility through its layered approach, providing compartmen-
talisation between components and traceability through relationships between el-
ements. This allows an architect to identify affected components during a model
iteration. Depending on the abstraction level of the model (the granularity of the
processes being recorded) the effort to manually identify changes to the model could
increase substantially. One proposed solution to this problem could be architectural
automation as discussed in Section 6.6.4.
Agility, while required in EA modelling, is still far from being achieved given
the complexity of modelling context and available tooling. Complexity is a primary
concern in EA, and is one of the founding reasons for implementing EA modelling.
Future research regarding the handling of complexity in this domain would be valu-
able.
6.1.4 Conclusions
In conclusion, there are three primary methods being used to include security aspects
into ArchiMate EA models. Two of these methods utilise ArchiMate concepts and are
delineated by their approach to the EA context. One of these ignores the overarching
application domain of ArchiMate ([35]), and the other attempts to integrate security
modelling into the EA application domain ([165], [169]). The third method is the
development of new security features within ArchiMate as discussed within [166]
and [167].
The second wave of ArchiMate research (Figure 5.3) predominantly presents EA
and security as joint topics, while earlier work focused on security being isolated,
or separate. This outlines the movement within academia to research these topics
together, as there is more recognition of the importance of security modelling in EA.
The current methods of security implementation in ArchiMate may be at odds
with its primary application. ArchiMate models serve as forms of visual EA docu-
mentation, and as such practitioners are less likely to identify them as formal mod-
elling opportunities. Visual additions to ArchiMate to support security modelling
often result in cross-cutting architectural drivers which reduces the compartmental-
isation of ArchiMate’s layered approach. Implementing Security as a cross cutting
element is an increasingly researched topic in the EA application domain, supporting
a growing interest in the governance of these systems by relevant stakeholders.
6.2 RQ2
What elements are required in ArchiMate to model security aspects in
the context of micromobility?
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To answer this research question, four different contributions were identified.
First, potential attack vectors such as physical attacks are discussed. Second, rele-
vant quality attributes of security in the micromobility context are provided. Third,
relevant elements, instantiated in parallel domains are presented and Finally, overall
design considerations regarding the modelling of micromobility are provided.
6.2.1 Understanding attack vectors
Classification of attack vectors extracted from relevant primary papers follows the
Social, Physical and Cyber convention used in [66]. Distinguishing attack vectors
based on these categories is useful in the context of micromobility technology as
physical attacks on these systems are much more probable than other instantiations
of IoT/CPS technologies. Vehicles offered by the micromobility services are provided
in public, under little supervision, which increases the risk of tampering, theft and
general damage.
Table 5.5 presents extracted physical attacks from relevant primary papers. Phys-
ical attacks in the AV, IoT and CPS domains present a general theme of the damage
or modification of hardware. The risk of direct physical damage to a micromobility
vehicle, either through malicious acts or general wear and tear, is less mitigated by
security considerations and aligns closer with the general rigidity, engineering, and
social perception of the micromobility enterprise. Physical access to USB ports - or
any interface with software - provides a more security-centric problem.
An interesting inclusion to the physical attack domain is resource depletion at-
tacks. These attacks have been identified in IoT and CPS technologies as a method
to disable security countermeasures and access an intended function. In the context
of micromobility vehicles, this attack can be used to disable a vehicles GPS and/or
backup GPS locator, providing the opportunity for modification and theft before
the enterprise can dispatch their retrieval staff.
Cyber attacks constitute the majority of extracted attack vectors (Table 5.6)
and identifies many attacks including networking, code injection and access control.
DoS and DDoS attacks have been, and still are a major issue for services who rely
on server bound services.
The risks of DDos and DOS attacks become increasingly clear with micromo-
bility enterprises who rely on the connectivity between mobile apps and servers in
order to unlock the vehicles, and provide their transport service. If the servers are
unable to service clients requests, the provided vehicles become unusable - an issue
which becomes increasingly problematic as a micromobility enterprise scales up. If
micromobility is to be heralded as a new method of urban transportation, the meth-
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ods used to implement it should not rely on servers (or should have an alternative
method of unlocking a vehicle) as it would perform a critical transport function.
Other cyber attacks critical to the micromobility domain include identity faking,
replay, and impersonation attacks in which an attacker attempts to gain access to a
vehicle through exploiting a weakness in the implemented authentication mechanics.
As micromobility enterprises offer a direct and physical service, these attacks become
desirable as a means to access this service for free.
Micromobility vehicles, similarly to connected vehicles and AVs, often have wire-
less connectivity - either to connect to a server or to connect via Bluetooth to a per-
sonal device. Bluetooth, specifically BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) - a form of Blue-
tooth used in resource constrained devices - has been demonstrated to be vulnerable
to many different types of cyber attacks. As such it would be recommended that
this connectivity be either excluded from micromobility devices, or, implemented in
such a way as to not provide access to critical systems of the vehicle. Aside from
these primary cyber attack concerns, there are also many attack vectors related to
networking, input validation, and access control which need to be accounted for.
Social attacks constitute the smallest set of attack vectors and identify attack vec-
tors which originate from employees and potentially social actors such as protesters,
white hat hackers, and others. Examples provided by primary papers include the
privileged insider attack in which an employee who has access to internal systems
compromises an area of the enterprise. Another attack includes social engineering,
in which an employee is tricked into disclosing sensitive information or credentials
through phishing attacks. These security vulnerabilities are treated with personal
training, vetting, and general awareness of these risks.
In general, attack vectors were discussed often without an associated mitiga-
tion technique. This could be due to how strongly each solution is context bound.
Another issue is the fact that many micromobility enterprises utilise third party
software, services, and technology to enable certain portions of their functionality.
It is difficult to understand what security concerns could arise from the inclusion of
these service, and how - if multiple third party solutions are used - the combina-
tory nature of these third party solutions affects security. This provides a primary
question for future research - “how should third party services, and their potential
security considerations, be modelled in an EA?” which was also a theme discovered
during industry interviews (Section 6.5.1).
6.2.2 Security Quality Attributes and Application Domains
Security quality attributes provide direction and frameworks for areas of security
development in applications. Identifying what security attributes are used in differ-
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ent domains can help identify the differences between application domains (such as
IoT, CPS, AVs, etc.) and helps classify the goals of each security solution.
In general, all primary papers which reference security quality attributes include
the classical CIA triad. More specific security attributes were identified in different
application domains. In the IoT domain, Omoniwa et al. [69] identified Trust, Au-
thentication, Privacy and, Access Control, outlining the importance of information
integrity and confidentiality in the context of generic IoT systems. Kavallieratos et
al. [74] identified Authenticity, Possession and Control, Utility and, Non-Repudiation
in the context of the CPS application domain, providing a similar emphasis on access
to information and confidentiality.
The similarities between the security attributes of these domains (IoT and CPS)
is understandable as they are similar in their instantiations. Baloyi and Kotzé [46]
observed that CPS frameworks often constitute a meta-framework for IoT instanti-
ations, making it possible to represent other IoT and CPS architectures using CPS
meta-architectures. This closeness in application, architecture and, technology may
explain why they have similar security quality attributes.
These specific security attributes constitute two of the three pillars of the CIA
Triad, Confidentiality and Integrity. The micromobility context affords a unique ap-
plication of IoT/CPS in which the final pillar, Availability becomes more important.
For reasons stated in section 6.2.1, availability of critical services such as transport
should be emphasised in these applications.
An emerging theme in the SLR is the joint consideration of both Security and
Safety, which are provided in tandem [74]. Like the CIA Triad, Security and Safety
have many overlapping applications, as well as potentially opposing applications.
For example, if a user pre-pays for one hour of ride time on an electric scooter, the
scooter should not force the use to stop after this hour is up for safety reasons.
This could also be treated as an exploit and therefore, as a security concern. The
joint elicitation of Security and Safety identifies these conflicts and seeks to provide
an adequate countermeasure. Joint quality attributes such as availability are also
possible. Availability in the context of security guarantees the service is accessible by
authorised users, however, in the context of safety, identifies that the device should
be able to provide a stated function if demanded under given conditions over the
devices lifetime.
The importance of safety is another unique aspect to micromobility services as,
by offering vehicles for public use, the risk of bodily harm is greater than traditional
instantiations of IoT and CPS technology.
Two papers identified applications of CPS and IoT technologies with both iden-
tifying Intelligent Transportation – which micromobility is an instantiation of – as a
growing application domain. Many of these applications intuitively include privacy
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as a primary security topic (smart home, smart health-care, smart cities, etc.) which
highlights a growing movement towards privacy regulation and governance. This is
discussed in more detail in section 6.6.2.
6.2.3 Instantiated Elements and Vulnerable Components
Identifying and extracting already instantiated modelling elements designed in the
joint security - IoT/CPS/AV domains indicates what elements researchers believe
hold the most utility to their application. This is useful as it identifies common
elements, components, and relationships as well as their associated security consid-
erations.
Tables 5.3.1.2 and 5.3.1.2 outline common and unique elements found for ap-
plication in the vehicle modelling and IoT domains respectively. Security modelling
of vehicles and vehicular systems was a relatively popular topic with five primary
papers providing modelling elements.
Two primary papers, [75] and [62] provided the majority of the common elements
with both identifying an ECU and four types of networks. A general network element,
VehicleNetwork is included as well as two vehicle network connectivity standards -
the CAN and FlexRay networks. An entertainment and sound system network, the
LIN network is also included however is not applicable to micromobility vehicles as
these do not include these technologies.
Unique elements span from physical technologies such as GPS [70], to generalised
concepts such as Dataflow [62]. This is due to their application context as these el-
ements are designed to work within the overarching context of the articles they are
used within. These unique elemets generally enabled one of two mechanisms. First,
the creation or extension of a formal modelling technique in order to run simulations
or provide quantifiable security metrics. Second, to provide a graphical representa-
tion of the security of a system to a user. For example, [73] and [79] both introduce
visual accents into their element design in order to promote understandably and
readability of their respective models.
The identification of vulnerable components provides a basis of which elements
in a technology need to be included in a security model, in order to mitigate these
vulnerabilities. The extracted components can be found in Table 5.3.1.1.2. These
components create a solid basis in the development of elements for security mod-
elling of micromobility applications. A list of micromobility-compatible components
extracted from Table 5.3.1.1.2 is provided below:
• TCU (Responsible for wireless connectivity between the device and a cloud
service)
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• Bluetooth
• ECU (Controls electrical systems in a vehicle)




• Vehicular Sensor Data
• Biometric Data
• Behavioural Data
These constitute a subset of the relevant and potentially vulnerable components
in micromobility vehicles. Each micromobility enterprise may utilise a different com-
bination/type of technology, so considerations should be made based on the context
of each vehicle design.
6.2.4 Overall Design Considerations
General modelling design considerations were drawn from researchers comments and
experiences. First, cross cutting elements are identified as problematic elements in
a modelling context [108] [63], this is discussed in more detail in section 6.6.6. The
specificity and generality of a modelling language is usually dependent on the types
of elements defined within it [107] [108]. For example, the modelling language UML
provides many extensions with particular elements which have specific meanings in
their own context. This provides superior specificity, with the definition of the model
being less burdened with an individuals interpretation of that model. However, it
also increases the amount of knowledge one must have about the modelling ele-
ments and generally lends itself to less readability due to the increased complexity.
ArchiMate provides a different standpoint, offering general elements which can be
specialised into various contexts. This provides a smaller language with less elements
which is more readily readable, however, a model may be interpreted differently by
individuals due to the lack of specificity.
The trade-off between these two attributes, specificity and generality is not con-
crete, as with a more general language you have the opportunity to provide specific
elements in specific contexts to achieve a similar result. The difference is that Archi-
Mate, and TOG by extension, do not provide these elements.
When designing a security modelling tool, there are further considerations to
take into account. A set of these were outlined during the creation of the MVS tool
[79] in which the authors propose three relevant considerations.
1. MVS should work on multiple platforms
2. MVS should help enhance the situation awareness of the user during its run-
time
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3. Node values and types should have intuitive visualisations
Requirement one provides limitations on a proposed solution, and aligns with
ArchiMate’s ethos of being available on many third party modelling applications.
A security solution in this context cannot require new unique behaviour from mod-
elling applications as this would exclude many third-party applications from creating
ArchiMate models, reducing its desirability as an EA modelling candidate. Require-
ment two outlines the utility of the solution, and how its fitness can be measured as
how the model translates as awareness to the user regarding the presented system.
Finally, requirement three discusses the visualisation aspects of elements, similar to
visual accentuation done in [73] and [79].
6.2.5 Conclusions
In conclusion, several aspects of micromobility vehicles and services have been dis-
cussed in regards to security modelling. The context of micromobility brings with
it unique security and safety requirements. Physical attacks are more likely, and
DoS attacks provide an imitate gate between micromobility enterprises and their
adoption into the critical transport domain. Elements for the modelling of security
in the context of micromobility can be based off previously instantiated elements
from research on vehicle modelling and the identification of vulnerable components.
Safety must be taken into consideration when proposing security modelling in a
micromobility context due to the increasing risk of physical harm. The joint proposi-
tion of safety and security provides quality attributes, that when proposed together,
can help consolidate a mitigation solution that promotes security without sacrificing
safety and vice versa.
The beginnings of a set of vulnerable micromobility components was presented
that identifies a set of components which should be taken into account during secu-
rity modelling. This set of components should be supplemented with the individual
devices technology in order to create a full understanding of its vulnerable compo-
nents.
A set of general design principles regarding attributes such as specificity, general-
ity, and cross cutting elements were discussed. The modelling of third party solutions
needs to be investigated as well as the associated risk and security implications in
the context of EA. Any security solution should attempt to retain ArchiMate’s ethos
of generality and universality, maintaining ArchiMate’s ability to be modelled via
third party modelling solutions.
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6.3 RQ3
What security strategies do micromobility companies currently employ?
This research question helped identify security methodologies, strategies, and
mitigation techniques of which a security modelling language would need to support.
To answer this, three viewpoints were identified - First, security methods that are
used in relevant contexts. Second, technical security and privacy solutions and their
descriptions and finally, relevant industry standards that have been utilised in these
works in order to provide a basis in industry.
6.3.1 Security Methods
A primary finding in the SLR is the emerging theme of safety and security co-
engineering methods which have all been published in recent years [107] [74] [67]
[131]. These outline the creation of new co-engineering techniques as well as provide
frameworks in order to categorise these techniques.
Three examples of these co-engineering methods can be found in [107], [67], and
[131]. Kavallieratos et al. [107] introduces a safety and security combined method,
drawing upon the Secure Tropos and STPA to create SafeSec Tropos.
Cui et al., [67] and Riel et al. [131] provide similar methods in contexts parallel to
the micromobility context with [67] providing a method of joint safety and security
analysis for application in the AV domain and [131] providing an integration method
of safety and security for smart products. The increasing rate of research on joint
methods and their closely associated application domains identifies these methods
as candidates for micromobility enterprises.
These new methods are well categorised within three distinct approach’s [107]:
• Security-informed safety approaches
– Methods that extend safety engineering by enriching themselves with
security aspects
• Safety informed security approaches
– Approaches that extend the scope of security engineering by adapting
safety-related techniques
• Combined safety and security approaches
– Combined approaches for safety and cybersecurity co-engineering
These classifications clearly identify the movement towards the coupling of these
two topics, with both methods from the safety and security domains being extended
to include the other. These findings show the increasing value in the simultaneous
engineering of security and safety quality attributes. A security strategy within
the MaaS domain is likely to include aspects of safety, either implicitly through
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security policy, or explicitly as quality attributes of the enterprise and vehicle design.
Research needs to be done regarding the relationship between security and safety
quality attributes to clearly delineate the responsibilities of both, and by doing so,
identify what mechanisms are security motivated vs. safety motivated.
One of the primary applications of EA is governance, allowing stakeholders the
appropriate information in a timely manner to facilitate decision making. This goal
fits well with a risk based method, specifically designed to support governance [27].
In this work the authors surveyed 59 firms regarding their risk processes and infor-
mation security governance behaviours. They found that 80% of the firms reported
the use of cyber risk management methods while 65% of respondents indicated that
the board held oversight over information security practices. This indicates an ap-
petite for security governance at the board level, something that EA could be poised
to deliver.
Agility in EA practice is a current topic of conversation (see Section 6.1.3) as
many EA methods incur significant overhead. Papke, [122] and Solhaug and See-
husen [41] discuss agile security methods and business structure. Papke [122] en-
ables agility through enabling MBSE in collaboration with EA and as such bringing
the benefits of an agile work from from MBSE into EA. Solhaug and Seehusen
[41] present a method of continuous risk analysis which is enabled by traceability
documentation, providing a means to update a model and automatically identify
all affected elements. These methods are enabled by MBSE and traceability docu-
mentation respectively which may indicate ways of improving EA’s documentations
agility.
6.3.2 Technical Security and Privacy Solutions
Identifying and understanding types of technical solutions which may be modelled
in a micromobility security model enables the design of elements to encompass these
applications. Tables 5.17 and 5.23 provide an overview of the extracted privacy and
technical solutions respectively while sub-tables 5.24, 5.25, 5.28, 5.26, 5.27 include
definitions for technical solutions organised by their respective primary paper.
Technical security solutions offered in the context of the vehicle domain provide
the most insight into potential micromobility technical solutions due to their similar
application. Two vehicle-centric, privacy technical solutions were described in [110]
and [60].
Ming and Yu [110] provide a method of privacy preservation for vehicles which
utilise vehicular sensor networks. In using these networks, a vast amount of informa-
tion is obtained from the environment regarding road conditions and environmental
parameters. This data is aggregated and collated in servers which can then be used
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to plan routes and trips to locations. Vehicles can query this data in order to plan
their own routes, however, in doing so they may disclose their location. The authors
use the method modified oblivious transfer [199] in order to craft queries which do
not disclose the vehicles location.
Xiong and Lagerström [60] utilise a privacy mechanism Local Differential Pri-
vacy [200] which specifies some architectural constraints and operational rules. The
method relies on a form of noise perturbation - adding noise to individuals data in
order to maintain a users geolocation data privacy.
Both privacy solutions extracted from the vehicle domain were developed to
support the privacy of a users location data, highlighting this as a primary privacy
issue. Micromobility enterprise’s face similar challenges with increased risk as loca-
tion data is more abundant in micromobility applications. A private vehicle, such
as a car, generally only reports its location when requested to via the user - for
example for map directions. Micromobility enterprise vehicles however have many
points of continuous GPS recording, through the application the user is using to
access the device, the device itself and, potentially a back up GPS device. Micro-
mobility enterprises require geolocation data in order to lower their associated risk
of physical damage and theft and also require this data for analytical purposes such
as modelling vehicle demand and employee retention (how many employees need to
be operating in an area in order to retrieve and charge vehicles). Because of this,
geolocation data has become a major enabler of their business models. This creates a
conflict between a users privacy, and the utility of geolocation data to the enterprise.
A naive solution is the sanitation of data between the vehicles and servers, reducing
the data to not include identifiable information. This solution does not account for
habitual behaviours and repeated trips which can infer much information regard-
ing a persons behaviours and personal details. A historical example of this is when
Uber released a statistical analysis of probable one-night stands [201], inferring this
information from a combination of ride and demographic statistics.
Three primary papers provide technical security solutions for application in the
vehicle domain [75] [62] [63]. These technical solutions are similar to those found
within the CPS, IoT, and General domains and identify general networking security
solutions such as host firewalls, static ARP tables and dedicated gateways. More spe-
cific technical solutions such as address space layout randomisation which protects
against memory attacks (such as No Operation (NOP) sledding) provide specific
protections for ECUs (see Section 6.2.3) and other on-board computers.
Revisiting the classification of Cyber, Physical, and Social attack vectors identi-
fied in Section 6.2.1, these security technical solutions fit squarely inside of the Cyber
domain. As expressed earlier, micromobility vehicles are often subjected to physical
attacks, and as such, technical solutions regarding this domain should be explored
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more in-depth either through product design or addressing the problem from a soft-
ware viewpoint in which the firmware contains methods to defend against foreign
inputs and attacks.
Generally, the extracted security technical solutions are consistent across do-
mains. Similar networking and device protections are offered across the board high-
lighting their homogeneous applications.
6.3.3 Industry Standards
Industry standards used in primary papers can be categorised similarly to classifi-
cations used in Section 6.3.1 on security methods. These classifications are security
based standards, safety based standards, and finally, joint security and safety stan-
dards. This further highlights the coupling between security and safety requirements
explored within the research in this SLR.
Joint security and safety standards used within works discussing joint security
and safety co-engineering methods do not directly apply to the CPS/IoT/AV and
connected vehicle application domains. This highlights a discontinuity between cur-
rent industry standards regarding safety and security, and research domains regard-
ing safety and security. For example, EN 50126:1999 identifies safety and security
requirements for railway applications and was used in work defining safety and secu-
rity in the context of AV’s [76]. This consistent observation indicates that currently,
there are few joint security and safety industry standards that apply to these specific
research areas.
Comparing these findings to security specific and safety specific industry stan-
dards we can see that there are many well aligned standards of which researchers can
utilise. IEC 61508 provides general safety guidelines applicable to IoT and CPS
technologies, ISO 26262 provides functional safety for electronic systems in road
vehicles, ISA/IEC 62443 provides guidelines to mitigate security vulnerabilities
in industrial automation, and ISO 27000 which provides methods of information
security management.
It seems that when discussing security and safety on their own there are more
standards in general, as well as more applicable standards to the IoT/CPS/AV and
connected vehicle domains than when discussing the joint concept of security and
safety. As indicated in Section 6.2.2 and Section 6.3.1, joint security and safety
processes are becoming increasing popular for technologies such as micromobility
vehicles. It would be valuable to see industry standards designed to facilitate these
processes.
From all the extracted standards nine were identified to be applicable sources
of information for application in a micromobility enterprise context. These include
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standards which are applicable to vehicles, as well as the associated applications
which users use to interface with the enterprise. These are provided below:
• ISO 21434 [140]
– Details cybersecurity engineering for application in the vehicle domain.
• ISO 27000 [141]
– Widely applicable standard defining information security terms, defini-
tions and mythologies.
• ISO/IEC 27034 [142]
– Standards which provide guidance on information security regarding ap-
plication systems.
• ISO/IEC 29100 [143]
– Provides high-level recommendations regarding privacy and the protec-
tion of personally identifiable IT.
• SAE J3061 [147]
– Outlines recommended cybersecurity practice in regards to the vehicle
domain.
• ISO 31000 [149]
– Risk management framework which addresses operational continuity.
• IEC 61508 [155]
– Addresses functional safety through safety life cycle engineering.
• ISO/PAS 21448 [156]
– Provides a framework in which intended use and potentially misuse affect
a vehicle in combination with a hazardous event.
• ISO 26262 [158]
– Defines functional safety for electronic systems in road vehicles.
6.3.4 Conclusions
In conclusion, while security strategies are generally not discussed in the direct
micromobility context, parallel contexts such as IoT/CPS and connected vehicles
provide actionable information on potential security mechanisms and solutions. Se-
curity and safety methods (engineering, requirements elicitation, etc.) are becoming
a theme in recent research regarding AV’s, connected vehicles and, by extension,
micromobility vehicles. Governance of risk processes and security mitigation is also
a growing requirement as identified in [27] which aligns well with the proposition of
security modelling within the EA context.
Geolocation data was identified as the primary concern for vehicular privacy,
which provides an interesting discussion on how location privacy can be archived in
a service, such as micromobility, which is effectively enabled by such data.
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In general, there seems to be a lack, and a need, for joint security and safety
standards in industry today. Research which sets out to identify or create new se-
curity/safety methods often utilised knowledge from standards who’s application
domain was not parallel with the goal of the work. It would be beneficial to see joint
action between researchers and industry on these topics.
Finally, a list of micromobility enterprise applicable industry standards were
provided based upon the set of extracted standards from relevant primary papers.
This provides a basis and small review of the available industry literature which
could be used in future research to consolidate modelling elements and behaviours.
6.4 RQ4
What support do architectural design languages provide for security in
EA?
Architectural design languages provide many security modelling methodologies.
These can be classified by their application context to provide useful information
in the context of micromobility and EA. First, how to represent attacks, and the
visualisation methodologies used to do so, and second, how cybersecurity modelling
languages have been designed to provide qualitative and quantitative information
for their users.
6.4.1 Representation of Attacks
There are many ways to represent attacks on a system, and depending on the goal
of the analyst one may choose an approach which is conducive to formal modelling
- extracting objective quantifiable information about an attack from a model, or
visual modelling - providing the user a contextual understanding of the attack, its
variables, and facilitating the conversation regarding mitigation techniques.
One common attack representation technique is to utilise a tree structure which
provides an implicit relationship between a root node and its leaves. For example,
the root of an attack tree could be “gaining access to an email account”. From this
root node, leaf nodes describe what necessary conditions must be true in order to
achieve the goal. In this way an attack can be represented and enriched to provide
measurements (statistical likelihoods of leaf nodes being true) if appropriate data is
available.
Fault trees follow a similar method but adopt a different perspective. Fault trees
identify how combinations of system failures can lead to undesirable state. This
perspective pivot is similar to the current push towards coupling safety and security
165
6.4. RQ4 CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION
engineering methods, attempting to provide a wider scope than just security. Attack-
defence trees also seek to provide a wider scope, including mitigation steps and
defensive postures into their representation to more accurately identify the current
state of the system.
The value of these representations is based with their tree structure which fa-
cilitates an overview of the architectural design of a system, and how it may be
exploited by an attacker. The created contextual understanding can be used to de-
velop mitigation strategies to address the enterprises needs. From this perspective,
EA modelling and attack trees provide the same mechanism, describing the current
system and enabling discussion regarding improvements for the next iteration. EA
models however (specifically those created with ArchiMate and TOGAF) are not
restricted to the same tree design rules as these methods, making them incompati-
ble.
Attack graphs are a set of methods which can be applied more broadly, and
are unusually generated, in part, automatically [177]. This can be achieved through
network and vulnerability scanners analysing hosts and network configuration to
discover multi-step vulnerabilities. This approach lends itself towards quantitative
measurement as the resulting graphs can often be extremely complicated, making
them difficult to use as a contextual tool.
A common theme in attack graph research is the abstraction and reduction of
attack graphs in order to provide a readable output [177] [176]. These methods can
both reduce computation time required for statistical models and provide discussion
and context regarding the scanned systems, an example of these reductive methods
is shown in Figures E.1 and E.2.
6.4.2 Cybersecurity Modelling Languages
Three cybersecurity modelling languages were presented in the SLR. These identify
methods researchers have used to model security systems, provide sets of applicable
elements and introduce methods of security measurement.
[187] presented SecML, a cybersecurity modelling language designed for appli-
cation in computer science, electrical engineering and other domains. SecML was
based upon UML and SysML combining aspects from both to provide a set of dia-
grams and models which describe cybersecurity concepts such as misuse-diagrams,
sequence diagrams and data interface diagrams.
Cross cutting elements (see Section 6.6.6) have been discussed in the context of
security models in architectural descriptions in [45]. In order to provide compartmen-
talisation and reduce the negative effects of cross-cutting elements on model-driven
development the authors provide a method which abstracts security features out of
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software modules into their own, self contained module. By doing so, these security
features are able to be reused and treated separately from the architecture, providing
compartmentalisation and promoting model-driven development.
A primary theme with cybersecurity modelling is the inclusion of probability to
enable the identification of risk and likelihood of an attack with mitigation strate-
gies in place (see Section 6.6.3 for more details). [190] and [189] discuss the inclu-
sion of statistical models in their work on the cybersecurity models CySeMoL and
P2CySeMoL (which is based on CySeMoL). A common method to achieve this was
to utilise a PRM which extend Bayesian networks to include concepts such as ob-
jects, relationships, and properties making them ideal for inclusion into modelling
language’s. P2CySeMoL extends PRM’s by utilising the P2AMF method which has
superior computation efficiency. A similar extension was provided for ArchiMate in
[167] who enabled availability analysis through embedding a PRM into the Archi-
Mate formalism.
Extending modelling languages to include statistical models for analysis has be-
come reasonably straight forward, however populating these models with the appro-
priate statistics is difficult for security analysts. There are several different knowledge
domains that an analyst may draw from - historical statistical data, expert opinion,
risk tolerance – and these have their own associated error probabilities. Methods
to identify what statistics are the least error prone and what their associated error
probability are would be useful.
6.4.3 Conclusions
In conclusion, there are many distinct security modelling methods used within ar-
chitectural design languages. Attack trees provide a method of identifying attack
paths and promote discussion regarding the mitigation strategy of the enterprise.
Attack graphs deliver quantifiable statistics regarding the number of attack paths,
their complexity, and the overall risk picture of a system. Attack graphs are often
very complex, lending themselves to abstraction in order to be readable.
EA models are often complex in and of themselves, maintaining different abstrac-
tion levels based on the architect and their objectives. For example, an architect who
is investigating the customer support processes in order to identify improvement op-
portunities would create a concrete model of these systems. On the other hand an
architect who wishes to represent the enterprise in its entirety might produce a more
abstract model, which represents customer support with less specific elements. How
can a security extension operate alongside these changes in abstraction level?
Statistical modelling is a popular analysis method in cybersecurity modelling,
usually utilising PRM’s or their modern equivalents. Enabling this analysis pro-
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vides a good platform to extract quantifiable information, however identifying what
statistics to use and, when statistics are absent, how to represent them is difficult.
6.5 Interview Insights
Interview findings are classified into two perspectives - the industry perspective
(Section 6.5.1) and governmental perspectives (Section 6.5.2).
6.5.1 Industry perspective
The industry perspective was gained talking to an enterprise who operates in the
vehicle services domain, providing rentable vehicle options to the public. This service
utilises an application in order to rent their vehicles and follows the same general
business structure utilised by many micromobility enterprises.
Third party security solutions
A primary finding is the application of third party technologies and solutions en-
abling SME to focus on their business service rather than underlying security im-
plications.
“One of our big views on security ... is that we actually just outsource
a lot of it. Our hardware box and the backing sort of API stack is a
software as a service product that we buy from a company in (another
country).”
Utilising third party hardware and/or software enables the enterprise to offload
a large percentage of the overhead associated with maintaining secure systems. This
proves beneficial if the enterprise does not have the resources, or personnel to imple-
ment such systems. These findings reinforce those from Section 6.2.1, which identified
that modelling solutions need to be developed that can describe these third party
systems.
Not all security is outsourced however, as the application which links together
consumers and vehicles is developed in house and requires its own security mecha-
nisms.
“A lot of the technology we’re building around [the application] side of
the business is proprietary because we think its really actually some of
the more valuable stuff and we do do that in house.”
An example security mechanism that was introduced in this domain is a facial
recognition system designed to disable identity fraud through the provided applica-
tion.
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“[We implemented a] piece of identity verification which is that we re-
quire a selfie now from everybody who signs up.”
This system further prevents identity fraud on their application platform. Addi-
tional application security primary revolved around data sharing and privacy.
External data sharing, required by government and councils where the enterprise
operates, require data to be sanitised - aggregating data to data points such as
total number of users, number of trips, and geographical area the trips took place.
Internal data sharing follows identified processes in which are designed to reduce
the likelihood of data misuse. Methods such as anonymised data exports and the
separation of customers from trend statistics are used to reduce privacy risk.
“...Everything we have is stored in a single cloud provider and we have
one copy that lives with our vendor in the Europe region and one copy,
which is our copy which lives in the Pacific region. We don’t give access
internally to anything [similar to that] of big data type ... without that
being like logged or like obfuscated in such a way that you couldn’t really
[enable big data analytics].”
Primary security concerns
Two primary security concerns were identified, identify fraud and physical modifi-
cation of the provided device.
“The biggest [security concern] that we have had has been identity theft
and the like. ... [As well as] the concept of someone who might have a
valid identity with a valid driver’s licence and everything, but he was
actually just signing up just to take [a vehicle] for a joy ride.”
This presents an attack vector (identity fraud) which was not discussed during
the SLR, which may be a primary consideration for micromobility enterprises. This
highlights some of the disconnect between what research and industry consider to
be primary security considerations. In industry this can extend to cases in which
individuals misuse the offered service in ways not explored by research.
These cases may not be explored in research due to the fact that these actions
may not be negative to the service itself, but are not in line with the enterprises
social values.
Physical modification and theft of small micromobility vehicles was also identified
as a primary risk, highlighting the fact that it is relatively easy to disable an electric
scooter through disconnecting their power sources.
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Geolocation Data
Geolocation data was identified as an integral aspect of the services operation, sup-
porting the findings of Section 6.3.2.
“We do have the ability to monitor where [vehicles] are in real time.
Yeah we have reasonable levels of access to that internally. ... We [have
a need] to monitor things.”
These services require to monitor their vehicles to reduce the risk of many fac-
tors such as theft and other criminal activities. Continuous geographical data is
uploaded live to service analysts who can monitor, and remotely control aspects of
their vehicles in order to protect their investments.
“Every sort of ten seconds, we have a GPS output of were the [vehicle]
is and how fast its going.”
General trends in research show a good alignment with industry on the topic
of geolocation data (Section 6.6.2) however, perspective often changes between the
protection of the asset vs. the consumers.
6.5.2 Governmental perspective
The governmental perspective was gained by interviewing a transport engineer who
works in relevant fields in a government department.
Licensing Agreements and Data Sharing
External data sharing is often required in licensing agreements between micromo-
bility enterprises and local governmental bodies.
“There is a lot of stuff to do with sharing with local councils, and I
know from a perspective of our research, we found that [there isn’t]
necessarily consistent information sharing with those councils about like
where micromobility are being used and how often, and by who.”
This can become cumbersome if an enterprise operates in many geographical
regions, it may need to provide different sets of data for each council as the type
and format of information required by each is not consistent.
“But that’s definitely something that we came to encourage to be done
more consistently nationally, but obviously that requires data security
stuff to be reasonably built at the point you’re going to be sharing it.”
From the perspective of micromobility enterprises external data sharing is of
much more import than other domains due to these governmental licensing require-
ments. This should be reflected in EA models with modelling tools able to identify
data lifecycle and data handling.
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Policy, Technology development and Regulation
Regulatory policy on micromobility technology often incurs a lag between the tech-
nology being implemented and new policy regarding the technology.
“Things like micromobility pose quite a challenge in that regard because
they are developing faster than policy can keep up.”
This can provide a challenge for micromobility enterprises who may need to
alter their business model to meet new policy or may need to meet different policy
requirements from geographical location to geographical location.
With the quick evolution of micromobility technology comes quickly evolving
security considerations. EA and security modelling solutions leveraged in this area
need to promote these agile considerations.
“[micromobilities] evolve at a faster rate compared to the rest of trans-
port - [other transport modes] don’t really evolve very fast at all.”
Equity and Access
One primary aspect of licensing agreements is the provision of Equity and Access.
This encompasses the initiative to provide transportation options within disadvan-
taged demographics. Micromobility enterprises are uniquely equipped to enable this,
providing affordable transportation options which can be used for commute and
other transportation purposes.
“Equity and access are [key well-being outcomes] and in some ways,
micromobility plays quite well into that”
Disadvantaged communities however, usually exhibit higher levels of vandalism,
theft and general crime, increasing the risk probability of damage to micromobility
vehicles. This stresses the importance of physical security of these vehicles as outlined
in Section 6.2.1.
“In terms of the security stuff that’s a big issue for equity of access,
particularly in terms of things getting stolen or broken or any of that.
Yeah, so it’s a sort of physical issue.”
6.5.2.1 Conclusions
Four primary findings impact a potential modelling solution for the EA of micro-
mobility enterprises. Firstly, third party security solutions and technology may be
implemented into portions of a micromobility enterprise. As such, methods of in-
cluding these entities in their EA structure should be implemented.
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Second, external and internal data sharing lifecycle’s and processes need to be
given special attention due to the relationships micromobility enterprises foster with
governmental bodies. Modelling solutions should provide clear and distinct elements
design to describe these unique processes.
Third, equity of access is a key objective for governing transportation agencies,
as such the technology implemented should implement physical security mechanisms
which need to be reflected within their models.
Finally, with quickly evolving micromobility technology, policy and legislation
will lag behind their applications. This means an agile enterprise structure and mod-
elling approach is more valuable as new restrictions and modifications will become
apparent in the future.
These findings are based off a limited number of interviews and as such do
not describe the full scale of micromobility enterprise and governmental policy on
micromobility enterprises. As such, a future study dedicated to this topic would be
valuable and provide a strong direction for future research.
6.6 Overall Observations
This Section serves to highlight dominant themes and pertinent discussion found
within the SLR literature. First, safety is discussed due to its strong relationship to
security in the vehicle domain. Second, privacy in MaaS industry is discussed. Third,
enabling quantitative models through probabilistic modelling is discussed due to the
methods prevalence. Forth, architectural automation – and by extension, enterprise
agility – is discussed. Fifth, observations regarding Architectural Frameworks and
associated layers are provided. Finally, a discussion on cross cutting elements is
provided.
6.6.1 Safety as a growing concern
Security research on IoT/CPS technologies, especially when regarding smart trans-
portation, has increasingly become coupled with safety and how these aspects can
be treated with respect to each other. This can be seen in the increasing number of
recent publications regarding security and safety co-engineering methods [74] [107]
[67] [131] of which half investigate the specific context of connected vehicles. Aside
from this, other primary papers [76] [171] observe the increasing number of safety
and security modelling techniques and, an increasing number of attack description
methods which increase their scope to include safety related concepts.
Defining security and safety can be difficult as they are closely joined domains.
For example, encryption on phone calls can be thought of as a security mechanism
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but it also enables the safety of the users conversations, and by extension the user
themselves. In this way safety can be thought of as a goal or quality that security
mechanisms aim to provide. The issue with this is that it does not identify situations
in which two viewpoints, such as risk to an enterprise and risk to a customer, may
be opposing. Take enterprise x who offers an electric scooter for rent in zone a. If a
user rides this scooter out of zone a what behaviour should the security mechanism,
designed to stop theft and maintain zoning exhibit? In regards to the physical safety
of the individual certain behaviours can be ruled out. In this way safety is used as a
framework in order to answer potentially ambiguous questions regarding the security
of the enterprise and the safety of the customer.
By including safety in the discussion of security provides a way to identify secu-
rity mechanisms that promote the safety of the user while protecting the enterprises
investment. As it stands, micromobility enterprise would benefit from a joint secu-
rity/safety approach due to its deployment into public spaces and its inherent risk
of physical harm. Because of this, a security extension to ArchiMate for use in EA
should include aspects of both security and safety to enable these decisions to be
reflected in an EA documentation.
6.6.2 A new understanding of Privacy
With the advent of data hungry applications and technology privacy has quickly
become a popular topic in both the research and public domains. IoT and CPS tech-
nology is often categorised as an enabler of these data hungry applications ranging
from vehicular sensor networks reporting on road and environmental conditions to
smart speakers, bulbs, coffee machines and beyond. In this context, privacy is an
issue of covert surveillance [46] [57] [58] in which information is unknowing gathered
and utilised.
Privacy specific modelling elements have been proposed in research [60] [57] which
identify types of sensitive data (geolocation data, vehicular sensor data, behavioural
data) and identifies methods which promote consumer privacy. Other works, such as
[57] and [59], provide guidelines to help organisations align themselves with govern-
mental privacy regulation and identify compliance benefits which can be born from
this [58].
Micromobility applications contain many points of interest from a privacy per-
spective. Primary aspects are geolocation data, data life cycles, data storage and
aggregation and, finally user and demographic data. As discussed in Section 6.3.2,
geolocation data is a primary enabler of the micromobility enterprise business model,
providing information for distribution, vehicle recovery, non-repudiation, and other
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applications. Because of this, methods such as optimising data lifecycles to pro-
mote privacy, data aggregation, data sanitation, and customer informing techniques
(Terms of Service, etc,.) become an important aspect of their operation. Because of
this, a security modelling extension should support the modelling of these processes,
outlining the transformation data goes through to provide a clear understanding of
any vulnerabilities there are in the enterprises approach to privacy.
6.6.3 Probability and modelling
A consistent theme throughout security formal modelling research is the inclusion
of probability models in order to derive probability metrics (see Sections 6.1.2 and
6.4.2). Five primary papers enable probability analysis, [175], [178], [189], [190] and,
[167].
Three of these papers implement PRM’s or extensions of PRM’s (P2AMF). [189]
integrated PRM into the cybersecurity language CySeMoL in order to analyse enter-
prise system architectures in regards to attack success rates. This was then extended
in [190], who interrogated P2AMF as a replacement for the previous PRM archi-
tecture to enable better computational performance. Finally, [167] utilised a PRM
to enable availability analysis on fault tree structures (Section 6.4.1 on fault tree
structures).
Other than PRM’s, researchers have used base Bayesian networks and other
methods to encode probability statistics into their models. Kordy et al. [175] im-
plements a form of probability evaluation through encoding Bayesian networks into
AD-trees in order to evaluate probabilistic factors. Khouzani et al. [178] encodes
probability by associating a probability metric with each edge in an attack graph
with the factor representing the success rate of an action occurring.
It is clear that using probability modelling is a popular choice within security
modelling, enabling analysis to manage security risk by identifying likely attacks,
providing targets for mitigation within an organisation. Its weaknesses stem from the
knowledge bases of which these probabilities are taken when informing the model.
Each probability factor has its own probability regarding the amount of trust the
analyst has in it accurately representing attack statistics. For example, historical
statistics regarding DDoS attacks from 2010 would not be relevant in today’s ecosys-
tem. Because of this it is important to also measure the error of the probabilistic
model, acknowledging the potential risk of using an out of date model.
Including probability analysis into security modelling in the context of EA pro-
vides an interesting question. Is it feasible to provide an extension to the ArchiMate
language which includes a self-contained probabilistic model for analysis while be-
ing included into the overall architectural description? Researchers have already
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provided an ArchiMate extension including a probabilistic model ([167], see Section
6.1.2) targeted at availability analysis rather than security analysis. This solution
however requires a new model to be built specifically for the investigation of avail-
ability, it does however indicate that integrating probability models into ArchiMate
is possible and newer research on this topic could yield good results.
6.6.4 Automation of architectural descriptions
Automation provides a method of reducing the work required when describing an
architecture. In this way, automation encourages EA agility (Section 6.1.3), increas-
ing the speed that an architecture can be investigated. Automation methods were
discussed in Section 6.3.1, where [41] automatically identifies elements in an architec-
ture which must be reevaluated during risk analysis, and in Section 6.4.1 on attack
graphs, which utilise automated modelling to create formal models of an enterprises
security posture.
Two primary papers specifically provide automation methods for use in EA. [184]
designed the tool Automatic Designer which is able to produce architectural solu-
tions designed to provide security analysis. [182] designed a tool which automatically
gathers the data required to create enterprise models. To do this they utilise vul-
nerability and network scanners. These papers, and all other primary papers which
research automation, are relatively older in comparison to the majority of included
works. This could be due to a limitation regarding the applicability of each method
to specific enterprise contexts. EA, as a practice, is not standardised. The tools and
methods used change from architect to architect which makes it difficult to provide
an automation solution, which are usually quite ridged in terms of required input
and expected output, that is applicable to these different contexts.
Security modelling, however, does lend itself to automated modelling. Specifi-
cally, cyber security modelling (see Section 6.2.1) is able to be automated through
network and vulnerability scanners. This was utilised in [182] and underlines why au-
tomated processes are popular during the creation of attack graphs (Section 6.4.1).
Physical and social security are more difficult domains to map as they are not clas-
sically defined as security vulnerabilities, rather they are design aspects related to
security.
Automated safety modelling is more difficult than security modelling due to its
wider and more abstract scope. Falessi et al. [185] provides an interesting work which
extracts safety relevant slices from an architecture to aid in safety auditing. This is
achieved by using safety traceability mechanisms where each element or process has
a related safety requirement. These safety requirements can then be used to extract
each module that requires safety consideration.
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Automation proves to be a difficult tool to implement in an EA context as
architects are often trying to elicit specific information from a model, and frame
the model to provide this. Cyber security modelling specifically however lends itself
to automated modelling, providing an opportunity for a joint approach - joint EA
design and automated security modelling. This method would allow for the flexibility
that EA requires while providing a standardised security modelling approach which
can be implemented in security conscious EA applications.
6.6.5 Architectural Frameworks and Structure
During the SLR, IoT and CPS technology architectures were extracted to identify
different perspectives researchers and industry were using in their approaches. In
total 16 IoT architectures and nine CPS architectures were identified. These archi-
tectures are divided into categories based on how many layers they define.
Baloyi and Kotzé [46] identified that IoT architectures could often be categorised
as instantiations of CPS architectures which would indicate that their architectures
should be reasonably similar. Three layer CPS/IoT architectures express this, with
IoT architectures containing elements of CPS architectures. For example the CPS
layer Devices is analogous to the IoT layer Sensing. This pattern of analogous ter-
minology is common in frameworks with few layers.
As the granularity of the architecture increase by adding layers these similarities
become more difficult to identify. This is due to their application contexts having
more influence over each layer. For instance, data management in CPS applications
is contextually more important than IoT applications, and as such is included as a
layer in their technology architecture.
Similar effects can be seen within EA structure, however, as businesses are more
diverse than CPS/IoT technologies this effect is augmented with many different
architecture structures being plausible. Because of this, standardisation has been
a valuable asset in EA, with, for example, TOGAF providing a set of layers and
their descriptions for use in a business context. This can also serve as a limitation
as discussed in Section 6.6.6 in which viewpoints are unable to be fully realised with
the provided layer structure.
Observations have been made regarding the lack of security-centeric layers in
IIoT architectures [89], identifying security as an incompatible layer with the current
architectural perspective of IoT and CPS technologies. These limitations arise from
the chosen architectural drivers (what goal is the architecture achieving, Section
6.6.6) and the architectural multi-layer framing that is prevalent today.
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6.6.6 Architectural Drivers and Cross Cutting Elements
A primary theme and issue facing security modelling in EA and layered modelling
frameworks is that of cross-cutting elements. Cross-cutting elements are elements
or layers which run perpendicular to the provided layer framework. Good examples
of this can be found within the primary papers highlighted in RQ1. In Figure D.1
the cross cutting element security layer is shown clearly as a perpendicular element
to the Business, Application, Technology and Physical layers. Figure D.2 provides
a similar example however with the assurance layer rather than security.
Multi-view modelling primarily addresses complexity, compartmentalising the
structure of a domain into vertically interacting components. This provides a method
of visualisation, decomposition and shows a perspective of the domain which the ar-
chitect deems the most useful. Multi-view modelling however, can obscure important
components of a domain due to the chosen perspective. One such component is se-
curity, which if implemented in a model along-side traditional EA frameworks, is
either dispersed throughout the model [45] or presented as a cross cutting function
of the model [169] [165].
This effect is best described [108] where architectural views are associated to their
underlying architectural drivers (their motivations). When an architect designs an
architectural framework they identify architectural views (layers) which promote the
underlying motivation for providing the framework. This results in a certain archi-
tecture structure which enables the task which the architect is trying to perform.
EA’s underlying motivation is to describe an enterprises primary components and
structure, reflecting stakeholders needs and enabling the business to address their
business issues and needs. ArchiMate, TOG’s visual modelling language for EA,
exhibits this motivation in the form of five layers (ArchiMate full framework, 6.1).
Each layer provides infrastructure and value for the next with good consistency -
that is each layer has a very little degree of potential overlap.
ArchiMate’s full-framework also specifies a set of vertical elements, aspects. The
first three aspects, Passive structure, Behaviour and Active Structure are not clas-
sified as cross-cutting elements as they classify and organise elements within the
five identified layers. The Motivation aspect most closely resembles a cross cutting
element however constitutes an element with good consistency and does include el-
ements or concepts from within other layers. Compare this to security, an aspect of
an enterprise which can be instantiated within at least three of the current layers
(Implementation & Migration, Technology and Application layers). This leads to the
current problem in regards to implementing security in EA modelling, specifically
in the ArchiMate language.
If an architect wish’s to provide an emphasis on the security of their domain (such
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Figure 6.1: ArchiMate full framework (extracted from [2])
as micromobility enterprise) there is very little ArchiMate can offer them in terms of
value, leading them to utilise separate modelling methods to describe their security
posture. The introduction of the RSO provides a set of elements and relationships
designed to provide utility in security modelling which works well in isolated models,
however, as an integrated part of ArchiMate’s overview model, constitutes a complex
cross-cutting element relating multiple layers together.
This lack of consistency can affect the agility of ArchiMate’s approach, as well as
disabling the ability to present security as a primary consideration to stakeholders
in the context of the overall enterprise. This highlights a discontinuity in the multi-
view modelling approach for application in EA - EA provides governance on systems
and processes deemed contextually relevant to an enterprise’s success however does
not support viewpoints such as security being modelled together with business pro-
cesses. With security becoming increasingly important in an enterprise operation an
important question needs to be answered: How can security be represented along-
side traditional EA framework structure in order to provide insight and oversight
for stakeholders?
This question can be extended to other relevant concepts such as safety, privacy,
social responsibility and environmental viewpoints. These viewpoints, while impor-
tant to different enterprises depending on their context, all constitute aspects that
an architect may want to accent in their architecture which are cross-cutting and
lack consistency. Solutions discussed during the SLR either disregard inconsistencies
or provide security modelling without the wider context of EA (even works utilising
ArchiMate, a modelling tool for EA) during their presentation, as such new solutions
need to be investigating taking into account the issues mentioned above.
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6.7 Future Research
The SMS presented in this research has already been published in SEAA [1] and the
provided SLR is planned to be published mid 2021. Future research opportunities
identified through this research are provided below.
Addressing the cross cutting concerns discussed in Section 6.6.6 one possible
research direction is the encoding of cross cutting viewpoints (security, safety) as
parameters into elements constituting the model, thus providing a way to view the
model from different dimensions. While these dimensions are not visually encoded
into the model, they provide the traceability needed to transform the model during
stakeholder interactions to present the topic under question. Consistency in this
context is extended into two attributes, visual consistency and virtual consistency
where virtual consistency identifies how many dimensions the element belongs to.
The encoding process may be implemented in many ways - Boolean expressions
or discrete values which identify the strength of an elements relationship to the
represented dimension, allowing for even more flexibility during analysis.
The modelling concepts instantiated within ArchiMate are motivated from as-
pects of TOGAF, as it was developed to provide utility to the overall architecture
framework. As such, research investigating the architecture frameworks themselves
(E.g TOGAF, SABSA) may provide information on how systemic security support
may be integrated within the underlying framework. This possible method would
be useful in conjunction with the dimensional modelling solution described above.
Together, these research topics would provide a stable security modelling solution
with structural support from the architecture framework and tooling support from
ArchiMate.
The relationship between safety and security is not well defined within both
academic research and industry standards. As such, it can be difficult integrating
these concepts into models which may benefit from including both perspectives. Se-
curity modelling of micromobility, and MaaS industries would benefit from research
investigating the interplay between security considerations/mechanisms and safety
considerations/mechanisms, providing a framework to identify how safety concerns
motivate security and safety quality attributes.
Further interviews within industry and government need to be performed in or-
der to align research to current trends. This would be particularly useful for the
micromobility and MaaS contexts due to the lack of industry standards associated
with them. The context of EA also needs to be more thoroughly explored from the
perspective of industry. Many tools and methods have been proposed in ArchiMate
for use in EA, but the uptake and general utility of these extensions are unknown
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in industry. Larger interview studies in these areas would provide the required un-
derstanding and contextualisation for future research.
There is an appetite in academia to enable quantitative modelling through inte-
grating probability models within ArchiMate. Further interviews would indicate the
value in this approach, and if there is also an appetite in industry, potential solutions
which integrate EA modelling and probabilistic models should be done. Integrating
probabilistic models into EA models is complicated by the fact that core elements
in an EA model may not have statistical information regarding them (either due to
the nature of the element, or due to a lack of historical data, for example). Research
discussing how incomplete probabilistic models, in the context of EA, would be a




This research was designed to investigate the intersection between micromobility
enterprise, EA, and security modelling. Micromobility, as a research topic is becom-
ing increasing desirable as a growing number of MaaS enterprises begin operating
around the world. These transport alternatives are driven by recent advances in
IoT, CPS and connected vehicle technologies, providing the risk mitigation needed
to enable these business models. With these quick advances however, comes a lag
in domain specific research, industry standardisation, and governmental policy pro-
viding a valuable opportunity to investigate this unique context.
To answer the research question – “How can EA provide security modelling util-
ity in a micromobility context?” – a three component methodology was designed,
consisting of an SMS study, an SLR study, and industry interviews. This method-
ology was selected due to a confluence of factors: micromobility specific research
was sparse, reviews provide the flexibility required when investigating new contexts,
and these methods provide a strong foundation for future research. The SLR study
constitutes the primary contribution of this research.
In total, the SMS returned 13 primary papers and provided feedback on candi-
date SLR method configurations. Using these findings the SLR was modified and
run, identifying a total of 71 primary papers for synthesis. The SLR synthesis was
enriched with three interviews from government and industry sectors. These results,
and discussions of future work, are provided in Chapter 6. Four research questions
were designed for the SLR identifying the current state-of-the-art methods for se-
curity modelling in ArchiMate (RQ1), micromobility security aspects (RQ2), mi-
cromobility security strategies (RQ3) and finally, architectural design and security
modelling support (RQ4). These research questions cover primary areas of knowl-
edge in terms of micromobility security and security modelling.
RQ1 identified a set of research which provides security modelling methods in
ArchiMate. Two general methods were utilised when providing security modelling
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in ArchiMate. First, the reuse of existing ArchiMate elements and relations to en-
able security modelling and second, the creation and addition of new elements and
relations to support security modelling. Two issues arose in regards to it, first, the
application of the provided security solutions were very contextual, and therefore
were unable to be applied outside of those contexts. Second, the security solutions
were often not designed with regard to EA, making it difficult to migrate their
solutions to an EA context.
RQ2 provided two primary insights - micromobility applicable attack vectors
defined in research and, previously utilised and instantiated security modelling ele-
ments developed in similar application domains. These insights simultaneously iden-
tify real world attack contexts in regard to micromobility and methods of modelling
these. Overall, while cyber attacks are the majority of the identified attack vectors
micromobility uniquely diverges from general IoT/CPS applications with an empha-
sis on physical security. Social security consisted of the least research, however, dur-
ing interviews new security considerations such as identity fraud were identified as a
primary security consideration. The majority of extracted modelling elements were
defined in parallel application contexts such as the connected vehicle domain, mod-
elling connected vehicles/AV. As micromobility vehicles are a subset of connected
vehicle/AV vehicles, some of these elements are applicable within the micromobility
domain.
RQ3 identified security strategies, solutions and standards used to mitigate at-
tack vectors described in RQ2, and provides information on what processes may need
to be modelled when describing the security posture of a micromobility enterprise.
A set of security methods, technical solutions and micromobility applicable indus-
try standards were extracted from research. A primary finding is the discussion and
development of closely coupled security and safety engineering methods for applica-
tion in vehicular contexts. This aligns well with micromobility enterprise due to the
physical service they offer, elevating the importance of safety in their application.
This theme is extended to industry standards, with many safety and security stan-
dards being used to educate engineering methods. These standards however were
developed in unrelated fields, which outlines the current lack of standardisation for
safety and security engineering in the smart vehicle domain. The identified technical
solutions provide a set of possible solutions that an architect may wish to repre-
sent in their model, and act as a method for measuring the coverage of a proposed
security modelling solution.
RQ4 discussed security modelling methods and contributed three primary in-
sights into attack/defence modelling, architectural automation and cybersecurity
modelling languages. Two primary forms of attack representations were categorised
- attack trees and graphs. These have been researched extensively and provided
methods eliciting both qualitative (attack trees) and quantitative information (at-
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tack graphs). Many of the discussed cybersecurity modelling languages implement
a form of attack graph, enabling the quantitative analysis of attack scenarios - usu-
ally through probability metrics. Architectural automation and security modelling
showed unexpected correlation as many architectural processes used security vulner-
ability scanners in order to map and model enterprise systems. These findings explore
security representation and modelling, providing information on current practices,
and outlining methods which achieve the desired security modelling outcomes.
7.1 Future Work
Future research should focus on addressing the core issue of cross-cutting security
elements, and more generally, how to include cross-cutting domains (security, safety,
environmental) into EA structures. This research needs to understand both the
modelling tools – ArchiMate – and the underlying architecture frameworks in order
to provide systemic reflections of these cross-cutting domains.
Periphery future work includes defining the relationship between the concepts
of security and safety – a definition that is becoming increasingly important as
complex technology becomes increasingly responsible for physical and cyber safety.
A definition, providing clarification on which motivation an element in a model
(say an IDS) should fall under (safety or security) would be valuable for industry
professionals, researchers, and policy makers.
Further research reflecting the current state of industry needs to be performed.
Currently there is little information on what EA methods are being utilised, and how
practitioners are using the provided tooling (ArchiMate). Interviews within industry
need to be performed to align academic research with industry.
Finally, a future research opportunity regards integrating quantitative modelling
into qualitative modelling methods. How can quantitative probabilistic models be
included within a tool such as ArchiMate without increasing the complexity of the
model? Further, how can you provide an incomplete statistical model, and still
provide useful – and not misleading – metrics?
7.2 Final thoughts
In conclusion, four primary contributions are made by this research. First, a mapping
of current micromobility research is provided through the SMS study – outlining the
current lack of micromobility specific research, a direct consequence of the technolo-
gies quick integration and development. This lack of micromobility research outlines
the second contribution: the initial identification and definition of a micromobility
security landscape through identifying relevant security considerations from parallel
183
7.2. FINAL THOUGHTS CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION
and intersecting domains such as IoT/CPS/AV/connected vehicle. The third con-
tribution of this research is the insight gained through interviews with industry and
government, enriching the understanding of MaaS and micromobility enterprise. Fi-
nally, the primary contribution of this research is the SLR, identifying and discussing
the current state of security modelling in EA and micromobility security concerns.




5W1H Who, What, When, Where, Why and How.
AD Axiomatic Design.
AD Trees Attack/Defence Trees.
AI Artificial Intelligence.
API Application Programming Interface.
APP Acronym undefined in referencing article.
APPI African Protection of Personal Information act.
ARP Address Resolution Protocol.
ARP* Aerospace Recommended Practice.
ATM Air Traffic Management.
ATSyRA Attack Tree Synthesis for Risk Analysis.
AV Autonomous Vehicle.
AVES Automated Vehicles safety and security analysis framework.
BLE Bluetooth Low Energy.
BPM Business Process Management.
BPNN Back Propagation Neural Network.
BPRIM Business Process Risk Integrated Method.
CA-ISFAM Cluster Adapted Information Security Focus Area Model.
CAD Computer Aided Design.
CAN Controller Area Network.
CAPEC Common Attack Patterns Enumeration and Classification assurance strate-
gic initiative.
CHASSIS Combined Harm Assessment of Safety and Security for Information
Systems.
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability.
CPS Cyber Physical Systems.
CRAF Cyber Risk Assessment Framework.
CS Cuckoo Search.
CWE Common Weakness Enumeration.




DBaaS Data Base as a Service.
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service.
DISCOA Distributed Coordinated Adaptations.
DoDAF Department of Defence (US) Architecture Framework.
DoS Denial of Service.
DS Database Security.
DSL Domain Specific Languages.
DSM Design Structure Matrix.
DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security.
EA Enterprise Architecture.
ECSS European Cooperation for Space Standardisation.
ECU Electronic Control Unit.
eEPC extended Event-driven Process Chain.
EN European Standards.
ERM Enterprise Risk Management.
ES-C2M2 Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model.
EUC Equipment Under Control.
EV electric vehicle.
FACT Failure Attack Countermeasures.
FAMM Focus Area Maturity Model.
FEAF Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework.
FEC Fog Edge Computing.
FECIoT Fog Edge Computing Internet of Things.
FR Functional Requirements.
FRAM Functional Resonance Analysis Method.
GPS Global Positioning System.
GSM Global System for Mobile communications.
HSM Hidden Structure Method.
IACS Industrial Automation and Control Systems.
ICAMP IoT and CPS Architecture based Model for data Privacy.
IDPS Intrusion Detection and Prevention System.
IDS Intrusion Detection System.
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission.
IIoT Industrial Internet of Things.
IMSA Intra Model Security Assurance.
IoT Internet of Things.
ISA International Standards on Auditing.
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ISFAM Information Security Focus Area Model.
ISO International Organisation for Standardisation.
IT Information Technology.
LAN Local Area Network.
LDP Local Differential Privacy.
LINDDUN Linkability, Identifiability, Non-repudiation, Detectability, Disclosure
of the information, Unawareness, Non-compliance.
LTE-A Long Term Evolution Advanced.
MaaS Mobility as a Service.
MAL Meta Attack Language.
MARIA Model of ATM Reality in Action.
MBSE Model Based System Engineering.
MCDA Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis.
MITM Man In The Middle.
MVS Metrics Visualisation System.
NFC Near Field Communication.
NICE National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education Capability Maturity Model.
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology.
NOP No Operation.
O-ISM3 Open Information Security Management Maturity Model.
P2AMF Predictive Probabilistic Architecture Modelling Framework.
P2CySeMoL Predictive Probabilistic Cyber Security Modelling Language.
PAS Publicly Available Standardisation.
PPSA Privacy Preserving Subset Aggregation.
PRM Probabilistic Relational Model.
R-BPM Risk aware Business Process Management.
RA Risk Assessment.
RAMS Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, Safety.
RDF Resource Description Framework.
RFID Radio Frequency Identification.
ROI Return On Investment.
RSO Risk and Security Overlay.
SABSA Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture.
SADT Structured Analysis and Design Technique.
SAE Society of Automotive Engineers.
SARA Security Automative Risk Analysis.
SARSA State Action Reward State Action.
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SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition.
SDL Security Development Lifecycle.
SEAA Software Engineering and Advanced Applications.
SecML Security Modelling Language.
SFA Signal Flow Analysis.
SIG Soft goal Interdependence Graph.
SLR Systematic Literature Review.
SME Small, Medium Enterprises.
SMS Systematic Mapping Study.
SOTIF Safety Of The Intended Functionality.
SQL Structured Query Language.
SQuaRE Systems and Software Quality Requirements and Evaluation.
SSL Secure Socket Layer.
STPA Systems Theoretic Process Approach.
STRIDE Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Ser-
vice, Elevation of Privilege.
SV Security Vulnerability.
SysML Systems Modelling Language.
TaaS Transport as a Service.
TCP Transmission Control Protocol.
TCU Telematics Control Unit.
TLS Transport Layer Security.
TOG The Open Group.
TOGAF The Open Group Architecture Framework.
TREsPASS Technology-supported Risk Estimation by Predictive Assessment of
Socio-technical Security.
UAF Unified Architecture Framework.
UDP User Datagram Protocol.
UFoI-E Uncontrolled Flows of Information and Energy method.
UWB Ultra Wide Band.
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[138] V. Hernández, L. López, O. Prieto, J. F. Mart́ınez, A. B. Garćıa, and A.
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• What are the primary security concerns that micromobility enterprise need to
tackle?
Question Two:
• Micromobility services are primarily enabled through smart devices and ap-
plications. What security considerations are relevant in this domain?
Question Three:
• One important way that micromobility enterprise differs from other businesses
is that they provide devices that are placed in the public domain. How does
this aspect effect security considerations?
Question Four:
• What processes are used when deciding on security features?
Enterprise Architecture Modelling
Question Six:
• Do you use visual enterprise architecture modelling?
– What languages are used in your models?
∗ What primary benefits are you looking for when deciding on the
modelling language?
– Do these models involve domain layers?
∗ What and how many layers constitute these models?
– What are the motivations/benefits if these models? Who are the stake-
holders?
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– Do you use any other documentation to describe the enterprises struc-
ture?
Security integration into EA modelling
Question Seven:
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Figure C.1: Nvivo classifications for RQ1
Figure C.2: Nvivo classifications for RQ2
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Figure C.3: Nvivo classifications for RQ3





APPENDIX D. CROSS CUTTING EXAMPLES

































































Figure E.1: Attack graph before abstraction (extracted from [177])
220
APPENDIX E. ATTACK GRAPH ABSTRACTION
Figure E.2: Attack graph after abstraction (extracted from [177])
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